SPLM OFFICIAL: ARREST, TORTURE AND POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 000158

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PREF SU ER
SUBJECT: SPLM OFFICIAL: ARREST, TORTURE AND POLITICAL
MACHINATIONS BY NCP SECURITY

REF: KHARTOUM 169

ASMARA 00000158 001.3 OF 003


Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD K. MCMULLEN FOR REASON 1.4(d).


1. (C) Summary: On March 13, DCM met with Amar Najm Eddine
al-Jak (Amar),a Khartoum spokesman for the Sudanese People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM),who had been spirited from Sudan
to Asmara by the SPLM after being arrested and tortured by
Sudanese National Security services (reftel). Amar relayed
the details of his arrest and interrogation on November 20,
his two-month detention in a Sudanese political prison, and
his eventual release and departure to Eritrea. Under
torture, Amar stated he was forced into making a false taped
"confession" that the SPLM leadership was plotting with
Darfuri SLA leader Abdulwahid Nur to provoke an insurrection
in Nubia. He also relayed his conversations in prison with
two incarcerated Chadian rebels, one of whom claimed the
Chadian opposition was being funded by China, and an incident
in which Sudanese prison official hid Ethiopian and Eritrean
prisoners during an Amnesty International visit (to be
reported septels). End Summary.

BIO NOTE
--------------


2. (C) Amar, a young man in his 20s and a Nubian Muslim, has
been serving in the position of Secretary of Media and
Culture for the SPLM in the Khartoum region since August

2006. Prior to his membership in the SPLM, he had been part
of the Sudanese Alliance Forces which had merged with the
SPLM several years before. Amar maintains close contacts
with Khartoum-based student leaders of the umbrella group,
"Youth for a New Sudan" to include students in groups
supporting SLA Abdulwahid's faction.

ARREST, INTERROGATION, TORTURE, AND ATTEMPTED BRIBERY
-------------- --------------


3. (C) On the morning of November 20, Amar was arrested at
Khartoum's airport while waiting to fly to Juba on personal
and SPLM business. Without a warrant or explanation, Amar
stated that National Security officials removed him forcibly
from the airport and transported him to their office located
at Khartoum Bahry. Prior to leaving the airport, Amar was
able to text his wife and phone SPLM contacts to tell them
what was happening.


4. (C) Upon arrival at Khartoum Bahry, two National Security
officials began immediately beating Amar with electric
cord/wire, "to psychologically soften me up for
interrogation," Amar commented. He then described a day-long
ordeal of torture interspersed with interrogations, including
his transfer to a different facility in which he was forced
to stand for a half hour in a water tank in which the
temperatures alternated between near-boiling to
near-freezing. During the day, National Security
interrogators questioned Amar about the number of SPLM
members in Khartoum, the group's sources of funding, and
other organizational questions. He also was questioned
closely about his relationship with Abdulwahid and his
relationship with the SLA faction. His interrogators accused
Amar of planning to fly onward to Nairobi through Juba,
stating his real objective had been to meet Abdulwahid in
Kenya in order to plan an armed insurrection in Nubia.
According to the officials, Abdulwahid was to provide Amar
with guns and support for this insurrection. The
interrogators ordered Amar to telephone two Khartoum student
leaders, members of organizations supporting Abdulwahid and
personal friends of Amar's, in order to set up a meeting with
them.


5. (C) Amar refused throughout the day to answer his
interrogators' questions or to contact his friends, despite
the beatings. Late that evening, he was taken to an office
presided over by four National Security officials with a tape
recorder. Amar was told to state, on tape, that SPLM leaders
Yassir Arman and Malik Agar had asked him to go to Nairobi to
meet with Abdulwahid to start an armed struggle in Nubia. He
was also told to mention that Yassir and Malik had ordered
other SPLM cadres to travel to Asmara and London to meet with
Abdulwahid's supporters. When Amar refused to make these
statements, he was sexually molested, after which Amar said
he "collapsed" and provided the National Security officials
with the statements they had demanded. He was then
transported to Kobar Prison and placed in solitary
confinement.

ASMARA 00000158 002.3 OF 003




6. (C) The following morning, Amar was transported back to
the Khartoum Bahry offices for continued questioning about
the SPLM and its relationship with Abdulwahid. At one
juncture, Amar's interrogators offered him $20,000 if he
would meet with Yassir and Malik fr drinks. Once they were
incapacitated by alcohol, Amar was supposed to "rape" them
and take photos on a mobile phone camera. Amar refused. In
early evening, Amar was told that he would be meeting with an
SPLM representative and warned not to mention that he had
been mistreated in any way. When the alleged SPLM
representative arrived, Amar repeated his "confession,"
making no mention of any torture. (Note: Amar said that he
did not know the SPLM representative and after his release,
made inquiries. None of his SPLM contacts recognized the
officer's name either. End Note.) After the interview, Amar
was incarcerated in Kobar prison for four days with no
further questioning. Around November 25, Amar was
blindfolded, loaded into a mini-bus and taken to Dabak
Prison, a facility Amar described as a "political prison"
located in northern Khartoum, where he was imprisoned in a
shipping container with three other men.

FORCED DENUNCIATION BY FRIEND
--------------


7. (C) In mid-December, Amar was transported again to
Khartoum Bahry. Shortly after arrival, National Security
officials brought out two student leaders, the same
individuals which Amar had refused to contact during the
November 20 interrogation. A National Security official
asked one of the students if Amar had been planning to meet
Abdulwahid in November in order to plan an insurrection. The
student leader responded, "yes," and both men were taken from
the room. (Note: Amar believes that the student had been
tortured into making this statement. End Note.) Amar was
then beaten severely, and transported back to Dabak Prison
where he remained for another month.

OUT OF PRISON BUT UNDER SCRUTINY
--------------


8. (C) On January 23, Amar was told he would be released
following a meeting that evening with General Majak (National
Security second-in-command and SPLM member) at the National
Security offices at the airport. En route, Amar was warned
not to mention any incidents of torture, or he would be
re-imprisoned. Amar was taken into a meeting with SPLM and
National Congress Party (NCP) representatives to include
General Majak, Major General Al Hadi, and Vice President Ali
Osman Taha. Amar speculated that this high level meeting
resulted from public pressure by the SPLM, Sudanese and
international media, and the UK Embassy about his case. At
the meeting, Amar was informed that he was being released;
however, meeting participants also noted that he was
considered a threat to national security given his plotting
to inspire an uprising. Amar stated that all participants
appeared to have been given his taped "confession," and he
did not dare to refute the charges in this meeting.


9. (C) Several days later, Amar began talking to the SPLM
leadership and media about his incarceration and torture,
which included an interview on the UN's radio, "Maraya." On
the evening of February 6, Amar was driving in the Kalatya
neighborhood, when his car was suddenly blocked in by another
car. Recognizing one of his interrogators in the other
vehicle, Amar jumped out of his car and began running through
the neighborhood chased by several men. By chance, he ran
into a friend who drove him to the house of Presidential
Advisor Mansur Khalid who provided him temporary safe haven.
The following day, Amar met with SPLM Deputy Secretary
General Yassir Arman. Noting that the SPLM could not protect
him, Yassir said Amar had two choices: either confront the
NCP and National Security apparatus in court, or flee the
country. Yassir advised him to leave the country. From that
point onward, Amar kept moving between houses of friends and
eventually traveled to Kassala - where, with the help of the
SPLM, he crossed the border and arrived in Asmara. Since
late February, SPLM representatives and employees of an
Asmara-based Sudanese NGO have sheltered Amar in Asmara. On
March 18, Amar flew to Cairo to obtain medical treatment,
although he noted that he did not plan to stay there long,
fearing that the Egyptian security services might deport him
back to Sudan.

COMMENT

ASMARA 00000158 003.4 OF 003


--------------


10. (C) This interview was facilitated by Dr. Taisier Ali, a
respected, exiled Sudanese academic who runs the Asmara-based
NGO, Peacebuilding Center for the Horn of Africa (PCHA). Dr.
Taisier believes Amar was targeted by the Sudanese security
services precisely because he is a northern SPLM member.
According to Taisier, the NCP seeks to contain the SPLM to
the South, and in advance of national elections, is actively
working to prevent the expansion of its influence into the
North and Darfur. In support of this assessment, Amar noted
that during his interrogations, he was accused repeatedly of
betraying both Islam and the Nubians by his SPLM membership.
The Khartoum regime regards Muslims in the SPLM such as
Yassir Arman and Malik Agar with particular scorn and
suspicion.


11. (C) Amar's severe torture is a grim reminder of the
brutality of the Khartoum regime. Amar was likely targeted
specifically because of his leadership role in coordinating
between the SPLM and the SLM, as Khartoum's greatest fear is
the intersection of the North-South and Darfur conflicts.
The torture also occurred during the SPLM's October-December
2007 walkout from the Government of National Unity (GNU) at a
point when both parties seemed to be heading toward military
confrontation, and while the SPLM was directly engaged in
helping several Darfur rebel factions unify in Juba (rebel
unification is something Khartoum actively tries to prevent).


12. (C) Several PCHA employees sat in and interpreted for the
interview. Dr. Taisier and the PCHA clearly deemed Amar's
narrative to be highly credible.


13. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Khartoum.
MCMULLEN