FRAUD SUMMARY: ASHGABAT, Q4 2007

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASHGABAT 000178

SIPDIS

PASS TO KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR CA/FPP (E. HOLMES),SCA/CEN (R. SNELSIRE)
FRANKFURT FOR RCO (R. BROWN)
ASTANA FOR LEGATT (H. LEADBETTER)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC CVIS CPAS CMGT KFRD TX

SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY: ASHGABAT, Q4 2007

REF: (A) 07 STATE 171211 (B) MOSCOW 150


1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public Internet.


2. (U) Embassy Ashgabat submits this quarterly consular fraud
report for the period October through December 2007 as requested in
reftel A.

COUNTRY CONDITIONS


3. (SBU) Turkmenistan is experiencing important social, political
and economic changes following the December 2006 death of Saparmurat
Niyazov, the autocratic president who had ruled since before its
independence in 1991. Despite these changes, Turkmenistan remains
behind its CIS counterparts in terms of modernization of its
economic, banking, communications, and technological capabilities.
Turkmenistan is moving to catch up with the 21st century, but has a
way to go. Unemployment is high, and salaries are low, even by
regional standards. For example, a middle-class professional
(teacher, doctor, government official) would be expected to have a
monthly salary of about $150-$200 USD.


4. (SBU) Following a coup attempt in 2002, Niyazov ordered a freeze
on the issuance of email accounts. Public Internet access, apart
from American Corners and other cultural venues sponsored by foreign
governments, did not exist. While a number of public Internet cafes
have opened in the last year, the general public remains fairly
"unplugged" and unfamiliar with the Internet in general. Most visa
applicants are unable to fill out their electronic visa applications
without assistance, often paying for this help.


5. (SBU) Turkmenistan remains a cash-based economy, making it very
difficult to assess applicant's relative net worth and income. Most
Turkmen do not use banks to store their savings or manage their
business finances. Often, applicants open bank accounts for one
day, right before their visa interviews, for the sole purpose of
having the bank issue a statement letter for their interviews.
These letters are basically worthless as evidence of bona fide
assets. Tax records are available, but only slightly more helpful
than the one-day bank statements, since local tax authorities are
often corrupt and income is generally underreported or unreported
altogether.


6. (SBU) For many bona fide students, payment of SEVIS, TOEFL and
other fees poses an additional logistical hurdle, as credit cards
are not widely used in Turkmenistan, and Western Union claims it can
only transfer money to a person, that it is prohibited by local law
from transferring money to a corporate entity or an organization.
Peace Corps volunteers have reported paying SEVIS and TOEFL fees for
their students using their own personal credit cards, because none
of their parents had cards of their own.


7. (SBU) The majority of fraud cases come from Lebap province
bordering Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, with applicants from Ashgabat
coming in a close second. There are relatively few fraudulent
applicants from Mary, Dashoguz, Ahal and Balkan provinces. The
level of nonimmigrant visa fraud is medium, while levels of other
types of fraud discussed below are low.

NIV FRAUD


8. (SBU) The vast majority of NIV fraud cases are refused under
section 214b of the Immigration and Nationality Act, however, Post
continues to investigate these cases for possible ties to labor
traffickers and other criminal elements. Post is currently
compiling information on U.S. notaries suspected of providing false
letters of invitation to applicants. In some cases, refused
applicants have said they've paid as much as $400 per letter, which
is between two and four times the average monthly salary of these
applicants. In some cases, a search of the inviter's records in
PIERS shows that the biodata and/or signature on the letter does not
match the name of the real American Citizen whose name is listed,
suggesting possible identity theft. The changes in biodata from the
actual AmCit's information suggest an attempt to make the
relationship more believable - for example, changing the birth year
(but not the month and day) to match the "schoolmate" applicant's,
or changing the country of birth to Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan.
Post is also investigating several illegal overstays from
Turkmenistan who are believed to be involved in providing false
documentation to applicants, possibly in conjunction with labor
traffickers in the United States, and possibly in collaboration with

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the notaries being investigated.


9. (SBU) The most common fraud pattern seen on the visa line would
be an applicant requesting a B1/B2 visa to visit a friend, family
friend or family member living in New York City. The inviters were
usually born in Uzbekistan, Ukraine, or Azerbaijan. Some claimed to
be legal permanent residents, others were American Citizens. The
applicants' stories about how they knew or were related to the
inviters were usually factually improbable, if not impossible. The
most common scripts heard include the following: "We became friends
while serving in the Soviet military/studying in a third country
during Soviet times" (because the applicant had never traveled to
the inviter's native country); "Our fathers served together in the
Soviet military"; "His relative was my neighbor and he used to come
visit"; and, for ethnic Turkmen, Muslim applicants asked about their
relationship to ethnic Ukrainian Jewish or Russian Jewish inviters,
"His/her grandmother, who immigrated to Kiev/Moscow from
Turkmenistan, was my grandfather's cousin." On several days,
separate applicants have applied claiming to be related to the same
inviter, yet have claimed not to know each other. No matter how
distant the claimed relationship, the applicants uniformly claim
that they talk on the phone "all the time" with the inviter, and
often have pictures that they say are of the inviter and his or her
family. The similarities suggest coaching and facilitation. These
cases have been referred to the Fraud Prevention Unit's (FPU)
ongoing investigation of the notaries involved.


10. (SBU) Another common fraud pattern involves applicants claiming
they want to go to New York City to study English as a second
language (ESL). While there are many legitimate ESL students from
Turkmenistan who qualify for student visas, a large number of
prospective ESL students are suspected of using the non-competitive
open Internet enrollment policies of some private language
institutes to try to go work in New York City. Validation studies
from previous years show a high rate of overstay for ESL students
attending New York language centers not linked to degree-granting
institutions of higher learning. A typical fraudulent ESL student
is a male, 22 to 40. The younger applicants in this pool have just
finished their term of compulsory military service and are
unemployed. The older applicants are either small businessmen or
low-ranking government officials. In both cases, these applicants
make credibility-defying arguments about how learning English is a
logical step in their professional and personal development. In a
handful of cases, these students have presented suspect account
statements from banks located in the Baltics.


11. (SBU) Post sees small numbers of petition-based nonimmigrant
visa applicants, apart from U.S. government-sponsored Js. Summer
Work and Travel (SWT) is not a large program in Turkmenistan, in
part because it is unclear that local universities would meet the
standards for their students to be eligible. There are no known SWT
recruiters working in Turkmenistan. All SWT applicants in 2007 were
students enrolled at foreign universities - the vast majority were
studying in Turkey. A large proportion of these students had no or
extremely poor English-language skills and most had very poor ties
to Turkmenistan. A validation study of 2006 SWT issuances showed
that 90% appear to have overstayed illegally in the United States.


IV FRAUD


12. (SBU) Post does not process immigrant visas. Immigrant visas
for citizens of Turkmenistan are processed by the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow. See reftel B.

DV FRAUD


13. (SBU) Post does not process immigrant visas. Diversity visas
for citizens of Turkmenistan are processed by the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow. See reftel B.

ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD


14. (SBU) During the reporting period, Post had no cases of
suspected ACS or U.S. passport fraud, nor have there been any cases
in recent memory. Because of the low numbers of legal immigrants
from Turkmenistan in the United States, there are few dual nationals
who return to Turkmenistan to request citizen services. Over the
past several years, Post has had several cases related to
American-citizen males who wish to transmit U.S. citizenship to a
child born out of wedlock to a Turkmen mother. Under local law, the

ASHGABAT 00000178 003 OF 004


father of an out of wedlock child must be present at the time of
registration of the birth for the father's name to be listed on the
birth certificate and for the child to be allowed to use the
father's surname. In cases where the father is out of the country
at the time of the birth, this creates difficulties in terms of
creating proper documentation of the parentage of the child.

ADOPTION FRAUD


15. (SBU) Post does not process immigrant visas. Immigrant visas
for children adopted from Turkmenistan are processed by the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow. See reftel B. Post is unaware of any cases in
the last several years of adoptions from Turkmenistan by Americans
or other Westerners.

USE OF DNA TESTING


16. (SBU) Post has not, in recent memory, utilized DNA testing to
resolve concerns about a consular or visa case. Polygamy is not
legal. Nevertheless, common law polygamy is practiced, especially
in rural areas. Post has seen a few cases where Turkish businessmen
living in Turkmenistan have applied for NIVs for their children and
common-law wives. These businessmen had legal wives and families
living in Turkey. While the relationships with the common-law wives
were not legally documented, the children of these unions had local
birth certificates that listed the Turkish citizen as the father and
the children usually had Turkish passports as well.

ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD


17. (SBU) Post has not processed any Visas 92/93 cases. There have
been no cases of requests to replace lost or stolen I-551s in recent
memory. Based on anecdotal evidence, Post suspects a high level of
fraudulent asylum claims. During the Niyazov era, most people with
a strong claim to political persecution were unable to leave
Turkmenistan. One recent returning student, who had previously made
what appears to be a frivolous claim for asylum, told the
interviewing consular officer that he had been "recruited" by other
Turkmen students to file his petition in order to make theirs more
credible. He said that the immigration lawyer assisting him assured
him that no immigration judge would ever refuse an asylum case from
Turkmenistan. The student said he abandoned the case because he
wanted to return home to see his family. In several other cases,
visa applicants who wanted to visit asylee relatives in the United
States have volunteered information suggesting that the relatives'
decision to request asylum was based solely on economic factors, and
that they "won't be able to return to Turkmenistan to visit us until
they get their U.S. passports."

ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST TRAVEL


18. (SBU) As mentioned above in the discussion under non-immigrant
visa fraud, Post suspects that there are several criminal rings at
work providing fake "letters of invitation" to nonimmigrant visa
applicants and providing false documentation to erstwhile ESL
students at institutes with rolling, non-competitive, Internet
enrollment. During the reporting period, Post received one credible
report by a local woman that her husband, an illegal overstay, had
been working in the United States under trafficking-type conditions.
She reported that his periodic phone calls home had stopped and she
feared for his safety. The RSO interviewed the woman and reported
the case through DS channels for further investigation.


19. (SBU) Turkmenistan is not considered to be a center for illegal
transit of aliens en route to the United States or other Western
countries.

DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS


20. (SBU) As mentioned in para. 17, the RSO section interviewed one
woman who claimed that her husband was a victim of labor trafficking
and forwarded its findings through DS channels for further
investigation. During the reporting period, the consular section
did not refer any cases for RSO field investigation. However, the
consular chief regularly discusses cases of suspected fraud with the
RSO section and the RSO and ARSO have, on occasion, assisted with
consular fraud interviews. The RSO and ARSO both have extensive
visa and passport fraud experience, which provides a positive
resource for the consular section. The consular chief and RSO are
preparing to investigate several cases jointly during the first
quarter of 2008.

ASHGABAT 00000178 004 OF 004



HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY


21. (SBU) Passports, identity documents and civil registry
certificates are fairly reliable and not generally subject to
counterfeiting and falsification. The Turkmenistani passport is
used primarily as an identity document, even by the majority of
citizens who have not traveled outside the country. The passport of
Turkmenistan does not have an expiration date and passports cannot
be issued or extended abroad. Travelers who lose their Turkmen
passports can be issued a travel letter for return by the
appropriate Embassy or Consulate of Turkmenistan.


22. (SBU) Instances of fake passports or passports obtained under
false pretenses are rare, however, Post is aware of one. In summer
2007, the consular section found one instance where a student visa
applicant applied for a visa with a passport listing an alternate
birth date than he had listed in a previous application. After an
investigation, the consular chief interviewed the applicant, who had
won a partial athletic scholarship for tennis. The applicant
admitted that his father, a government official, had obtained for
him a real passport based on a fake birth certificate that listed
him as two years younger than he was, allowing him to compete in a
different age bracket at tennis tournaments. The initial fraud had
occurred years before, when the applicant was a minor, but the
applicant had continued to use the passport to apply for visas for
several years after becoming an adult, and had submitted the bad
passport for the pending application. In a separate interview, the
father initially denied that the birth date in the passport was
false, then insisted that he knew nothing about how his son obtained
the false passport, finally changing his story to cast blame on the
son's former tennis coach.

COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES


23. (SBU) Post has not, in recent memory, formally collaborated with
host government authorities on a fraud investigation. However,
consular and RSO staff have been successful in getting material
information, on an informal basis, from host-government contacts.
The RSO reports a decent level of host government cooperation on
investigations. Post anticipates working with host government law
enforcement on a more formal basis during the coming year.

AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN


24. (SBU) The consular section takes every opportunity to inform
applicants that letters of invitation (LOIs) from a U.S. resident
are not a required element of a nonimmigrant visa application.
Applicants were advised of this fact at the time they made
appointments. The consular section's information campaign appears
to have paid off, as the percentage of B1/B2 applicants presenting
LOIs has dropped noticeably.

STAFFING AND TRAINING


25. (SBU) The consular section consists of one Consul, who serves as
section chief and fraud prevention manager (FPM),and two
locally-engaged staff (LES). All staff are expected to support
anti-fraud programs. Training and anti-fraud experience for each
consular team members follows:

- Elizabeth Webster, Consular Chief, FPM:
- ConGen (2001); Advanced Namechecking Class (2002); Advanced
Consular Course (2006); Consular Section Chief Basics (2006); CLDC-
2002, 2006
- FPM, U.S. Embassy, Abu Dhabi, 2001-2003
- Gozel Arazmedova, Visa Assistant:
- Primary LES responsibility for anti-fraud work
- Consular FSN Training, RSC Frankfurt, 2003 and 2007
- Regional Consular LES Workshop, (EUR) 2005
- TDY training with FPU, Consular Section, Istanbul, 2006
- Ogulbagt Bapbyeva, Consular Assistant:
- Consular FSN Training, RSC Frankfurt, 2000 and 2002
- Regional Consular LES Workshop, (EUR)2001
- Moscow Consular Conference, 2003 and 2004
- NIV FSN Workshop, FSI, 2005

HOAGLAND