Comoran Dialogue Depends on Sambi's Leadership

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000620

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/FO AND AF/E

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON ASEC CN
SUBJECT: Comoran Dialogue Depends on Sambi's Leadership

REF: ANTAN 606
ANTAN 591


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Ambassador called on President Sambi to take
leadership and reach out to the opposition to make progress toward
the pending "Inter-Comoran Dialogue". In bilateral discussions and
in joint meetings with international community colleagues, the
Ambassador encouraged Union and "opposition" members to improve
their communication, which in turn might foster economic progress.
Sambi reiterated his private promise to step down in 2010 and that
the Mohelian "turn" as president will be respected. Getting him to
say so publicly might provide the key to the heretofore elusive
solution to their institutional problems. This week's bilateral
meeting with the Comorans will be another opportunity to stress the
importance of their resolving these issues. END SUMMARY.

Ambassador Asks Sambi to Lead
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (SBU) The Ambassador encouraged President Sambi to take
leadership of the stumbling process toward an Inter-Comoran
Dialogue. Meeting September 11 in Moroni, the Ambassador suggested
Sambi make a public statement that he would not extend his mandate
beyond 2010, allow Moheli its turn next in the rotation, and
preserve island autonomy (all things the President has assured us in
private). President Sambi took on board the Ambassador's points,
while again complaining at length that the constitution was
unworkable and he had insufficient power to govern the Comoros. The
Ambassador told Sambi the "opposition" could continue to use their
fears as a pretext to avoiding talks, until the President offered
his solemn assurances.


3. (SBU) While open to the Ambassador's guidance and insisting he
preferred dialogue to a referendum, President Sambi referred to
obscure previous times (one in France) when (in vague terms) he had
made the guarantees the opposition wanted. The Ambassador assured
Sambi his messages to date have been inadequate or too ambiguous,
that more presidential leadership is needed to create the conditions
for a true dialogue, and suggested the President use the solemn
occasion of his Eid address to the nation to specifically reassure
Comorans of his intentions.

Union Ministers On "Process"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (SBU) In separate meetings with the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Justice, and Institutional Reform, the Ambassador called on
his interlocutors to push President Sambi to lead. The GOC
officials spoke from the same script, insisting the constitution was
unworkable. They blamed in particular Grande Comore Island
President Abdouwahab and the National Assembly for obstructing
effective governance. Foreign Minister Jaffar, who will lead the
Comoran delegation for bilateral discussions in Washington this
week, cleared shared the ambassador's view that more presidential
leadership is needed; Jaffar encouraged the ambassador to deliver a
clear message to that effect to the president in their meeting the
next day, and implied he would do the same.

"Opposition" Remains Distrustful
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


5. (SBU) In meetings with Grande Comore's Island President and the
National Assembly President (the cornerstones of the opposition
coalition, the latter a Mohelian),the Ambassador allowed them to
voice concerns while pushing for improved communication with the
Union. They remain intransigent, seeking written guarantees from
the African Union before they will agree to talks with the Union.
They insisted (again) the constitution "must not be touched" during
the dialogue, reiterating that Comoros' governance problems are
rooted in the Sambi government's incompetence and failure to
implement legislation related to federal responsibilities.
Nonetheless, the ambassador encouraged them to be open to signals
and new communication from the president, especially those
reassuring them on their main concerns (that Sambi will leave in
2010, when Moheli will get its turn, and that island autonomy will
be preserved). The National Assembly president expressed openness
to any such signals.


6. (SBU) In a new wrinkle, G-C President Abdouwahab said the
"Technical Committee" was unacceptable and that leaders themselves
must sit down first to establish principles. He blamed Sambi for
not having convened such a meeting, despite multiple suggestions
that he do so. (NOTE: African Union S/E Madeira has been pushing
for technical talks, hoping to be less threatening in order to build
a little confidence. END NOTE). Adbouwahab's argument, in part
based on his legal background as a magistrate and in part in his
search for any excuse to avoid talks, included renewed demands for
written assurances before he would agree to any talks with the Union
government. Abdouwahab did not exclude revising the constitution if
the assembled parties deemed it necessary to do so, but rejected any

ANTANANARI 00000620 002 OF 002


Union initiative intended expressly to revise the constitution
(which he has good reason to suspect). He also chafed at what he
perceives as an excessive foreign (read AU) role in conducting a
dialogue "that is supposed to be between Comorans". Responding to
an AU press conference held on September 11 at which Madeira offered
assurances that Sambi will leave in 2010 and that Moheli's turn is
assured, Abdouwahad complained, "Sambi knows how to speak. He does
not need the AU to do that for him."

S/E Madeira's Final Push
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (SBU) While in Moroni, the Ambassador also participated with
African Union Special Envoy Madeira and the international community
in ongoing talks with the GOC (REFTELS). The group again advised FM
Jaffar that the Comorans must take ownership over the dialogue
process; the AU cannot and will not do it for them. Before
departing September 11 (he is unlikely to return until the Comorans
demonstrate their will to talk by taking basic steps in the
Technical Preparatory Committee),S/E Madeira made a public
statement in which he called on President Sambi to lead, in addition
to the assures noted above.


8. (SBU) The tiny Moroni international community remains closely
aligned, insisting on Comoran ownership and offering facilitation.
South Africa (following a fall-out over Mbeki's opposition to the
Anjouan liberation in March) is again openly supportive of the AU
initiative; the French are supportive, but only quietly so, for fear
of being blamed for any future breakdown. A senior Tanzanian
delegation was also in town, looking at opening a diplomatic mission
in Moroni, but curiously was not part of any talks with the AU.)
Members noted the Union and opposition remain as far apart as they
were one month ago, despite many meetings and the basic framework
the AU has established. S/E Madeira declined to provide his own
guarantees to the opposition, insisting again, "You must sit down
with your brothers and decide what you must talk about." In his
communications with the Island Presidents of Grande Comore and
Moheli, and the National Assembly, S/E Madeira emphasized the
Technical Preparatory Committee must simply establish a budget and
timeline so at least international partners can offer support (NOTE:
When this process does start, the AU, UN and perhaps others will
foot most of the bills for inter-island flights, hotels, and per
diem. END NOTE).

COMMENT:
- - - - -


9. (SBU) Mistrust continues to prevail in the Comoros. If
President Sambi takes our advice to make specific public assurances,
in his Eid address or elsewhere, the opposition's best excuses for
delay may be neutralized. The threat of a referendum, which the
President has not/not made public but which is well known to
opposition leaders, may also serve as motivation to bring them to
the table - although some clearly doubt Sambi's ability, having lost
almost all of his post-liberation popularity, to muster the majority
required for a constitutional referendum to pass. The mutual
recriminations made indirectly by both sides, via international
diplomats as conduits, demonstrate Comoran politicians' continuing
focus on self-interest (mainly the preservation of powers, prestige,
perks, and salaries under the current system) and inability to seek
compromise. Nonetheless, Sambi's explicit (if not yet public)
commitment to leave office in 2010 (coming less than two months
after Secretary Rice privately suggested he do so) is an important
development perhaps providing the key that eventually will unlock a
solution. END COMMENT.

MARQUARDT