Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANTANANARIVO195
2008-03-13 09:31:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Antananarivo
Cable title:  

Why We Should Help the Comoros with Maritime Logistical

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS KDEM PHUM PINR CN 
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O 130931Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1065
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000195 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/E AND AF/RSA MBITTRICK
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KDEM PHUM PINR CN
SUBJECT: Why We Should Help the Comoros with Maritime Logistical
Support

REF: A) ANTAN 186
B) 3/12 Marquardt-Beyzerov/Bittrick/Orth telcon

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000195

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/E AND AF/RSA MBITTRICK
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KDEM PHUM PINR CN
SUBJECT: Why We Should Help the Comoros with Maritime Logistical
Support

REF: A) ANTAN 186
B) 3/12 Marquardt-Beyzerov/Bittrick/Orth telcon


1. (SBU) As I write this, AU troops from Tanzania and Senegal, and
perhaps also Sudan and Libya, are arriving in Moroni, on Grande
Comore Island, by various means. According to the Union government,
over 1,000 foreign troops are expected to come augment their own
"Army of National Development" (AND) force of perhaps 400; about 400
Tanzanian and Senegalese have already arrived. While the Union
government has now met repeatedly with defense counterparts of the
other four nations and the AU, and reportedly developed an
operational plan for the Anjouan mission, it seems clear that they
cannot execute their plan without additional maritime lift
capability for these soldiers and their equipment.


2. (SBU) Given this situation, twice in the past five days Comoran
Foreign Minister Jaffar has phoned me to request U.S. military
logistical/maritime lift support (REF A). His second request came
on Tuesday, March 11, after I had informed him that no U.S. naval
vessel is within reasonable steaming distance of the Comoros at this
time; this time, he requested our help in locating and contracting
for a commercial vessel somewhere in the sub-region that would be
capable fulfilling their mission.


3. (SBU) Following reftelcon, I informed the Comoran Defense and
Foreign Ministers that we were attempting to respond positively to
their second request for maritime logistical support, but that to do
so we would need considerable, additional, detailed information
about their plan. Defense Minister Dossar told me he would provide
that "precious information" on March 13 (to be transmitted
separately). Additionally I told him that Defense Attache Bridges
will arrive in Moroni on March 14 to assist in their planning and
preparations. Both Ministers were relieved and appreciative of the
prospect of this support.

-- (SBU) I greatly appreciate Washington agencies' willingness to
consider positively this Comoran request for support; without our

support, I fear this mission will not succeed. As we take the next
steps in responding to their request, I wanted to provide the
following input on why I think that it is in our national interest
to provide U.S. logistics support to the Union of the Comoros and
African Union to transport troops and equipment from friendly
nations to and/or within the Comoros:

-- (SBU) American involvement in this action generally, and U.S.
logistics participation specifically, raises considerably the
possibility that, when they realize they truly are facing an
overwhelming force, Colonel Bacar and his associates will throw in
the towel and end this crisis without further bloodshed. With U.S.
military support in the form of an amphibious vessel, surface
combatant, or even a contracted commercial vessel, its mere presence
would signify a powerful commitment of the U.S. military to assist
in the current crisis. This may finally convince Colonel Bacar that
he has absolutely no chance to win and that his fall is imminent and
inevitable.

-- (SBU) Success of the mission will help establish much-needed
credibility for the African Union; failure here will have exactly
the opposite effect. This would negatively impact U.S. interests in
places like Darfur, where we are counting on the AU for serious
support. Tanzanian Foreign Minister Membe told us as much, "As AU
President, Tanzania will see to it that this organization is
relevant and effective. If we cannot solve this tiny problem in
Anjouan, what hope do we have in other crises in Africa?"

-- (SBU) As we struggle on a global basis to convince Muslim
audiences that we are not against them in the War on Terror, here is
a rare opportunity, at low cost and low risk, to respond to an
invitation from a friendly Muslim democracy to cooperate militarily
with a largely Muslim, multinational force intervening to restore
democracy on their territory. The Arab League participated with the
U.S. and others in the recent ultimatum mission to see Colonel Bacar
and remains engaged in the Comoros in support of President Sambi.
The Muslim world will not soon forget this positive American reply
to the cry for help from one of their own.

-- (SBU) Iran's influence in the Comoros remains a wild card.
Recent unconfirmed press reports indicate Comoros has "opened an
Embassy" in Tehran. U.S. logistics support for Sambi will be
greatly appreciated by the already pro-American President; to the
detriment of Iran's influence in the Comoros. The opposite also
holds true; the longer Comoros looks for friends, the further they

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may look.

-- (SBU) For several years, the Comoros has been an ally in the
war on terrorism. They cooperate with DAO and RSO on
counterterrorism training, information-sharing, border controls, and
the Rewards for Justice program. Harun Fazul, born in the Comoros
but radicalized elsewhere, is the shame of moderate Comorans. U.S.
logistics support for the legitimate President Sambi, and in defense
of Comoros' unity and stability, will both reinforce their
motivation to cooperate on terrorism and actively prevent the
country from becoming a haven for terrorist activity. Bringing
Anjouan back in to the Union will help us address concerns there
about drug smuggling, money laundering, shell banking, and other
rule of law issues.

-- (SBU) We also will have demonstrated a sensitivity for the
uncomfortable French position in the Indian Ocean, where they
continue in a touchy situation given their continuing control of the
fourth Comoran island of Mayotte. Giving them political cover to
date has permitted their own limited support of the Union
government, which otherwise they probably would have avoided. Our
intervention gets them off the hook from providing something of
which they are capable technically, but not politically. This in
turn gives us leverage the next time we need their help elsewhere in
Africa where they have capabilities that we do not.

-- (SBU) Finally, on a purely bilateral basis, this support will
leave no doubt in the minds of Comorans (and their neighbors) that
we truly are their friends and allies. We will have demonstrated
that we are willing to step up when a democratically-elected Islamic
government is challenged by a despotic thug. Clearly this is what
President Sambi was looking for in his historic January meeting in
Moroni with Ambassador Frazer. Even if the Comoros is one of the
world's smallest countries, this will pay dividends for us far into
the future.

MARQUARDT