TURKEY RE-LAUNCHES BID TO WIN CENTRAL ASIAN HEARTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000089

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ENRG EPET EINV KZ KG TI TX
UZ, ZK, TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY RE-LAUNCHES BID TO WIN CENTRAL ASIAN HEARTS
AND MINDS

REF: ASTANA 0004

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Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4, b, d


1. (C) SUMMARY. Turkish President Abdullah Gul is
spearheading a renewed GOT effort to strengthen
Turkish-Central Asian relations through visit diplomacy.
Unlike Turkey's initial, post-Soviet era approach to the
region, the Turks are viewing Central Asia as a partner not a
patron, and offering a wide range of political and economic
cooperation. The GOT is also striving for energy supply
security and believes warmer relations with Central Asian
leaders can create the conditions for Turkey to realize its
Caspian energy objectives. While sensitive to the cultural
and linguistic differences between Turks and Central Asians,
GOT officials still believe "Turkic-ness" gives them a
strategic advantage and a foundation for bolstering relations
in the region. Shared democratic values are not necessarily
a basis for strengthening ties. Turkey will patiently
support its neighbors' gradual democratic development, in
part by recognizing important achievements, notably in
Kazakhstan, where Turkey is supporting the Kazakh OSCE
chairmanship bid. The GOT does not believe its previous
alignment with Western critics of human rights abuses in the
region paid dividends; President Gul is preparing to warmly
congratulate Uzbek President Karimov on his re-election,
despite GOT recognition that the Uzbek election was
undemocratic. Gul has already signaled his desire to visit
Uzbekistan at the earliest opportunity. END SUMMARY.

BONDING WITH CENTRAL ASIAN LEADERS
--------------


2. (C) Personal politics are a must for doing business in
Central Asia, MFA Central Asia Head of Department Sule Gurel
told us recently. Former Turkish Presidents Ozal and Demirel
recognized this; so does President Gul. Former President
Sezer, by contrast, was protocol-driven. When Central Asian
leaders failed to make return visits to Ankara, high-level
contacts decreased and relations cooled. Abdullah Gul has
been willing to cast aside formalities and take the
initiative to rekindle strong leader-to-leader relations. He
has already visited Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (reftel) in
December 2007, and plans to travel soon to Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

TRADE, INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
UNDERPIN TURKISH OUTREACH
--------------


3. (SBU) Gul primarily sees his role abroad as helping to
create the positive spark need to kindle wide-ranging
bilateral cooperation. Business, in particular, should be
the engine driving relations, and huge trade delegations have
accompanied him on his travels to the region.


4. (SBU) According to Gurel, head-of-state participation in
Turkey-Turkmenistan and Turkey-Kazakhstan Business Council
meetings was an important feature of Gul's visits to those
two countries. Turkey-Turkemenistan trade is paltry at only
$500 million per year. Turkey-Kazakhstan bilateral trade is
valued at about $2 billion per year -- still a relatively
small figure given Kazakhstan's size. The two countries are
aiming for $5 billion by 2010. Gurel noted that over 140
Turkish companies operate in Kazakhstan. Most are small and
medium sized enterprises, focused not just on energy and
construction, but on sectors such as food processing and
financial services. She emphasized the contribution these
companies make to employment and to diversifying the Kazakh
economy.


5. (SBU) To help further Turkish investment in Kazakhstan,
the Turkish Chambers and Commodity Exchanges Union (TOBB)
pledged to create an industrial zone there, augmenting
President Gul's diplomatic outreach as it has in the Middle
East and Pakistan. In addition, Turkish Defense Minister
Gonul accompanied Gul to Kazakhstan, where the two sides
pledged to bolster defense industries cooperation. The GOT
has also sought to boost commercial ties by relaxing visa
requirements. In July 2007, Turkey unilaterally exempted
Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek citizens from visa requirements for
visits to Turkey of 30 days or less. Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan had already mutually abolished visa requirements
with Turkey.


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6. (SBU) Along with Pakistan and Iran, Turkey is a founding
member of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO),of
which all Central Asian republics are members. According to
Gurel, the Central Asian states particularly value ECO
transport projects. The Kazakh government would like to see
enhanced transport links between Istanbul and Almaty, and
Kazakh President Nazarbayev committed Kazakh cargo to the
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway -- the final link in a
trans-Eurasian rail corridor -- during Gul's visit.


7. (U) The legislation creating the Turkish International
Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in 1992 expressly
mandated the new agency to provide development assistance to
neighboring countries and developing countries where Turkish
is spoken. While TIKA's mandate has broadened since then,
the lion's share of Turkey's $700 million 2006 official
development assistance budget went to Central Asia and the
Caucasus. TIKA maintains a coordination office in each
Central Asian republic.

CASPIAN ENERGY: GUL OFFERS TO MEDIATE
AZERI-TURKMEN DISPUTE
--------------


8. (C) Harkening back to its role leading negotiations on
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Turkey has offered to
play a leading role in developing a trans-Caspian natural gas
pipeline (TCP). Gul offered to mediate the dispute between
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan regarding the disputed
Serdar-Kapaz gas field, which both claim in their territorial
waters. Resolving this dispute could lead to an agreement
between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan on Caspian Sea
delimitation and pave the way for a trans-Caspian pipeline.
According to Gurel, both sides viewed Gul,s proposal
positively but negotiations have not yet begun. While
advocating for TCP, Gul was careful not to press too hard,
recognizing that Berimuhamedov must balance doing business
with Russia and Europe.


9. (C) International Strategic Research Organization
Director Sedat Laciner, who is close to Turkey's foreign
policy establishment, told us he believes there has been a
significant improvement in Turkmenistan's relations with
Turkey and the West since Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov
took office last year. But he does not believe the new
president is strong enough, or has the freedom of action, to
be able to appear to be defying Russia by committing Turkmen
gas to Turkey and Europe -- even if Turkmenistan has ample
and sufficient resources. Turkey can provide political
support and guarantees to help Turkmenistan move in this
direction, but can only be effective in cooperation with the
United States and the EU.

THE LONG VIEW ON DEMOCRACY
--------------


10. (C) The GOT is under no illusions about democratic
shortcomings in Central Asia. Turkey is encouraging Central
Asian governments to do more on democracy, Gurel told us, but
does not believe Central Asian leaders will respond to
pressure. She cited Uzbekistan as an example, arguing Turkey
gained no benefit whatsoever from aligning itself with the
West in the 2006 UNGA Third Committee resolution to condemn
Uzbekistan's human rights record. Turkey-Uzbek relations --
already fragile over the presence of Uzbek opposition figures
in Turkey and the closure of Turkish-run schools in
Uzbekistan -- further soured. In a bid to shore up Turkey's
ties with the government of Central Asia's most populous
nation, Gurel said President Gul is preparing to send a warm,
congratulatory message to Uzbek President Karimov on his
recent re-election, and hopes to receive an invitation to
visit Tashkent soon. While conceding the Uzbek election was
deeply flawed, she convey no uneasiness with the prospect of
President Gul being among the very first world leaders to
visit Karimov after his widely criticized re-election.


11. (C) The democratic situation in Central Asia is uneven,
and not all bad, Gurel emphasized. Citing Kazakh FM Tazhin's
November 29, 2007 speech to the OSCE Ministerial in Madrid,
she said the Kazakh government has made strong and important
democratic commitments, including to press freedom, free
elections, political party liberalization, and religious
freedom. Turkey strongly supports Kazakhstan's bid to chair
the OSCE in 2009.


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A TURKIC COMMONWEALTH?
--------------


12. (C) Improving Turkey's relations with Turkic states and
communities is a key foreign policy component of the ruling
Justice and Development (AK) Party's government action plan.
While respecting the cultural differences between Turkish and
Central Asian Turks, the GOT believes shared ethnicity and
cultural values still form a basis for developing political
alliances in the region. One way the GOT has sought to
advance this agenda is by reinvigorating the
intergovernmental Turkic Summit, which Turkey founded in

1992. Turkey would like to institutionalize the summit and
create a permanent secretariat for the grouping in Istanbul.
After a hiatus from 2002 to 2005, Turkey hosted the event in
November 2006, but the Kazakh and Kyrgyz presidents were the
only Central Asian leaders to attend. Uzbek President
Karimov's last minute cancellation, following Turkey's UNGA
Third Committee vote, was a stinging disappointment for
Turkey. Baku is hosting the next summit this spring, and the
GOT is hoping for a strong Central Asian turn-out. Gurel
told us the GOT has asked Kazakh President Nazarbayev to
intervene with President Karimov to encourage his
participation.


13. (C) The GOT views Nazarbayev in particular as a strong
ally on this issue. Gurel noted Nazarbayev was the first
foreign leader to visit President Gul in Ankara following his
election last year -- a meaningful gesture for Turks. Sedat
Laciner believes Nazarbayev is a strong admirer of Turkey's
western integration and democracy, and sees Kazakhstan's
Turkic heritage as a means of strengthening his country's
sense of nationhood. Yet he cautioned that Nazarbayev, like
other leaders in the region, has to be mindful of Russian
relations and will tread carefully in "turcofying" his
country.


14. (C) According to Laciner, the vast network of Fetullah
Gulenist schools operating throughout Central Asia -- and now
other regions of the world -- are also deepening
Turkish-Central Asian relations. While emphasizing the
schools provide a secular education, he said they offer a
Turkish environment and help convey an "Anatolian Islamic
understanding." In Laciner's view, Islam is an important
part of Central Asian identity, and reminded us that Islam
came to Turkey from Central Asia. The principal schools of
Islamic thought that have influenced Turkish Islam were
Central Asian, and there are strong similarities in the
religious practice of the Turkish and Central Asian peoples.
For Laciner, this constitutes an important opportunity -- an
alternative, moderate Islamic understanding expanding across
a large part of the Islamic world.

COMMENT: THE GUL SUPRA-FOREIGN MINISTRY
--------------


15. (C) Since taking office in August 2007, President Gul
has blazed a trail across the Caucasus and Central Asia, to
Pakistan, and, most recently, on to Washington. His energy
seems to leave MFA diplomats breathless. But President Gul,
PM Erdogan and FM Babacan do not appear to be operating at
cross-purposes, despite media efforts to exploit any hint of
space between them. Gul's visits to date have reinforced
well-established AKP foreign policy priorities, notably in
Central Asia. As a former politician and FM, he is uniquely
suited to advancing GOT objectives in regions where personal
connections count. According to Gurel, the operational
relations between MFA and the presidency are equally smooth.
Gul has an exceptionally large, experienced foreign policy
staff, hand-picked from MFA. As the former FM, MFA staff
know his style. If we've heard one complaint, it is that
Gul's -- and Erdogan's -- frequent international travel has
meant Babacan does not spend much time in the Ministry in
Ankara, leaving some key issues unattended to.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON