TURKEY: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE'S CONSULTATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000887

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KNUC UNSC IR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE'S CONSULTATIONS
IN ANKARA

REF: ANKARA 0847 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) During April 28-29 meetings in Ankara with MFA
Undersecretary Apakan, Presidency advisor Turkoglu, PM
advisor Davutoglu, Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK)
president Cakiroglu, six members of parliament, and Turkish
General Staff J-5 LTG Zorlu, UNVIE Ambassador Schulte urged
continued Turkish support for international efforts to
convince the Iranians to give up their nuclear weapons
ambitions, as Turkey prepares to assume a seat on the IAEA
Board of Governors and aspires to a seat on the UN Security
Council in 2009-2010. In meetings with officials as well as
academics and opinion leaders, Schulte countered
misperceptions about the latest National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE),warning that Iran seeks to master enrichment
technology and could have a nuclear weapon between 2010 and

2015. He also urged officials to declare publicly that
Turkey does not seek its own fuel enrichment capacity, while
encouraging Turkey to become a member of the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership (GNEP). Turkish officials assured Schulte
that Turkey shares US concerns, will continue to urge Tehran
to accept the P5 1 package, and will implement UN Security
Council resolutions while remaining vigilant against attempts
to transfer nuclear technology through Turkey. Officials
stated that Turkey plans to build three to five nuclear
reactors for electricity generation but does not yet have a
policy on fuel enrichment. Opinion makers told Schulte that
a "grand bargain" between the U.S. and Iran could delay
Iran's inevitable attainment of a nuclear capability. Some
suggested Turkey would feel compelled to develop its own
nuclear weapons in response to Iran's doing so. GOT views on
Iranian internal politics and advice on engaging Iran on the
P5 1 incentives package are reported reftel. End Summary

GOT's Strong Messages to Tehran
--------------


2. (C) Schulte reviewed US concerns about developments in
Iran's nuclear program, noting President Ahmadinejad's
announcement that Iran will set up an additional 6000
centrifuges. Although, according to the IAEA, Iran's
existing centrifuges are operating at only 20 percent
capacity, Tehran is clearly seeking to master the nuclear
fuel cycle. Once it has done so, it could continue
enrichment at clandestine sites with no oversight. Schulte
countered misinterpretations of the 2007 NIE, stressing that
our prognosis remains the same: Iran could have a nuclear
weapon between 2010 and 2015. Schulte described IAEA
safeguards chief Olli Heinonen's visit to Tehran to
investigate evidence of weaponization, noting that Director
General ElBaradei's next report is expected at the end of
May. The U.S. is looking for Iran to explain indications of
past weaponization activity and to demonstrate transparency
in its current activities, to include implementing the
Additional Protocol. The international community must
maintain a common front against Iran's attempts to sow
division.


3. (C) Apakan, Turkoglu and Davutoglu assured Schulte in
separate meetings that Turkey shares US concerns about Iran's
nuclear program and that Turkey had been, and would continue
to be, very frank and direct with Tehran about Iran's need to
regain the international community's confidence. In high
level encounters since 2006, the GOT has encouraged the
Iranians to accept the P5 1 package and suspend enrichment,
pointing out that continued isolation threatens Iran's own
technology base. The GOT's private messages to Iran have
been tough, even if Turkey's public statements have appeared
milder. At the same time, Turkey has encouraged Syria to
distance itself from Iran.

Turkey's Commitment to Non-Proliferation
--------------


4. (C) Apakan and Turkoglu emphasized the GOT's efforts to
implement UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803. In the spirit of
those resolutions, Turkey has implemented strict controls on
dual use items and is alert to possible transfers of illicit
weapons and materials between Iran and Syria. When
Iranian-origin weapons bound for Syria were found on a

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derailed train in Turkey on 2007, the GOT duly notified the
UN and protested strongly to Iran, Apakan asserted. He and
Turkoglu noted, however, that Turkey welcomes one million
Iranian tourists each year and that tens of thousands of
Turkish trucks must transit Iran enroute to Central Asian
trading partners. They asked that pressure also be put on
source countries to take effective measures to prevent the
export of illicit materials. Asked about the status of
Turkey's legal implementation of all three UNSCRs, Turkoglu
noted that heavy translation and reporting requirements have
made formal implementation a lengthy process, but one which
is continuing.

Nuclear Fuel and Energy
--------------


5. (C) Noting Turkey's interest in nuclear power and the
pending US ratification of our bilateral Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy agreement, Schulte asked Turkish officials
about the GOT's position on domestic uranium enrichment.
Apakan aide MFA Arms Control Deputy Director General Ahmet
Gun stated that Turkey has not yet developed a policy on
domestic uranium enrichment. In a separate meeting, TAEK
president Cakiroglu stated that Turkey has no plans to
develop the technology to enrich nuclear fuel, as it is
planning to build only 3-5 reactors. Schulte encouraged
Turkey to consider foregoing its own enrichment program and
to announce that decision publicly to set a positive example
and raise confidence in the region. Noting that Turkey is an
observer in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP),
Schulte urged Turkish officials to consider full membership.
He noted that reliable access to nuclear fuel for nuclear
energy would be on the IAEA Board of Governors' agenda as
Turkey assumes a seat there in the fall of 2008.

Opinion-Makers Views: Iran's Ambitions and Turkey's Response
-------------- --------------


6. (C) An array of Turkish opinion makers agreed that Iran is
intent on developing nuclear weapons, whether as an icon
around which to maintain the regime's prestige, out of
insecurity, or as a means of enhancing Tehran's drive for
regional hegemony. Most saw little prospect of thwarting
Iran's goal in the long-term, even if the regime changes,
although postponement is possible. Ibrahim Kalin, the head
of the SETA policy institute with close ties to the AKP
government, stated that the key to any deferral of Iran's
nuclear quest is a "grand bargain" between the US and Iran
that addresses the nuclear question as well as all other
outstanding U.S. - Iran issues. Others echoed this theme,
although with little clarity on what such a "grand bargain"
should be based. METU international relations professor and
TV commentator Huseyin Bagci stated that Turkey can play a
helpful role, given its historical experience in the region,
but only if it is given the space to engage all parties. He
stated that trying to convince Turkey that Iran is an
"enemy," as Israel seeks to do, is not an effective approach.


7. (C) Several prominent commentators, including secularist
ASAM policy institute president and former Turkish ambassador
to the US Faruk Logoglu, as well as AKP MP and former German
Marshall Fund head Suat Kiniklioglu, suggested that Turkey
would be reluctant to cede regional influence to a
nuclear-armed Iran and may be compelled to develop its own
nuclear weapons in response to Iran doing so. Bilkent
international relations chair Mustafa Kibaroglu noted Turkish
skepticism of NATO's security guarantee; many Turks perceive
NATO did not adequately support Turkey during the first Gulf
war and again during Operation Iraqi Freedom, when NATO
balked at providing Turkey with missile defense coverage.
Others expressed fears that the U.S. is preparing a military
strike against Iran, noting that Turkey does not want to
jeopardize cooperation with Iran on energy and against PKK
terrorism.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON