TURKEY: SE KURDS HOPE REFORM MOMENTUM WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000559

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2023
TAGS: PGOV PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY: SE KURDS HOPE REFORM MOMENTUM WILL
CONTINUE DESPITE AKP TRAVAILS

Classified By: Adana Principal Officer Eric Green, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) Optimistic voices in the pro-Kurdish Democratic
Society Party (DTP) and Diyarbakir NGO community view the
combination of Western pressure, alleged Turkish military
set-backs against the PKK, and the ruling Justice and
Development Party's (AKP's) self-interest in expanding
democratic reform as opening a path for significant progress
on the Kurdish issue in the near future. They view recent
ground-breaking events such as the Talabani visit and
President Gul's meeting with DTP deputies as signals that the
GOT may be interested in a cease-fire with the PKK that could
open the way for discussing a comprehensive solution to the
Kurdish issue. The optimists contend the closure case
against the AKP could actually redound to the Kurds' benefit
by persuading the ruling party that it can only protect
itself by accelerating Turkey's democratization and EU
processes. The pessimists caution that the AKP government is
fundamentally insincere about solving the Kurdish issue and
will prefer to manage it with small-scale reforms and
increased investment.


2. (C) If the AKP succeeds in quashing the closure case, it
could use its increased authority to undertake serious
efforts on the Kurdish issue. But if the struggle drags on,
hopes for a cease-fire or the actual laying down of PKK arms
-- let alone significant progress on the root causes of the
Kurdish problem -- will not materialize without support from
the military, which is unlikely to want to extend any
assistance to a potentially vulnerable AKP. End summary and
comment.

Is This Challenge an Opportunity?
--------------


3. (C) Meeting with Adana Principal Officer in Diyarbakir on
March 19, DTP Deputy Selahattin Demirtas cast a positive
light on the current GOT upheaval, noting that "a time of
deep crisis is a time to resolve serious issues." He
applauded the visit of President Talabani to Ankara as a
significant step in improving Turkish-Iraqi relations and
said he believed contacts with the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG) will follow soon. The land operation by the
Turkish military against the PKK will reduce public pressure
on the military to undertake additional offensive operations.
He asserted that, although the U.S. and EU had agreed to
Turkey,s plans for an incursion, they had conditioned
approval on the GOT taking steps to address the Kurdish issue.


4. (C) Demirtas also expressed satisfaction with the
dialogue opened the previous week between the DTP and senior
GOT officials, including President Gul, though he was
disappointed that PM Erdogan had (again) publicly refused to
meet the DTP until it denounces the PKK. These talks, he
hopes, could lead to a de facto cease-fire between the PKK
and the Turkish military. He said it was critical to achieve
a cease-fire prior to the traditional onset of violence that
normally accompanies the spring thaw. He stressed that the
DTP cannot deliver a PKK cease-fire at will, but if the DTP
is treated as a serious interlocutor, its leverage will
increase vis-a-vis the PKK. The AKP also needs to do its
part to push the Turkish General Staff (TGS) to observe a
cease-fire. (Note: Ceasefires have generally been observed
in the breach; considerably more effective would be a PKK
laying down of arms, which we consistently urge on DTP. End
note.)


5. (C) A cease-fire, Demirtas said, would create space for
both sides to start working on the essence of the Kurdish
issue. Initially, the Kurds and the GOT would need to shape
public opinion so that Kurds and Turks did not have such
diametrically opposed views on issues such as amnesty. In
addition, he said, greater freedom of speech needed to be
established early in the process so people are not under
constant threat of indictment for expressing their views.


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6. (C) Diyarbakir Bar Association President Sezgin Tanrikulu
criticized the AKP for procrastinating on constitutional
reform, which would have preempted efforts to close the
party. Nonetheless, he asserted this is the last gasp of
resistance by the old order to the AKP and once this case is
out of the way the party should be able to continue on the
democratization path unfettered. The Diyarbakir Bar and over
20 other local NGOs released a statement condemning the
closure case. Tanrikulu joked that, if the AKP is closed
down, he could face prosecution as well for opposing the
action.

CBO: A Splendid Failure?
--------------


7. (C) Our contacts in the southeast are unanimous in
believing that the late-February Turkish military incursion
into Northern Iraq was a failure, contrary to the TGS's
claims that over 250 PKK militants were killed. Bedrettin
Karaboga, a Mardin businessman with strong connections to
Northern Iraqi authorities, was convinced that only a handful
of PKKers had been killed in the operation and that the
Turkish military withdrew because its soldiers were freezing.
DTP officials also claimed that since the operation failed,
its own popularity has increased. The AKP has also lost
popularity because it authorized the operation; a sub-mayor
of Diyarbakir showed us polling data indicating the AKP is
still short of it goal of winning the mayoral election next
spring. Optimists such as Demirtas and Tanrikulu believe
that, following this set-back, the military will now be more
amenable to stepped up political efforts to deal with the
PKK. Others argue that the military will simply wait for
better weather conditions and attempt another offensive.

Economic Programs, Broadcasting Rights: Where's the Beef?
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Yilmaz Akinci, a local journalist, said he was
astonished that Erdogan, during a stop in Siirt during his
recent swing through the region, highlighted establishing a
Kurdish/Arabic/FARSI channel on the state TV network (TRT) as
a cornerstone of the GOT's approach to expanding Kurdish
rights. Akinci noted that Kurds in Turkey already watch up
to eight different foreign Kurdish satellite TV channels and
the programming on TRT is deadly boring in any case.
Tanrikulu threw up his hands at the mention of broadcasting
rights, saying that the GOT "should be ashamed of itself" for
the glacial progress on the issue. He pointed out that the
law was changed several years ago to liberalize all
broadcasting, public and private, but bureaucrats in the
regulatory agency continue to block implementation.
(Contacts at Diyarbakir's sole Kurdish-language TV station
told us last year they have seen evidence that the TGS
directly influences these regulatory decisions.)


9. (C) Recent GOT promises of a $12 billion economic package
for the southeast have also been met with skepticism.
Officials at a rural development NGO said they suspect the
focus of the program will be completion of the GAP (Southeast
Anatolian Project) hydropower and irrigation scheme in five
years. Such a plan would be welcome, they said, but to date,
the GAP,s dam-building -- which produces electrical power
for western Turkey -- has taken priority over digging
irrigation canals, which contribute to employment in the
region.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON