TURKEY: THE UPS AND DOWNS OF GOVERNMENT-MILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000553

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PSEC MOPS PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: THE UPS AND DOWNS OF GOVERNMENT-MILITARY
RELATIONS

REF: A. A. ANKARA 430

B. B. ANKARA 475

C. C. ANKARA 171

D. D. ANKARA 222

E. E. ANKARA 513

F. F. ANKARA 502

Classified By: A/DCM Kim J. DeBlauw for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: Turkish military operations against PKK
terrorists in northern Iraq over the past three months have
lent a facade of unity to the contentious relationship
between the military leadership and Prime Minister Erdogan's
governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). The Turkish
General Staff (TGS),deeply frustrated by the AKP's 2007
election victory and its political clout, remains fiercely
opposed to what it considers to be the ruling party's
Islamist agenda, symbolized by the recent passage of the
so-called headscarf amendment to the constitution. Future
flashpoints include broader constitutional reform, programs
aimed at addressing the demands of ethnic Kurdish citizens,
and any measures perceived to cut into authorities or
privileges of the secular elite. The March 14 closure case
has put AKP on the defensive, taking attention away from the
military's spat with the political opposition over whether
the February ground operation into northern Iraq was
terminated early under US pressure. Most expect TGS to act
coolly in the days ahead, distancing itself from legal debate
surrounding the closure case against the AKP. The political
distractions expected as the closure case proceeds may weaken
the government's hand as it considers non-military
initiatives to weaken support for the PKK among Turkey's
ethnic Kurds. End summary.

Iraq Operation Makes for Strange Bedfellows
--------------


2. (C) The Turkish armed forces' air and ground campaign
against PKK terrorists in northern Iraq since November 2007
created the appearance of unity between erstwhile ideological
foes TGS and the governing AKP. Both the military and the
government contributed to and capitalized on an outpouring of
Turkish nationalism following high Turkish casualties during
PKK attacks in October 2007. Cross-border counter-strikes
which followed beginning in December enjoyed overwhelming
public support and both the GOT and TGS sought to take
credit.


3. (C) The charge leveled by the main political opposition
Republican Peoples Party (CHP) and Nationalist Action Party
(MHP) against the military and the government (refs A and B),
that the army withdrew from northern Iraq under U.S. pressure
and without finishing the mission, has further driven TGS and
AKP together. Chief of Turkish General Staff GEN Buyukanit
characterized the opposition's charges as "treasonous." The
opposition charges have touched a raw nerve, opening a rift
between the military and its traditional ideological allies
that will not heal anytime soon. Meanwhile, Prime Minister
Erdogan added to the appearance of solidarity with the
military by heaping lavish praise on military's performance
in northern Iraq.

Military Frustration High
--------------


4. (C) Serious tensions remain between the military and
civilian leadership, barely under the surface. While still
regarded as the country's most revered and respected national
institution, the Turkish military suffered a major political
setback with the resounding re-election of the AKP in July
2007 and Gul's subsequent elevation to the presidency. Its
infamous web posting of April 27, 2007, the Constitutional
Court's controversial ruling a few days later, and the series
of large public demonstrations in favor of secularism which
TGS was widely believed to have supported behind-the-scenes
hastened elections and, most believe, led to broader support
for the AKP. With no prospect of popular support for more
overt action against the government, TGS had no recourse but
to wait and watch the government's actions as Gul moved to
Cankaya with a headscarved first lady. Renewed PKK attacks
in the fall of 2007, culminating in the Daglica ambush in

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October, offered TGS an opportunity to regain some prestige
in the public's eye through military action.


5. (C) For TGS, among the most symbolic and provocative
elements of the AKP's agenda was the government's pledge to
pass a constitutional amendment designed to lift the ban on
women wearing headscarves at universities. When it was clear
that the AKP had the votes it needed with support from the
MHP, Parliament pressed forward speedily with the
constitutional amendment package. GEN Buyukanit declined to
address the question publicly and, when pressed, commented
only that the public was well aware of the military's
feelings on the matter (ref C). The amendment gained
parliamentary approval easily (ref D); however, President Gul
chose to wait until February 21, the day on which TGS
launched its ground attack against PKK terrorist positions in
northern Iraq, to sign the amendments into law. The package
is currently under review by the Constitutional Court and
implementation, which had been hotly disputed by the
universities, has been suspended.

Flashpoints Ahead
--------------


6. (C) The so-called headscarf amendment was a blow to the
military. Future broader constitutional reform under
consideration by the AKP will also be opposed by the
military, which oversaw the drafting of the current
constitution following the 1980 coup, to the extent that
those proposals are perceived as anti-secular or as chipping
away at the authorities of the state establishment. Another
contentious issue ahead is the plan to address economic and
social ills of the southeast. The military acknowledges that
economic measures are needed in the southeast. However, it
remains opposed to any broad amnesty for PKK terrorists, seen
by some as necessary to bring PKK cadres down from the hills
and into a peaceful political process. TGS also opposes any
cultural measures, such as Kurdish language education, that
would appear to give Turkey's Kurds -- who are not regarded
as a minority in any legal sense -- a special status.

Implications of "Judicial Coup"
--------------


7. (C) The March 14 closure case against the AKP (ref E) adds
a new dimension to the military's struggle against the ruling
party. If TGS feels vindicated by the case against the AKP,
the military leadership has offered no public comment. Most
expect TGS to act coolly and with restraint in the days
ahead, distancing itself from court debate, and allowing
another wing of Turkey's secular establishment to take its
run at the AKP. The inevitable political distractions
expected as the closure case drags on will likely weaken the
government's hand as it considers non-military initiatives
towards Turkey's Kurdish population, making consensus on
those proposals more difficult.


8. (C) Currently at odds with all parties in parliament and
unable to effectively influence public sentiment through
press statements or dire Internet warnings, TGS is forced to
rely on like-minded allies in the judiciary and bureaucracy
who similarly feel that the Republic - and their stake in it
- is under threat. The closure case currently before the
Constitutional Court bears no overt military fingerprints but
serves the military purpose of keeping AKP in a tight box.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON