TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS REMAIN ON TRACK DESPITE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000393

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV RU TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS REMAIN ON TRACK DESPITE
KEY DIFFERENCES


Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4, b, d


1. (C) SUMMARY. The atmosphere was surprisingly positive
during Turkish FM Babacan's February 19-20 visit to Moscow,
MFA Russia and Eastern Europe Department Head Meltem
Buyukkarakas told us February 26. Trade and investment
continue to drive relations, though the Turks are
dissatisfied with a trade imbalance weighted heavily against
them. Babacan emphasized that Turkey views existing pipeline
projects as complementary. The Russians claimed to support
any economically feasible pipeline projects, and wished to
expand Russian energy investments in Turkey.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D. Russian FM Lavrov appreciated the
difficulty of Turkey's struggle against the PKK in northern
Iraq, but did not commit Russia to recognizing the PKK as a
terrorist organization. Both sides affirmed their support
for BSEC as the principal regional organization. Babacan
emphasized the cultural and historic bonds with Kosovo that
led Turkey to recognize independence. These bonds, coupled
with Russia's similar ties to Serbia, could provide a
foundation for stability in the region. Babacan was told
there has been no change in Russia's position on Cyprus, but
that Russia supports a solution acceptable to both sides.
The two sides affirmed their support for Iraq's stability and
territorial integrity and for engagement with Iran, but
Russia's deep distrust of Saakashvili and strong opposition
to Georgia's NATO aspirations are not shared by Turkey.
Lavrov told Babacan that Russia supports normalizing
Turkey-Armenia relations and will try to persuade the GOAM to
be more constructive toward Turkey's historical commissions
proposal. The two sides did not bridge their differences on
Russia's rejection of the linkage between NATO Allies'
ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty and the fulfillment of
Russia's Istanbul commitments. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) The Turks had some apprehension about pressing
forward with FM Babacan's February 19-20 visit to Moscow,
coming only days before Russian elections and right after
Turkey's swift recognition of Kosovo's independence,
Buyukkarakas told us. This was the first Turkish FM-visit to
Moscow in four years. Buyukkarakas reported that Babacan
found Lavrov surprisingly cooperative and constructive during
a nearly 3.5 hour discussion on a wide range of topics,
including trade, energy, PKK, Iraq, Iran, Kosovo, the
Caucasus, and CFE. Babacan also met with Industry and Energy
Minister Hristenko, who co-chairs the Russia-Turkey
intergovernmental joint economic commission with Turkish
Energy Minister Guler. President Putin and Dmitry Medvedev
were unable to meet with Babacan due to the campaign.
Buyukkarakas said the two sides reaffirmed the continued
importance of a high-level political dialogue and pledged to
realize more such visits. MFA U/S Apakan has already invited
his Russian counterpart to Turkey for political consults in
May.

TRADE STILL DRIVING THE AGENDA
--------------


4. (C) Trade and investment remain the driving force in
Turkey-Russia relations. Russia is Turkey's number two
trading partner, with Turkey reporting that bilateral trade
reached $28 billion in 2007. Bilateral trade is heavily
weighted in Russia's favor due to energy exports. Babacan
reportedly sought commitments from Lavrov and Hristenko to
help balance trade by expanding opportunities for Turkish
construction firms. Lavrov praised the quality of Turkish
construction companies and encouraged them to bid on Sochi
Winter Games projects. At the same time, the Russians sought
expanded opportunities for Russian companies in Turkish
energy, tourism and infrastructure projects.


5. (C) Babacan told his counterparts that Turkey views
existing pipeline projects as complementary. Lavrov said he
agreed, noted Turkey's strategic importance, and cited the
existing BOTAS/GAZPROM MOU. Buyukkarakas said the Russian
side sought expanded opportunities to invest in natural gas
facilities, electricity distribution, and nuclear power
projects in Turkey. The Russians told Babacan that, in
support of regional energy security, Russia does not oppose
any economically feasible pipeline project.

PKK/COUNTER-TERRORISM
--------------


6. (C) Babacan briefed Lavrov on the anti-PKK operation in
northern Iraq and asked Russia to list the PKK as a terrorist
organization, Buyukkarakas said. Lavrov reportedly

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appreciated the difficulty of Turkey's struggle against the
PKK, but the PKK not having attacked inside Russia has
precluded the government from seeking a court decision to
that effect. (Turkish law similarly restricts the GOT from
formally recognizing a terrorist group that has not struck
inside Turkey or against Turkish interests abroad.) The two
sides pledged to continue discussing the issue through their
existing bilateral security mechanism. Asked if Russian
allegations about Turkish support for Chechen or Dagestani
separatists remained a bilateral issue, Buyukkarakas
described it as a "technical issue," not raised during
high-level visits.

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN,
BUT CONFLUENCE ON SOME KEY ISSUES
--------------


7. (C) The two sides reaffirmed their support for BSEC as
the principal international organization in the Black Sea
region, according to Buyukkarakas. Both sides believe
existing BSEC mechanisms should be utilized without
duplication by other organizations. Lavrov reportedly
endorsed BSEC-EU cooperation, but wants cooperation directly
between organizations, not EU cooperation with a "wider Black
Sea area."


8. (C) There was no getting around differences on Kosovo,
whose independence Turkey was among the first to recognize.
Babacan reportedly told Lavrov Turkey's strong historical and
cultural bonds with Kosovo demanded Turkey's special
attention to Kosovo and recognition of its independence.
Buyukkarakas said Babacan posited that Turkey's special ties
to Kosovo, coupled with Russia's similar relations with
Serbia, could form a foundation for peace and stability in
the region. Buyukkarakas said Cyprus was not discussed in
detail and Turkey does not expect change any overnight change
in Russia's staunchly pro-Greek Cypriot position. Babacan
urged Lavrov to support renewed negotiations, while Lavrov
said Russia endorsed the Gambari plan and would support a
solution acceptable to both sides. Lavrov reportedly told
Babacan that President Putin's mention of Turkish Cypriot
independence was not an endorsement of "TRNC" independence,
but rather Putin trying to characterize a "double standard"
being applied by the West in Kosovo.


9. (C) The two sides reaffirmed their shared approach in
support of Iraq's stability and territorial integrity, and
agreed the Iranian nuclear problem should be settled through
dialogue. Lavrov reportedly told Babacan that Russia, like
Turkey, opposes Iran's isolation and supports confidence
building measures.


10. (C) Lavrov was critical of Georgia, noted Buyukkarakas.
She said Lavrov does not trust Georgian President
Saakashvili, whom he described as "NATO obsessed," and told
Babacan that Russia needs positive signals from Georgia to
normalize relations. He reportedly complained about what he
described as Georgia's dangerous, offensive military
build-up. Buyukkarakas said Lavrov expressed support for
normalized Turkey-Armenia relations and said he would try to
persuade Yerevan to be more constructive on Turkey's
historical commissions offer. Buyukkarakas stressed that
Turkey did not ask for mediation, only Russian persuasion.

CFE: SECURITY PRIORITIES DIVERGE;
A WINK AND NOD ON TURKEY'S UNSC SEAT?
--------------


11. (C) Lavrov rejected the linkage between the Istanbul
commitments and NATO Allies' ratification of the Adapted CFE
Treaty, according to Buyukkarakas. Lavrov said he expected
Turkish sensitivity to Russia's security concerns, while
Babacan stressed that CFE is a key security concern for
Turkey. Despite these differences, she said Lavrov was
conciliatory, and both sides would continue the dialogue at
an experts-level. Buyukkarakas mentioned that Babacan raised
Turkey's desire for a UNSC seat. Lavrov predictably declined
to state how Russia would vote, but the Turks believe they
received a positive signal "between the lines."

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
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WILSON