TURKEY: PKK SUCCEEDING IN DRIVING WEDGE BETWEEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001935

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL OSCE TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: PKK SUCCEEDING IN DRIVING WEDGE BETWEEN
TURKS AND KURDS IN SOUTHEAST

Classified By: Adana Principal Officer Eric F. Green, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (U) This is a Consulate Adana cable.


2. (C) Summary: During one week of meetings in southeastern
Turkey, PolOff met with political figures, writers and NGOs
to discuss the Kurdish issue, growing regional tension, and
upcoming local elections. Contacts said the PKK is using
the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) to escalate
tension, with continued protests to invoke Kurdish sympathy
and garner votes in an upcoming election it considers a
means to legitimize its mandate as well to settle a score
against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Part of the PKK's strategy is maintaining its jailed leader
Abdullah Ocalan's exclusive position as symbolic leader of
the Kurds. Kurds are divided on both defining the Kurdish
problem and agreeing on a solution, and most would support
an alternate to both AKP, which hopes to dilute them with
Islam, and DTP, which continues to espouse violence. The
AKP government must address this issue more
dispassionately and with greater sensitivity if it does not
want violence to spiral. End summary.

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PKK's Election Strategy: Divide and Conquer
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3. (C) Yilmaz Akinci, a Kurdish freelance writer and
al-Jazeera correspondent, has interviewed on numerous
occasions PKKers in the Qandil mountains of northern Iraq,
and has lived in
Diyarbakir for much of his life. He told us the PKK still
controls the city in large part, and is driving DTP's
election strategy of ratcheting up and sustaining societal
tension to further polarize the Kurds, and ensuring it is
closed down by the Constitutional Court. The PKK, still
strong
and meeting its recruiting goals, is banking on ethnic
fidelity to deliver the Kurdish vote in the Southeast, in
particular in battleground cities like Diyarbakir, Van and
Siirt. Akinci believes the PKK sees the election as a way
to repudiate the July 2007 election results (when the AKP
won 55% of the votes in the region) and show the emptiness of
the AKP's promises on the Kurdish issue and so-called
defiance of the military establishment. Not all PKK
tactics are supported across the board in the region,
however. According
to Akinci, the decision to close retail shops during Prime
Minister Erdogan's visit, which was portrayed as a
reflection of popular protest, was resented by businessmen,
who complied out of fear of PKK reprisals. Akinci said a
DTP political contact told him their plan is to continue
mounting high-profile protests at least once every 15 days
in order to prolong the airing of their primary
grievances: the GOT's continued denial of the Kurdish
reality and lack of progress on it, Ocalan's confinement
conditions and treatment, the lack of Kurdish-language
education and
freedom of expression, and the GOT's resistance to granting
an amnesty to PKK fighters.


4. (C) DTP Provincial Chairman Necdet Atalay argued the
passion displayed on the street is organic and comes from
the years of pain and humiliation suffered by the Kurds.
He said the AKP and media were playing "dirty politics" by
portraying the demonstrations as DTP's election ploy, and
indicated it was yet another way to sweep the Kurdish issue
under the rug. Kurds were appalled by the insensitivity of
the government to Kurdish outrage about Ocalan's inhumane
treatment; instead of opening an inquiry as DTP requested,
Atalay said, the Ministry of Justice issued a "hasty and
empty" statement dismissing the allegations. He acknowledged
that DTP closure would create short-term rage that would
generate votes (for a successor party),but denied that was
their aim, noting how harmful it would be for Turkey's
already imperfect democracy. According to Atalay, it's
time for the government to pay attention as Kurdish rage
has reached a level not seen since the aftermath of
Ocalan's capture in 1999 and he warned ominously that DTP
could only do so much to keep it from boiling over the

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"control point." Former Diyarbakir sub-mayor Abdullah
Demirbas argued AKP had already sabotaged itself among
Kurds with its close alliance with the military, approval
of "murderous" cross-border operations, and corruption
scandals like Deniz Feneri. Why would DTP need ploys to
win votes in the face of these outrages? To hone the
point, he said Diyarbakir's AKP members of Parliament
hadn't visited the city in "a long time" because they were
ashamed of their own affiliation with these issues.

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Only One Kurdish Superstar Allowed
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5. (C) Kurdish writer Altan Tan observed that behind the
PKK's election strategy is the principle of "no charisma
allowed." That is, no one leader should emerge to rival or
challenge the cult of personality and leadership
represented by Ocalan. (A week earlier, Adana PO met with
an AKP parliamentarian of Kurdish descent who echoed this
sentiment, claiming the DTP may not nominate Diyarbakir
incumbent mayor Osman Baydemir because the PKK is
uncomfortable with his high level of popularity.) Tan
emphasized this by pointing out that none of Diyarbakir's
DTP parliamentarians actually come from the province.
Ocalan's personality cult is also rubbing against the
ambitions of KRG President Barzani, who Tan said aspires to
be viewed as the symbolic leader of all Kurds. This
ambition, according to Tan, is one of the reasons Barzani
resists ridding northern Iraq of PKKers. Barzani knows
that being responsible for Kurd-on-Kurd violence would
destroy his reputation. Now, while the PKK does not
recognize him as their leader, it still depends on him for
protection.

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What Kind of Solution? Whose Solution?
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6. (C) Akinci faulted Kurdish activists for
misunderstanding the political approach needed to resolve
the Kurdish issue. The demand by many for the release of
Ocalan as part of a solution to the Kurdish problem, for
example, was a ridiculous nonstarter. The GOT would never
come to the negotiating table with that on the agenda ) but
the PKK knows that, which suggests it does not want a
solution. Akinci held that the PKK reflex for revenge
combined with the military's tunnel vision on the Kurdish
issue create an insurmountable obstacle to finding a
peaceful solution. Tan went even further, claiming neither
the military nor the PKK want a solution as they are each
other's raison d'etre. The PKK is working with the Deep
State, and the Deep State in turn uses the PKK to maintain
its dominion and the status quo. He pointed to a pattern
of increased terrorist attacks whenever Turkey takes
positive steps forward on the EU accession process, or
democratization.

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The Third Way
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7. (C) Tan proposed a "third way" to win approval from the
vast majority of the Kurdish population (neither radical
nor assimilated) who simply want an end to all violence,
expanded identity, cultural and linguistic rights, and to
live in a true Turkish democracy. These pious Kurds
neither want their identity subsumed under AKP's religious
and social assimilation plan, nor to be dragged into more
violent conflict by the PKK and DTP. Tan recognized,
however, that a leader to harness this voter base does not
exist right now. Such a leader, he acknowledged, would
need to balance several characteristics: Kurdish, but with
a Turkish pedigree; pious, but liberal; an intellectual,
but not a socialist.

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Comment
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8. (C) Our contacts unanimously agreed the DTP's recent
escalation of street protests and displays of civil
disobedience point to the PKK's intention to polarize
society along ethnic lines with a view to resuscitating
ethnic allegiance among Kurds who voted for AKP in July

2007. Whether the tactic is increasing the DTP's
popularity remains to be seen, but thus far the GOT seems
to be taking the bait with its dismissive statements about
Ocalan's well-being, using excessive force to restrain
protesters, and continuing to subject DTP and NGO leaders
to lawsuits and prosecutions. Statements by Prime Minister
Erdogan, such
as condoning the behavior of an angry nationalist who
threatened pro-Kurdish protesters with a rifle and
suggested some citizens should leave the country if they
don't like it here, play into the "us vs. them" mentality
the PKK hopes to intensify. If AKP wants to win hearts,
minds and votes in the Southeast, it needs to become more
savvy -- and sensitive -- in dealing with the Kurdish
issue.

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WILSON