TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION HEAD REMAINS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001924

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/PRA, ISN, DOE/NNSA FOR TOBEY,
BIENIAWSKI AND DESCHLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS: PREL KNNP ENRG EXBS TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION HEAD REMAINS
SUSPICIOUS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION

REF: A. STATE 106280 (BIENIAWSKI LETTER)

B. STATE 114915 (TOBEY LETTER)

Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor A. Godfrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) During a November 4 meeting with a team from the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Safety Administration
(DOE/NNSA) to discuss the repatriation of US-origin highly
enriched uranium (septel),Turkish Atomic Energy Commission
(TAEK) President Okay Cakiroglu expressed annoyance with the
proposal to work with Turkey on securing radiological sources
(ref a). Seizing on the word "assessment" in the non-paper
outlining possibilities for potential cooperation, Cakiroglu
characterized the offer to conduct "joint assessments" of
facilities with radiological sources as an attempt to
"inspect" Turkish sites. He said this would not be
appropriate or acceptable for Turkey, emphasizing that Turkey
was a founding member of the IAEA and a responsible member of
the international community in the area of nuclear
nonproliferation. He noted that our bilateral cooperation
must be based on the principles of equality and partnership,
and would welcome an exchange of information among experts.


2. (C) Turning to suggestions for further collaboration on
radiation detection monitors, Cakiroglu dismissed the need
for dual-channel (gamma and neutron) radiation detection
equipment, arguing that neutron radiation would be easy to
mask. He claimed that any element releasing neutron
radiation would also give off gamma signatures, but
acknowledged that plutonium might be a possible exception.
He also said he's seen recent reports of US radiation
monitoring equipment being faulty, but did not provide
details. Cakiroglu also asked whether the USG was deploying
portal monitors on the Iraqi side of the Turkey-Iraq border,
and suggested that the USG might want to do so as there had
been instances when Turkish authorities intercepted
radiological scrap originating from Iraq.


3. (C) Cakiroglu confirmed that his letter of resignation has
been rejected by Minister of Energy Guler and, as a result,
he will stay on as head of TAEK for the foreseeable future.


4. (C) Comment: Given his negative disposition toward
cooperation in securing radiological sources and toward the
Second Line of Defense program, we recommend that DOE/NNSA
consider inviting Cakiroglu himself to lead a team of experts
to the U.S. to: discuss USG experience with developing
nuclear detection equipment and working with third countries
to enhance their indigenous equipment; exchange threat
analysis concerning nuclear smuggling; discuss the importance
of having dual-channel detection capabilities at the border;
and to test Turkish equipment at U.S. facilities (if Turkey
is interested). Such a visit might also be helpful in better
explaining our goals in working with Turkey on securing
radiological sources.


Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON