TURKEY: CYPRUS WATCHERS DOWNBEAT ON TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001910

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE - NETOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2018
TAGS: CY PREL TU US
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CYPRUS WATCHERS DOWNBEAT ON TALKS

REF: A. NICOSIA 836

B. ANKARA 1598

C. NICOSIA 703

Classified By: DCM Doug Silliman, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Skepticism about the chances for a Cyprus
settlement continues across a range of Turkish academics and
opinion leaders who track the issue, a small group of whom
the DCM hosted October 31 for a free-ranging discussion. The
prevailing sentiments include:
-- G/C voters turned to Christofias primarily because they
saw themselves "losing ground" in their international image
under Papadopoulos, not because they had become
pro-settlement;
-- Christofias and the G/C side lack motivation to negotiate
because they have nothing to lose should the talks fail;
-- a two-state solution is the best starting point and offers
the most promising chance for a lasting solution, even if
those two states later agree to unify. Our one Turkish
Cypriot participant disagreed with this point;
-- Greek nationalism and the desire to control the entire
island is a significant obstacle to G/C compromise; and
-- Kosovo offers a glaring comparison for the lack of
recognition for the "TRNC." END SUMMARY

Widespread Views: Greek Cypriots want the Whole Island
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Doubts on Greek Cypriot motives unfolded as follows:
The initial optimism about GOC President Christofias had been
misplaced. AKEL has always been "opportunistic," in the past
even lining up with EOKA and favoring Enosis. In the Greek
Cypriot elections which brought Christofias to power, the
main issue had not been achieving a settlement but the G/C
public concern that they were "losing ground" in their
international image because of former GOC President
Papadopoulos's hardline posture. The most important element
to be taken into account is Greek Cypriot nationalism which
insists that the island is Greek and should remain Greek.

Turkish Cypriots are Risking More
--------------


3. (C) According to these Cyprus watchers, the risks of
failure in the talks are greater for Turkish Cypriots. This
fact forces them to be more conciliatory. Isolation is a
"secondary concern" for the Greek Cypriots because they
already are EU members. Europe -- which caused T/C isolation
-- has to "pay the price" for bringing the Greek Cypriots
into the EU by supporting Turkish Cypriot independence. The
"essence" of the problem of reunification is whether Greek
Cypriots are prepared to share the island. Greek Cypriots,
the Turks argued, are prepared to take back Turkish Cypriots
only if they come as their "subjects," albeit with
"privileged rights." The Greek Cypriots must be convinced
that they will lose the northern part of the island should
the talks fail. "Threatened recognition" may be the only
viable leverage that will influence Greek Cypriots. Many
Turks see compelling similarities between Cyprus and Kosovo,
and believe it is fundamentally unfair that Europe and the
U.S. have recognized Kosovo but not the "TRNC."

Two States Must Come Before One
--------------
.

4. (C) When asked what Turkish Cypriots want to get out of a
settlement, nearly all participants (unhelpfully) argued that
T/C views were not important: the big international players
must ensure the historical wrong of Turkish Cypriot isolation
is corrected. Several argued that the only workable solution
in the long run is recognition of two independent States, one
Greek and one Turkish. Those two states could then sign
various bilateral agreements, such as a non-aggression pact,
and eventually even agree to some form of union. While not
the position of the current Turkish Government, they argued
that this is the personal opinion of most Turks and of many
in the bureaucracy and MFA. Ideally, an overall package that
offers Turkey and an independent northern Cyprus entry into
the EU in return for a settlement could work.


5. (C) One minority voice -- a Turkish Cypriot journalist --
disagreed with his Turkish colleagues that international
recognition of a separate T/C state is a prerequisite for a
lasting solution. While pessimistic, he argued that the
current UN talks might be able to bridge the gaps between the
two communities enough to find a workable compromise.

Cyprus According to Soysal
--------------
.

6. (C) In a separate conversation earlier in October with
Emboffs, former FM Mumtaz Soysal disputed allegations that
the TGS is calling the shots on Cyprus issues. Soysal said
that TGS has redlines: it would never agree to a complete
withdrawal of all Turkish forces from the island. The
Turkish security guarantee is critical. Beyond that,
however, TGS takes little interest in the negotiations.


7. (C) Soysal said a settlement will prove elusive because
T/C support for the Annan Plan has waned and the vast
majority of residents in the north will want to retain their
own "state." Turkey really wants to see two founding
states of this new confederation as a final outcome of
negotiations. Turkish Cypriots need to have the legal
ability to declare independence if "things don't go well at
some point in the future."


8. (C) Soysal stated that there is a high level of
bitterness among the Turkish public toward Turkish Cypriots,
who saw their strong support for the Annan Plan in 2004 as a
"sell-out" and a repudiation of the decades of strong support
provided by Turkey to northern Cyprus. Soysal argued that
most Turks also saw the vote on Annan as a betrayal of Rauf
Denktash, who remains a revered personality throughout
Anatolia. Turks also view as unfair that the Greek Cypriots'
rejected Annan yet were "rewarded" with EU membership.

Comment
--------------
.

9. (C) Cutting through the gloomy predictions, it is notable
that even these skeptics acknowledge that the Turkish
Government has given its support to Turkish Cypriot leader
Talat, and that the Annan Plan remains the basic outline of
what Ankara can accept in a settlement. On the down side,
there was also a strong belief that Greek Cypriots have far
less to gain in a settlement than Turkish Cypriots, and are
therefore not engaging seriously. The strong emotional tinge
to the conversations indicates that Cyprus still touches a
raw nerve with Turkish public opinion.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON