SCENESETTER FOR THE WASHINGTON VISIT OF TURKISH

S E C R E T ANKARA 001902

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS IZ RU TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE WASHINGTON VISIT OF TURKISH
NAVAL FORCES CHIEF ADMIRAL METIN ATAC

Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Anthony Godfrey, reasons 1.
4 (b and d)


1. (C) Admiral Atac's visit will permit us to further cement
strong bilateral military ties through the service with which
we have perhaps the strongest bond. This visit will allow
Atac to raise the most pressing issues for the Turkish Navy
today:

-- U.S. naval presence in the Black Sea in response to a new
test to stability and security in the Caucasus
-- Improvement of Turkish capabilities
-- Renewed Aegean Dispute over Noble Archer


2. (C) CJCS Admiral Mullen's September visit to Turkey was
the first foreign counterpart visit accepted by the new CHOD
GEN Basbug and served well to reconfirm the strong bilateral
cooperation we have enjoyed since the President's November
2007 decision to increase anti-PKK intelligence sharing. On
October 24, Gen Odierno visited Turkey and met with DCHOD
General Hasan Igsiz to further develop this relationship;
VCJCS General Cartwright's upcoming visit to Turkey and
meeting with General Igsiz planned for November 15 will
further strengthen the critical bond with the new leadership
at the Turkish General Staff (TGS).


3. (C) Domestically, relations between a staunchly secular
military and a mildly Islamist government seem at least
adequate, with the government defending the military
leadership in the aftermath of the attack against an isolated
outpost on the border with Iraq in early October. As we
prepare for annual High Level Defense Group planned for
December 4-5 in Ankara to frame US-Turkish military relations
in 2009 and beyond, talks with Atac can help convey a sense
of our strategy, reassure Ankara of a continuity in
senior-level USG interest and understanding, and enlist help
where we need it.

Strong Military Relations
--------------


4. (C) At his August 28 change of command ceremony, incoming
CHOD GEN Basbug described intelligence sharing arrangements
with the U.S. targeting the terrorist PKK as "perfect." He
said that one of his most important responsibilities is to
ensure that U.S.-Turkish cooperation continues. Basbug has
observed that military force alone cannot defeat terrorism;
economic, social, diplomatic and other means are needed. To
back this up, he visited the southeast in his first week as
CHOD and studiously listened to Kurdish NGO leaders on the
complexities of politics, economics and terrorism.

PKK/Iraq
--------------


5. (S) Real-time intelligence provided to TGS through our
Combined Intelligence Fusion Cell has fueled almost 150
cross-border strikes against the PKK in northern Iraq since
November 2007. Basbug has suggested that the PKK may be near
the breaking point and that this winter may be decisive.
However, fighting and attacks within Turkey in recent weeks
has risen in the southeast, Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin and
elsewhere. If the usual PKK flow back to northern Iraq
occurs before winter and/or if large-scale PKK attacks within
Turkey occur, pressure for a land operation will rise, but it
is just as likely that air, artillery and possibly Special
Forces strikes will remain the tools of choice.

Black Sea
--------------


6. (S) Events in Georgia reminded Turks they are on NATO's
front line in the Caucasus against Russia, on which they
depend for 3/4 of their natural gas. Turkey is deeply
concerned about the prospects for more instability or revived
East-West confrontation, does not see a strategic approach
from the West, and will not want to be tougher with Russia
than others. Despite misgivings, Turkey has approved all our
ship transit requests and has rebuffed Moscow's complaints it
was bending Montreux to suit us. Since Georgia, Turkish
authorities have not reprised their complaints about U.S.
aims in the Black Sea, but they do not want problems.


7. (S) The Turks have highlighted their commitment to working

with the U.S. and NATO in support of Georgia, reaffirmed
their support for Georgia's territorial integrity, promoted
their Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, and asked
about our plans. You can reassure Atac that we will continue
to work within Montreux and that despite our increased naval
presence in the Black Sea, we are not seeking confrontation
with Russia. Atac will likely acknowledge the new level of
NAVEUR presence in the Black Sea, will recognize the
necessity of this presence, but will ask that the U.S. "take
a breather" between Black Sea operations and allow a brief
period between vessel transits.

Security Cooperation
--------------


8. (C) During the conduct of anti-PKK operations, our ODC
identified multiple Turkish capability gaps with respect to
command and control, intelligence collection, and close air
support. In rapid fashion, the ODC aggressively developed
multiple programs (manned ISR platform, offers for attack
helicopters, development of a Predator capability) to address
these capability gaps -- only to watch the civilian
procurement process here gum things up and our efforts
languish. Longer-term, we have promoted the idea of a
forward looking security cooperation plan with the Turks.
Its target: developing the allied military capabilities
Turkey needs to face upcoming challenges to NATO and
bilaterally (counterterrorism, counter WMD, energy security,
etc.) in ways that ensure interoperability and compatibility
with US and NATO systems. Mention of this to Atac will help
get Turkish buy-in ahead of the HLDG, which can, we hope, be
elevated from gripes about slow licensing and third-party
transfer restrictions to a more a
appropriately strategic cooperation.

Noble Archer
--------------


9. (C) Atac will likely raise this Greek exercise planned for
December requiring overflight of Agios Efstratios, an Aegean
island Turkey considers demilitarized. SACEUR has agreed to
make NATO assets available to the Greeks. If the exercise
proceeds as planned, we anticipate a strong Turkish reaction
which might undermine some high priority issues on our
bilateral agenda with Turkey.

Cooperation Programs
--------------


10. (C) INTELLIGENCE,SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE (ISR).
Turkish military has expressed interest in acquiring armed
Predator UAVs. Turkish military and acquisition personnel
are in Israel until at least 3 November 2008, presumably to
take delivery of some of the Heron UAVs previously purchased.


11. (C) AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. On 17 Dec 2007, the
Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) submitted A
Request for Price and Availability (P&A) for 12 Patriot fire
units and a mixture of GEM-T and PAC 3 missiles. A large
contingent of Turkish officials from SSM, Turkish Air Force
and TGS visited a Raytheon Patriot system production facility
in Andover, Massachusetts, the Lockheed PAC-3 missile
assembly plant in Camden, Arkansas and Ft Bliss, Texas, home
of several Patriot units and the schoolhouse. The trip was
very informative and the Turkish delegation had all major
agenda items answered. The delegation was able to discuss
Patriot issues with five current and former battery
commanders all of whom had confirmed tactical ballistic
missile (TBM) kills during Desert Storm and OIF. On 22 July,
Raytheon personnel briefed SSM on their plan to provide
Turkey with an integrated air defense system with options for
significant Turkish industrial participation primarily with
Aselsan and Roketsan. The deal includes workshare and
offsets that will provide Turkish Land Forces Command (TLFC)
with up to 9 HAWK XXI fire units for medium range and 144 AIM
9X missiles for short range protection. A decision on which
system Turkey will purchase is expected by the end of 2008.


12. (C) NAVIGATION AND TARGETING PODS. SSM submitted a LOR
for LOA on 11 July 2008 for 30 Sniper and 30 LANTIRN ER pods.
On 26 Sep 2008 the package had passed Congressional
notification and was forwarded to Air Force Security
Assistance Command to write the Letter of Request for Offer
and Acceptance (LOR for LOA).



13. (C) HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTERS. Boeing met with SSM,
Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and ASELSAN on 4-5 June

2008. SSM reviewed the plan for the CH-47s as a standard
exportable model with 4 Turkish unique requirements provided
via FMS. TAI, ASELSAN and Boeing would develop, design, test
and integrate nine remaining unique configuration items via a
commercial sale after delivery. SSM directed Boeing to
conduct technical meetings with TAI, ASELSAN and PM Cargo in
the U.S. from 23-27 June in order to define Statement of Work
(SOW),work share, cost and scheduling required to complete
all 14 non-standard modifications. SSM notified Boeing that
USG restrictions concerning release of the Chinook software
source code may cause the Turkish Government to reconsider
the program. Boeing continues to work with SSM and Turkish
industry to reach agreement on ground rules and work sharing
arrangements to serve as a basis for Boeing's ROM estimate
for the post-FMS commercial program in Turkey. The new
proposed date for the demonstration is 19-23 January 2009.


14. (C) MK-54 LIGHTWEIGHT HYBRID TORPEDO. The Ministry of
National Defense (MND) signed a FMS case to purchase 100
MK-54 torpedoes and associated support in August 2007, making
Turkey the first foreign purchaser of this air and surface
launched weapon.


15. (C) MK-48 ADVANCED CAPABILITY (ADCAP) HEAVYWEIGHT
TORPEDO. MND requested Pricing & Availability (P&A)
information for this submarine launched torpedo in January

2008. The Turkish Navy is considering the purchase of
between 30 and 60 of these torpedoes for their new Air
Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarine project. A team with
representatives from Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and others
visited Ankara on 20 August 2008 to discuss weapon
integration solutions to a Turkish Navy designed and built
combat management system. Naval Undersea Warfare Center is
working with LM and Raytheon to develop Rough Order of
Magnitude (ROM) cost for the integration effort. Turkey
decided in July 2008 to start contract negotiations with
Germany's HDW and Marine Force International (HDW/MFI) joint
partnership group for the acquisition of six AIP submarines
to be built at Turkey's Glck naval shipyard.


16. (C) HARPOON BLOCK II MISSILES. On 1 October 2007,
Turkey signed a FMS case for 25 missiles and parts/technical
support. This significant upgrade to the Harpoon missile
will give the Turkish Navy a limited land attack capability.
The Turkish navy will have initial operational capability in
the Fall of 2009.


17. (C) MK-41 VERTICAL LAUNCH SYSTEM (VLS). Turkish Navy
purchased four additional Vertical Launch System (VLS)
launchers and upgraded Air Warfare systems for GABYA
(EX-OLIVER HAZARD PERRY) Class Frigates in November, 2007.


18. (C) AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL (AEW&C) AIRCRAFT.
Production of four AEW&C aircraft began in late 2004, and
Boeing delivered the first sterile aircraft to TUSAS
Aerospace Industries, Inc. (TAI) on 13 March 2006. TAI is
currently modifying the remaining three AEW&C Peace Eagle
aircraft at its facility in Turkey. During 4-8 February 2008
Peace Eagle System 1 flew its first flight with mission
systems up and running. Due to the continuing dispute over
liquidated damages over the 3 year delay of the program the
last program review was postponed until this issue is
resolved. In late August 2008, a team from Boeing provided
SSM and Turkish Air Force Boeing's best offer to attempt to
resolve the situation. Boeing believes penalties are not due
given the late and deficient Government Furnished Equipment
(GFE) ESM subsystem, which is as late as the rest of the
system, and the contract allows for a day-to-day slide for
the program's delay. Nonetheless, Boeing feels they made a
very generous offer including cash, providing a second SATCOM
at no cost, a spare engine, a list of enhanced capabilities
for Turkish Air Force, and a willingness to absorb the impact
of the late GFE. Boeing hopes SSM/Turkish Air Force will
accept their offer to resolve the issue and allow all sides
to positively move forward to complete the system, enter
qualification testing early in 2009 and commence deliveries
the following year.


19. (C) ATTACK HELICOPTERS. Turkey and Italy launched a
project in June 2008 for the joint manufacture of up to 91
attack helicopters, worth approximately $3 billion. Italy's

AGUSTAWESTLAND will provide the engine and flight
control/monitoring systems. The Helo will be based on
AGUSTAWESTLAND'S A129 Model, and the first delivery is
expected in five years.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON