Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA1854
2008-10-24 07:29:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: A/S FRIED'S OCTOBER 21 MEETING WITH MFA

Tags:  TU AM GG IR IZ KNNP PREL RU US NATO 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001854 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: TU AM GG IR IZ KNNP PREL RU US NATO
SUBJECT: TURKEY: A/S FRIED'S OCTOBER 21 MEETING WITH MFA

REF: A. YEREVAN 844

B. ANKARA 1827

C. ANKARA 1818

D. ANKARA 1628

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001854

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: TU AM GG IR IZ KNNP PREL RU US NATO
SUBJECT: TURKEY: A/S FRIED'S OCTOBER 21 MEETING WITH MFA

REF: A. YEREVAN 844

B. ANKARA 1827

C. ANKARA 1818

D. ANKARA 1628

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a three-hour meeting October 21 with EUR
A/S Fried, Turkish MFA Under Secretary Apakan said that
Turkey:

-- hopes to wrap up an agreement with Armenia before the end
of the year;
-- wants both the U.S. and EU to join the Caucasus Stability
and Cooperation Platform in its second stage;
-- needs additional support from the U.S. vis a vis the PKK
in northern Iraq;
-- supports rebuilding Georgia and has counseled Saakashvili
to avoid confrontation with Russia;
-- continues to support Kosovo's independence, and
-- has not tied the hands of Turkish Cypriot leader Talat in
UN talks.

Fried briefed Apakan on his visits to Yerevan and Tbilisi,
noting that President Sargsian had welcomed his message that
the Turks are serious about rapprochement, and that he had
been blunt with President Saakashvili that he must avoid a
cycle of confrontation that only serves Russian interests.
END SUMMARY.

Armenia/Nagorno Karabakh
--------------


2. (S) A/S Fried told U/S Apakan that, during his October 17
visit to Yerevan, he emphasized to Armenian President
Sargsian that normalization of relations with Turkey is
Armenia's chance "to get out of its fortress." Turkey is
serious about a deal with Armenia and is not just playing a
game to forestall Armenian genocide resolution passage in
Congress. The Turks, he told Sargsian, have proven their
seriousness by the flexibility they have demonstrated on
points of Armenian concern (ref A). Fried said Sargsian saw
this as positive, saying that a three month window exists for
an agreement with Turkey.


3. (C) Fried said he emphasized to Sargsian that the
Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) conflict cannot continue to drift.
The U.S. intends to stay in the Minsk Group and will seek to
continue to work with Russia to solve N-K. At the same time,
the U.S. does not intend to give the GOAM a pass on

democracy: he told Sargsian to find a way to resolve the
detention of 75 persons detained since March. Sargsian
appeared less anxious to move on these issues than on foreign
policy, and the opposition believes Sargsian wants to use
Turkey and N-K negotiations to attract Western support
without making domestic concessions. In the long-run,
nevertheless, it is good for Armenian democracy for Armenia
to normalize relations with its neighbors and escape its
"siege mentality."


4. (S) Apakan said Ankara will retain its forward-looking
approach toward Armenia. Turkey's goal is to finalize an
agreement soon, certainly by the end of the year. While
Turkey is determined to succeed with Armenia, there has to be
balance and an "honorable deal" for both sides to show to
their publics. Apakan noted that the Armenians are
unfailingly "nice people" but have a collective psychology of
nervousness due to the pressure of history and geography.
You cannot treat the Armenians as a country of equal
confidence and weight as Turkey, Fried replied. Sargsian is
different; he appears to want to transform his country's
position. The U.S. will do what it can to support this and
the work Armenia and Turkey are engaged in, Fried promised.

Georgia
--------------


5. (C) Apakan said Turkey would send a state minister to
Brussels October 22 for the Georgia donors' conference (ref
B) to show its solidarity and seriousness on Georgia. Apakan
said FM Babacan would like the U.S. and EU to be included in
the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) "at

ANKARA 00001854 002 OF 004


the proper time, in the second phase." Apakan allowed
defensively that the hasty introduction of the CSCP, days
after the Georgia conflict erupted, did not give Ankara room
to invite the U.S., but it had known all along that Turkey
needs U.S. political and economic engagement, not only in the
Caucasus but also in the Balkans and Central Asia. Turkish
engagement will facilitate a more active U.S. role in the
Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans, not impede it.


6. (C) Fried responded that Georgian President Saakashvili
expressed concern about any structure that included Georgia
and Russia without the United States. Turkey should continue
to engage with him to explain its goals and objectives.
Fried's own message to Saakashvili was blunt: the U.S. will
not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
but the cycle of confrontation serves Russian interests, so
Georgia must focus on strengthening the economy and stability
of unoccupied Georgia, and avoid incidents that could spark
conflict. Georgians have rallied around Saakashvili, but
they do not want another war. They know how close they came
to losing their country.


7. (C) Fried said he had spent a day along the line with
South Ossetia and had heard firsthand accounts about South
Ossetian gangs continuing to raid Georgian villages even
after the Russian withdrawal. The U.S. is considering
military support for Georgia, but only for defense. Turkey,
Fried concluded, has legitimate interests in the region and a
right to hear what the U.S. is considering. The West needs
to support Saakashvili while leaning on him to be restrained,
sober and serious.


8. (C) Apakan underscored the cultural and historical ties
Turkey has to Georgia through its ethnic Georgian and Abkhaz
communities. Despite pressure from Turkish Abkhazians,
Ankara showed its support for Saakashvili by not allowing
Abkhaz "President" Bagapsh to visit Turkey. Utilizing the
ties it has to the Abkhaz defacto leadership through Abkhaz
and Circassian Turks, Ankara has conveyed the message to the
Abkhaz that they "should steer clear of the Russians."
Saakashvili, he said, does not know this. Likewise, in the
early days of the crisis, Turkey used its soft power as a
neighbor of Russia, telling Moscow that Russian occupation of
Georgia was unacceptable and needed to end. Apakan asked the
U.S. to tell Saakashvili to stay in contact with Turkey and
take account of its views.

Iraq
--------------


9. (C) Apakan said Turkey and the U.S. share nearly
identical views on Iraq, particularly regarding territorial
integrity and political unity. Turkey needs U.S. support on
Kirkuk and in developing Iraqi energy resources. Regarding
the PKK, Apakan said Turkey needs support beyond what the
U.S. is already doing to "isolate and remove" the PKK from
Iraq. New cooperation with PM Maliki and KRG President
Barzani presents a new opportunity. Fried commented that
Turkey's strategy of military steps against the PKK coupled
with outreach to Turkish Kurds is a very sound plan.


10. (S) Apakan asked for news about the U.S.-Iraq SOFA.
The Ambassador noted that the debate over the SOFA in Iraq is
likely to be long, and urged that Ankara do what it can to
influence Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs with which Turkey
has good relations, to support it. If the SOFA is not
approved, the U.S. does not want to go back to the UNSC for
another mandate because this could put critical Iraq issues
at the mercy of other international political problems.
There is no language that the USG would accept in a new UNSCR
that is not already in this SOFA, he said.

Kosovo/Bosnia
--------------


11. (C) Apakan said Turkey supports Kosovo's independence
and will continue to offer social, economic and political
support. He noted that the GOT is working with Ankara's
prestigious Middle East Technical University to open a campus
in Kosovo. Turkey did not vote on the recent UNGA resolution
on referring Kosovo's independence to the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) because it did not believe it should

ANKARA 00001854 003 OF 004


obstruct Serbia's legal right to bring the case to the court.
Nevertheless, Turkey made a statement that the recognition
by 51 countries is giving Kosovo's independence legal status.
The USG, Fried said, also views Kosovo independence as a
fact, but wants Kosovo to feel confident and will help Kosovo
in the ICJ case. Turkey's support is helpful. The U.S. also
wants Serbia to know that it has a future as a European
country. The political trajectory in Belgrade is positive
but the Serbs cannot be "European by day and threatening by
night." Fried expressed greater concern about Bosnia, where
the leaders are behaving as if it is 1996. Apakan agreed.
He said PM Erdogan and President Gul conveyed the same
message to the Bosnian Presidential Council earlier this
year: "This is 2008; you need to act in a way that supports
Bosnia."

Macedonia
--------------


12. (C) Fried said that although the USG does not agree with
the Greek position on Macedonia's name, a delay in solving
the issue could cause instability in Macedonia. The
Albanians in Macedonia would not be happy if lack of a name
deal keeps Macedonia out of NATO. Because Turkey cannot be
accused of being too pro-Greek, it should urge the
Macedonians to make a deal. Apakan replied that the Greeks
themselves have made the same suggestion. He noted that
Turkey and Macedonia agreed to postpone signing of their
bilateral strategic framework declaration until after the end
of the General Assembly to give name negotiations more time
to work.

Cyprus
--------------


13. (C) Apakan said he was disappointed to learn from the UN
SYG Ban that ROC President Christofias has been complaining
about Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leader Talat. Turkey was
one thing, he said, but Talat is a "positive man, and a man
for peace." Several people have hinted that Turkey should
allow Talat more negotiating room, but this is a
misconception: Ankara is not dealing with Talat or seeking
to manage the Cyprus talks on a day-to-day basis. Instead
the Turkish MFA sends its deputy director general for Cyprus
and an MFA attorney to Cyprus roughly every two weeks to stay
informed and monitor progress. Turkey has not tied Talat's
hands.


14. (C) Deputy U/S Berk noted that the renewed UN process
lacks discipline because it has allowed the Greek Cypriots to
reopen parameters that have been agreed in previous UN
discussions: political equality, equal status of two
constituent states, and power sharing arrangements. Turkey's
assumption had been that the new talks would start with the
Annan Plan as a basis and that each side would raise its
objections. Ankara remains serious about the process but
"our optimism is fading." Fried agreed that the initial
optimism had "run into the sand," but argued that a solution
could not be imposed. A Cyprus deal inevitably would not
satisfy everyone, but the current situation is not a good
one. There is no alternative to a settlement.


15. (C) Apakan outlined what he described as the "essence"
of a settlement: bizonality, bicommunality, co-founding
states, security, property, territorial adjustment, an EU
dimension and Greece-Turkey balance. Apakan said that an
agreement would entail significant territorial gains for the
Greek Cypriots, and that up to one-third of Turkish Cypriots
would have to be relocated. Turkey would remove most of its
troops (down to 650). In return, the Turkish Cypriots want
to become a constituent state with proper arrangements for
power sharing and political equality. To keep the regional
balance, the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee must remain
intact. Without these, he said, the GOT will not be able to
sell an agreement to the Turkish parliament or public.
Apakan underscored that Turkish Cypriots also ask,
justifiably, what their status will be if the negotiations
fail.


16. (C) Apakan also said that the EU must adopt any Cyprus
settlement as a source of primary law so that Turkey and
Turkish Cypriots will have "legal certainty" that the EU will

ANKARA 00001854 004 OF 004


not later change the parameters of the settlement. Ceilings
on resettlement of Greek Cypriots in Turkish Cypriot areas
and drawdown of Turkish troops should be tied to Turkey's EU
accession. These are not preconditions, Apakan said, but
would facilitate smooth implementation of the agreement.
They are not Turkey's points, he added; they are points
previously espoused by the UN.

Aegean
--------------


17. (C) Berk said Turkey appreciated the support of the U.S.
in May for canceling the NATO exercise involving the Greek
island of Agios Efstratios. However, Ankara is hearing again
that Greece is reinitiating this exercise. NATO should not
get involved in bilateral disputes among members. Fried took
note of the Turkish concern. Separately, he said that he had
welcomed the cancellation by Turkey and Cyprus of military
exercises near Cyprus. Berk agreed, but said the Turkish and
Greek exercises Barbaros/Toxotis exercises remain undecided.
Turkey's Barbaros is usually first. If Greece agrees to
cancel Toxotis, then Ankara would not proceed with Barbaros.
Berk noted that Ankara has not/not yet asked Greece to cancel
Toxotis, but would soon.

Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------


18. (C) Apakan said Turkey plans to continue its trilateral
outreach with Afghanistan and Pakistan. FM Babacan will
travel to Afghanistan soon. Turkey believes that -- from a
strategic point of view -- the Hazara Turks, Uzbeks, and
Turkmen in Afghanistan form a very strong northern block of
opposition against the Taliban that should be utilized.
Fried suggested coordination with Germany given its role in
the North.


19. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

Turkey
--------------

Under Secretary Ertugrul Apakan
Deputy Under Secretary Haydar Berk
Deputy Under Secretary Selah Koruturk
Director General for Americas Vefahan Ocak
Deputy Director General for Americas Ersin Ercin
Americas Department Head Damla Say
Special Advisor to the Under Secretary Mustafa Pulat
Staff Assistant to the Under Secretary Asli Guven

U.S.
---

EUR Assistant Secretary Dan Fried
Ambassador Ross Wilson
DCM Doug Silliman
POL Counselor Dan O'Grady
Political Officer Anthony Renzulli


20. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this cable.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON