Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA1779
2008-10-14 13:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP'S

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS TU IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001779 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE, NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY: GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP'S
CONVERGING VIEWS ON PKK FIGHT

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001779

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE, NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY: GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP'S
CONVERGING VIEWS ON PKK FIGHT

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: A consensus appears to be emerging on the
elements needed to defeat the PKK and the GOT and Turkish
military are collaborating closely, according to several
well-placed sources. These elements include: denying PKK
safe havens in northern Iraq; granting security forces
additional powers in line with democratic principles;
providing economic development, improving education and
health services, advancing social and cultural rights in the
Southeast; and improving the integration of Kurdish migrants
in urban areas. Civilian and military leaders, along with
opinion makers and counter terrorism experts are in agreement
that the opposition parties, call for a buffer zone in
northern Iraq is unworkable. Observers agree that TGS CHOD
Basbug,s pragmatism and understanding of the counter
terrorism challenge and the AKP,s desire to make gains in
the Southeast in the March 2009 municipal elections provide a
potential window of opportunity for the government and
military to take coordinated action to address the root
causes of the PKK. However, there remains deep skepticism
whether GOT and TGS leaders will be able to agree on specific
proposals and overcome ideological differences and
bureaucratic inertia to implement a coordinated plan of
action. End Summary.

Emerging Consensus
--------------


2. (C) Ihsan Bal (please protect),a counter terrorism expert
at the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK),
said there is an "emerging consensus" between the military
and government on the general contours of a strategy to
address the root causes of support for the terrorist
organization. Bal, who attended an October 8 brainstorming
session chaired by Turkish General Staff (TGS) Chief General
Basbug, said he has participated in a number of other
brainstorming sessions with the Ministries of Interior and
Foreign Affairs over the past few months and the general
sense emerging from these sessions was strikingly similar.

Non-Military Measures Key
--------------


3. (C) Specifically, Bal said there is broad agreement
military and non-military efforts must be coordinated and
implemented simultaneously, not sequentially, and that the
key to defeating the PKK is to address the root causes of
Kurdish support for the terrorist organization through
non-military measures. At the brainstorming session -- which
he characterized as a genuine dialogue with Basbug -- Bal
said the bulk of the discussion was on non-military means to
defeat the PKK. The key elements raised repeatedly during
the meeting included: Democratization, economic development
and job creation, education and health services, respect for
human rights and the rule of law, and better integration of
ethnic Kurds in urban areas.

Denying PKK Safe haven in Iraq Remains a Priority
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Nihat Ali Ozcan (please protect),another counter
terrorism expert at the Economic Policy Research Foundation
of Turkey (TEPAV) who also attended the TGS brainstorming
session and who met separately with PM Erdogan on October 8,
said denying the PKK safe haven in northern Iraq also remains
a priority. Both he and Bal said there was broad agreement
at the TGS brainstorming session and in their discussions
with GOT officials that Turkey,s preferred approach is to
work in unison with the US and Iraq to increase pressure on
the KRG to deny the PKK freedom of movement and logistical
support. Both noted that the general view among policy
makers, experts and the public is that the KRG continues to
provide logistical support to the PKK and allow wounded PKK
fighters to receive medical treatment at hospitals in KRG
controlled areas. Both also said the public continues to
believe that Marsoud Barzani would take more action if the US
really placed pressure on him (Note: This is a view
reiterated by numerous Embassy contacts since the October 3
Aktutun attack. End Note). Bal stressed repeatedly that

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Turkey would be willing to "guarantee" Barzani,s status as a
regional authority if he actually took action against the
PKK.


5. (C) Bal observed there remains a significant gap between
what GOT and TGS leaders are saying about US-Turkish
intelligence sharing (cooperation is strong and ongoing) and
the public perception (Aktutun could not have happened if the
Americans were giving Turkey good intelligence). He
suggested that the USG consider steps to close this
perception gap.

Additional Powers for Security Forces
--------------


6. (C) Bal and Ozcan also noted an additional element of the
emerging common strategy is granting some additional
authority to the military to combat the PKK within Turkey,
although they both said media reporting of tensions between
the military and government regarding the appropriate scope
of additional powers were exaggerated. Both the military and
GOT agree that any additional powers granted to security
forces should be in line with democratic practices and the
rule of law.


7. (C) Influential journalist Murat Yetkin (protect),who is
considered well connected to the military, agreed. He told
the DCM he was surprised to learn the extent to which the
government and military have been consulting on additional
measures to strengthen Turkish security forces, efforts
against the PKK. Yetkin said the October 9 High Counter
Terrorism Council meeting was scheduled well before the
Aktutun attack at the behest of General Basbug. There have
been numerous working level meetings between various elements
of the GOT and the Turkish military to discuss what powers
the military believe will be effective. While the military
wants more than the government is willing to concede, the
atmosphere of the discussions has been collaborative , not
confrontational, according to Yetkin.

Buffer Zone a Non-Starter
--------------


8. (C) With respect to calls by opposition parties for the
creation of a buffer zone in northern Iraq, Bal and Ozcan
both dismissed the proposal. Bal called it "irresponsible
politics, not policy." Ozcan said no one in the military is
seriously considering this. He noted Deputy TGS Chief Igsiz
said publicly the idea was "very risky" in response to a
question October 5 on whether Turkey should create a
"security belt" in northern Iraq (Note: Prior to becoming
DCHOD, Igsiz lead the Second Army which has primary
responsibility in combating the PKK in southeast Turkey).
Responding to a press question, PM Erdogan said on October 13
that "We do not need a buffer zone. We are doing what is
necessary (to fight terrorism)."

Window of Opportunity Exists...
--------------


9. (C) Both Bal and Ozcan agreed that Basbug has a pragmatic
approach to the PKK problem, and that he showed a genuine
understanding of the counter terrorism challenge and a
willingness to consult views outside the military (both said
the brainstorming session Basbug hosted was the first time in
their recollection a TGS chief asked to meet directly with
non-military experts). Ozcan stressed Basbug's tenure as TGS
chief is a window of opportunity for the GOT to develop a
truly comprehensive strategy to defeat the PKK. Bal echoed
Ozcan,s observation about Basbug and added that given the
AKP,s stated goal of making additional gains in the
Southeast in the March 2009 municipal elections, the GOT will
also be motivated to make some meaningful progress in
extending economic, social, and cultural measures in the
Southeast.

... But Expectations Are Low
--------------


10. (C) Despite the appearance of a consensus among GOT and

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TGS leadership and willingness to work together on a way
forward, both Bal and Ozcan were skeptical whether the GOT
and TGS will be able to overcome ideological differences and
bureaucratic barriers to develop, much less implement, a
comprehensive anti-PKK strategy. For its part, the GOT has
been downplaying expectations. During a press interview,
Deputy Prime Minister and GOT Spokesman Cicek echoed PM
Erdogan,s October 7 statement that the fight against
terrorism is a long term struggle and "it is not possible to
eradicate terrorism overnight." He dismissed questions about
whether there will be a package of proposals coming out of a
follow-on High Counter Terrorism Council meeting on October
12, stating "It is not right to introduce packages. Indeed,
there should not be announcements at all."


11. (C) COMMENT: We agree that any additional steps to
address root causes of PKK terrorism will likely be
incremental and modest, particularly as the AKP-led
government shows signs of trying to limit electoral damage
from opposition party charges of corruption and weakness
against terror (septel). However, signs that the GOT and the
military are willing to work closely to address the PKK issue
are encouraging. It is clear calls for a buffer zone and for
the restoration of emergency powers in the Southeast are not
gaining traction. Further dramatic attacks by the PKK may
give new life to these bad ideas, while meaningful steps
taken by the KRG to curtail PKK,s freedom of movement would
help tamp down calls for Turkish ground incursions into
northern Iraq should the PKK strike again.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON