TURKISH CAUCASIANS' INFLUENCE ON REGIONAL POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001635

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG RU TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH CAUCASIANS' INFLUENCE ON REGIONAL POLICY

REF: ANKARA 1062

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The conflict in Georgia has
mobilized a large portion of Turkey's ethnic Caucasian
community to lobby Ankara to join Moscow in recognizing
Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence. As during the
Chechen wars of the 1990s, ethnic Caucasian groups will force
the GOT to walk a fine line between supporting the
territorial integrity of a neighbor, in this case Georgia,
and engaging breakaway regions with which a large number of
Turks feel strong cultural and historical bonds. Turkish
Caucasians are divided between "North Caucasian," or
"Circassian," groups, e.g., Abkhaz, Chechen, Ossetian, and
"South Caucasian," or "Georgian," groups -- segments once
allied in their anti-Soviet and then anti-Russian
orientation. The Circassian lobby is organized and
politically active, though weakened somewhat by growing rifts
between Circassian groups that fear Russia's long-term
intentions to annex Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and those
that favor greater cooperation with Russia, largely for
business reasons. In contrast, Turkey's ethnic Georgians
have struggled to constitute an effective lobby. Mostly from
the Ajara region of Georgia, and fewer in number than the
Circassians, Turkey's Georgians are defined more by their
Muslim identity than their ethnicity. They complain about
Georgian President Saakashvili encroaching upon Ajaran
autonomy. As a result, most, but not all, Turkish Georgians
have limited sympathy for Saakashvili, even as they voice
their solidarity with the Georgian people.


2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONT'D: Despite pressure from
Turkish Circassians, the GOT will not break from its Western
allies to recognize Abkhaz or South Ossetian independence.
GOT support for Georgia's territorial integrity is strong and
based on self-interest: adherence to the principle of
territorial integrity underscores Turkey's own political
unity. Moreover, it is in Turkey's interest to support a
strong, united Georgia if Turkey is to avoid one day
bordering Russia directly -- a centuries-old experience it
does not wish to relive. Under pressure from Turkish
Circassians and wishing to forestall a formal annexation of
Abkhazia by Russia (effectively doubling Russia's Black Sea
coastline),the GOT may seek to engage Abkhazia more robustly
in the months and years ahead through trade and investment,
transportation links, and unofficial contacts with the de
facto government in Sukhumi. Ankara will likely seek to
persuade Tbilisi of the wisdom of this approach, but may
prove undeterred if Tbilisi continues to oppose such
measures, as it did, to Ankara's regret, before this latest
conflict. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

CAUCASIANS IN TURKEY
--------------

3. (SBU) Estimates of the Caucasian population in Turkey vary
but range to as high as seven million. Apart from Turkey's
recognized Armenian, Greek and Jewish minorities, Turkish
censuses do not investigate ethnicity, making an accurate
count difficult. However, TOBB University International
Relations Department Professor and Caucasus expert Mitat
Celikpala, in his paper, "From Immigrants to Diaspora:
Influence of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey," notes
that in the 1965 census, Turks were asked about their primary
or secondary language. About 119,000 (four percent of the
population at the time) responded Abkhazian or related North
Caucasian languages -- an impressive amount given that the
majority of immigration from that region to Turkey took place
in the mid-to-late 19th century. A smaller number of
respondents indicated they spoke Georgian. Based on those
responses, and recognizing that a majority of Circassian
Turks would have integrated and lost the ability to speak
their native languages by 1965, Celikpala estimates the
Turkish Caucasian population today to be about 3.5 million,
but the extent to which these peoples self-identify as
Caucasian (or Abkhaz or Ossetian or Georgian) varies. In
contrast to the Armenian diaspora in the United States, for
example, the Turkish Caucasian diaspora is far more diffuse.


4. (U) Turkish Caucasians are divided into two main groups:
North Caucasian and South Caucasian. North Caucasians
descend from the Caucasian territories of present-day Russia,
i.e., Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingusetia etc., as well as from

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Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This group is commonly known in
Turkey as Circassian, and the largest sub-group among the
Circassians are the Abkhaz. (Ossetians are known in Turkey
as Kusha and constitute a far smaller community.) In the
Turkish context, South Caucasian generally refers to
Georgians and related ethnicities, such as Laz and
Mingrelian. (Other South Caucasians in Turkey are distinct:
Armenians are a recognized minority and Azeris linguistically
and ethnically are Turkic.)

CIRCASSIANS
--------------

5. (SBU) Turkish Circassians' ancestors were forced to leave
their North Caucasian homelands as Russia completed the
annexation of the region in the second half of the 19th
century. Celikpala estimates that over 1.5 million emigrated
-- about 90 percent of the North Caucasian population at the
time. They settled largely in the Ottoman Empire, in present
day Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Balkans, but mostly in
Anatolia. A second, smaller wave of emigration to Turkey
took place in 1918, as the Bolsheviks re-consolidated Russian
power in the region. Finally, the GOT permitted about 600
North Caucasian legionnaires to settle in Turkey after World
War II. Circassians in Anatolia settled primarily in the
Marmara region around Adapazari, moving to villages based on
their respective sub-identity, i.e., Abkhaz, Ossetian, etc.,
though these sub-groups, as well as the Georgians who came to
live among them, interacted and intermarried. Anatolia's
rural isolation helped ensure that Circassian culture and
language persevered well into the 20th century.


6. (SBU) Turkish Circassians quickly gained a reputation for
loyalty to their new country, and are still known today for
their nationalistic character (as are Georgians). Yet they
retained a strong Circassian cultural identity which they
channeled into political activism against Russian
"occupation" in the Caucasus. However, the need for the new
Turkish Republic to cooperate with the Bolshevik regime in
the early days of Turkish independence, and the subsequent
pan-Turkism introduced by Ataturk as a key element of Turkish
nation building, curbed Circassian political activism until
the outset of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union became
defined as an enemy of Turkey. With the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, Turkish Circassians, with the tacit approval of
Ankara, emerged as a key support base for Chechen separatists
in their 1990s wars against Russia, much to the annoyance of
Moscow. Turkey's overall support for the Chechen insurgency
faded, however, as the insurgency became associated
increasingly with terrorism. Chechnya remains, nonetheless,
a passionate issue for many Turkish Circassians.


7. (C) Numerous groups are active in the Circassian lobby
today, but two stand out: The Caucasus Association (KAF-DER)
and the Caucasus Abkhazia Solidarity Committee (KADK).
KAF-DER (kaf-der.org.tr) is led by Cihan Candemir, board
member of Turkish construction giant Yuksel Insaat. KADK
(abhazya.org),and a related, ad-hoc group known as the
"Friends of Abkhazia," are led by Irfan Argun. The
Istanbul-based Caucasus Foundation (www.kafkas.org.tr) is
instrumental in fundraising for Caucasus causes. KADK could
be described as Abkhazia's unofficial representation in
Turkey, though both Argun and Candemir maintain close ties to
Sukhumi, in particular with one Turkish-born Abkhaz
"parliamentarian," Sener Gogua, who visits Turkey frequently
and told us he coordinates diaspora affairs for "President"
Bagapsh (reftel). KADK and KAF-DER are both members of the
Federation for Caucasus Associations (kafkasfederasyonu.org),
an umbrella organization for Circassian NGOSs, also led by
Candemir. But Argun and Candemir do not see eye-to-eye
completely. KADK, Celikpala explained, welcomed Russia's
recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, but is
concerned about Russian annexation of Abkhazia (South Ossetia
increasingly being seen as a lost cause). Argun's allies
continue to advocate for the rights of Caucasians in Russia
proper, including Chechens. (KADK shares roots with the
Caucasian-Chechen Solidarity Committee, which played a
similar role in Turkey vis a vis Chechnya.) Candemir pays
lip service to the same concerns about Russia, but has
reportedly developed close ties to the Russian Embassy in
Ankara and thus more reticent to criticize Moscow. Yuksel
Insaat has extensive business interests throughout Russia and
the former Soviet Union; Candemir has, according to
Celikpala, used his KAF-DER and Federation leadership to

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cultivate ties on behalf of his company. The upcoming 2014
Sochi Winter Olympic Games promise to be a boon for Yuksel
and other leading Turkish construction firms. (NOTE:
Turkish MFA estimates that Turkish construction contracts in
Russia are worth $30 billion; $6 billion having been added
last year alone. END NOTE.)

GEORGIANS
--------------

8. (SBU) Turkish Georgians are primarily of Ajaran descent.
Being Muslim, they moved to or preferred to stay in Turkey
when the Soviet Union and Turkey formally delimited their
border in 1921. Some Turks descending from Georgia claim an
Ahiska Turkish identity, allowing them to more easily
assimilate within Turkish society as Turks. (NOTE: The
Ahiska or Meskhetian Turks are ethnic Turks from present-day
Georgia who were deported by Stalin to Central Asia and are
now campaigning, with Ankara's support, for the right to
return to their homeland. END NOTE.)


9. (C) Georgian cultural identity is weaker (and Islamic
identity stronger) than for Circassians, and Georgians are
less active politically. While not activists, Bilkent
University Professor Hasan Ali Karasar points out that
Georgians have retained important economic and political
influence in Turkey, primarily in the Black Sea region, but
also in Ankara (the Forest Ministry, for example, is
historically led by a Georgian, Karasar told us) and
Istanbul, where many have emigrated. A number of key
political leaders, including PM Erdogan and nationalist
Republican People's Party (CHP) Chairman Deniz Baykal are
reported to be of Georgian descent, though it is unclear how
much, if at all, they are influenced by their heritage;
neither would welcome any non-Turkish definitions of their
identity. The Turkey-Georgia Inter-Parliamentary Friendship
Group has twenty members representing all three main parties
in Parliament.


10. (C) Turkish Georgians retain strong ties to Batumi,
viewing the eastern Black Sea region and Ajara as an
integrated whole. Turkish Georgians have invested greatly in
Batumi and welcome GOT efforts to promote regional economic
integration with Georgia. But they have complained about
Tbilisi's alleged efforts to curtail Ajaran autonomy, of
which Turkey is a legal guarantor, they argue. They also
complain about Georgian chauvinism. Turkish Georgians
criticized, for example, the decision to insert a Georgian
cross in the Ajaran flag following Saakashvili's successful
efforts to consolidate Ajara within Georgia (sending
then-Ajaran leader Abashidze fleeing via Trabzon). Maps of
"Greater Georgia" that occasionally emerge from Georgia
showing the Eastern Turkish province of Artvin as part of
Georgia raise eyebrows here. Turkish Georgians are also
watching closely for Tbilisi's support for the repatriation
of the Ahiska Turks.


11. (C) While Saakashvili has not helped himself with Turkish
Georgians through his actions in Ajara, Tbilisi has
cultivated useful ties with some Turkish Georgian groups.
The oldest and principle Turkish-Georgian language newspaper
in Turkey, "Chveneburi," (chveneburi.net) is decidedly
pro-Saakashvili in its coverage. Acar Insaat, a large
Turkish construction firm, has close connections with the
Saakashvili administration, according to Celikpala. A number
of other large holding groups in Turkey are run by ethnic
Georgians, including the Carmikli and Ozaltin groups, and
also maintain ties with Tbilisi. In the 1990s, with GOG
support, Turkish and Georgian businessmen founded the
Turkish-Georgian Cultural and Solidarity Foundation in an
effort to balance the Abkhaz/Circassian lobby. Additional
foundations and associations were created, but have never
competed effectively with the Circassians. But the Russian
invasion of Georgia prompted, according to Karasar, the
first-ever street protests organized by Turkish Georgians, in
Ankara and Istanbul. This may signal greater Georgian
political activism in the future, but it will be difficult
for Georgians to overcome their dislike for Saakashvili, even
as they express their solidarity with the Georgian people.
Turkish Georgians' cultural awareness has been enhanced in
recent years through efforts by the Georgian Embassy in
Ankara and local governments in northeastern Turkey to
promote Turkey's Georgian heritage, including hundreds of
churches, as a tourist attraction.

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HOW WILL TURKISH CAUCASIANS SHAPE GOT POLICY?
--------------

12. (C) Turkey will not break ranks with its Western allies
to recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Circassian voters
are an important nationalist vote base, but as nationalist
National Action Party (MHP) Vice Chairman Vural Oktay told
us, "Turkey comes first." While pragmatic on Kosovo (a
testament to the strength of ethnic lobbies in Turkey;
Kosovar Turks campaigned strongly for Kosovo's independence),
adherence to the principle of territorial integrity
underscores Turkey's own political unity, namely with regards
to the Kurdish question, ensuring Turkey acts carefully. The
Turks will also not wish to take any action that destabilizes
Georgia. Georgia is a buffer between Russia and Turkey; the
Turks have no interest in once again bordering Russia, with
whom they fought 13 wars over the centuries.


13. (C) At the same time, the GOT will be under considerable
pressure from the Circassian lobby. While diffuse and
factionalized, the lobby includes a number of well-placed,
influential businesspeople and former high-level bureaucrats
who will urge the GOT to alter its policy of non-engagement
with Abkhazia. These groups have argued that Turkey's
"unilateral," pro-Tbilisi policies have ignored the plight of
peoples living in the region, re-subjecting them to Russian
domination. Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM)
Senior Researcher Hasan Kanbolat underscored the Turkish
Circassian view that Abkhazia desires a Western orientation
and that Turkish engagement with Abkhazia (if not
recognition) is essential to forestalling Russian annexation
of Abkhazia. At the urging of Tbilisi, Ankara has avoided
direct engagement with Sukhumi, leaning on Circassian NGOs to
cancel two "unofficial" visits by Bagapsh (though a visit by
"FM" Shamba took place in June 2008) and holding back its
proposal to link Sukhumi to Trabzon by ferry. The GOT has
long complained to us privately about Georgia's opposition to
even limited engagement with Abkhazia and may no longer be
persuaded by the Georgian argument that any unofficial
engagement would constitute de facto recognition. As we have
learned through our contacts with Turkish Circassian groups,
some Turkish businessmen are already traveling to and
planning to invest in Abkhazia.


14. (SBU) Criticism of Turkish "unilateral" policy in the
Caucasus has resonated beyond the Circassian lobby. As
evidenced by public support for Turkish-Armenian
rapprochement, Turks favor dialogue as a means to solve
problems. Turkish analysts have argued that Turkey has
wasted opportunities to prevent this latest conflict by not
exercising its historic and cultural linkages with the
peoples of the Caucasus. Karasar, for example, has argued
that, in addition to normalizing relations with Armenia,
Turkey should seek dialogue with all parties in the region.
It should channel humanitarian aid to the separatist enclaves
of Georgia while investing heavily in Georgia's
reconstruction. It should accept refugees from Georgia's
war-torn regions, and establish direct economic relations
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including establishing a
flight between Sukhumi and Istanbul. He further advises that
Turkey expand existing scholarship programs for Caucasians
from across the region with an eye to shaping the region's
democratic future. Karasar has endorsed Turkey's Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform concept, but predicts the
platform will fail if it does not offer a seat at the table
to all peoples represented in conflict areas, including
Abkhazians, Ossetians, and even Nagorno-Karabakhians.

RUSSIA AND THE CHECHNYA EXPERIENCE
--------------

15. (C) The extent to which Russia would support enhanced
Turkish engagement with Abkhazia and other separatist
enclaves in the Caucasus is unclear. The GOT believes
Russians harbor lingering historical doubts about Turkey's
intentions in the Caucasus and Central Asia and will be wary
to lose influence to pro-Western, NATO-member Turkey. In the
meantime, Russia will likely continue playing the Circassian
card to foster division between Turkey and Georgia and seek
to exploit the sympathies most Turks have for the Abkhaz in
the conflict with Georgia. Russia witnessed first hand
Circassian influence in Turkey during the 1990s when Turkey
tacitly sided with the Chechens in their separatist war
against Russia, making "unofficial" contacts with Chechen

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leaders, allowing the Chechens to establish unofficial
representation in Istanbul, permitting Chechen insurgents to
move freely within Turkey, and funneling humanitarian aid to
Chechnya over Russian complaints the aid was cover for
weapons shipments. In 1991, four Chechens, including Shamil
Basayev, hijacked a Russian plane and flew it to Ankara to
highlight their cause. The Turks refused the hijackers a
press conference, but allowed them to return to Chechnya
despite Russian demands for their arrest. Overall Turkish
support for the Chechen cause waned eventually as the
insurgency became increasingly associated with terrorism;
Abkhazia is now the cause celebre for Turkish Circassians.

CIRCASSIANS AND CYPRUS
--------------

16. (C) Turkish Circassians point to Turkey's recognition of
an independent "TRNC" as justification for Turkish
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russians too
have invoked northern Cyprus as a precedent. Russia argued
the West paved the way for widespread recognition of the
"TRNC" by recognizing Kosovo's independence. Later, Russia's
Ambassador in Ankara reportedly proposed a convenient
quid-pro-quo to Turkey, suggesting Russian "TRNC" recognition
in exchange for Turkish recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. The Turks have not accepted this thinking, and do
not trust Russia on Cyprus. Moscow is perceived in Ankara as
pro-Greek Cypriot, whereas Moscow has traditionally viewed
the "TRNC" as a base of support for Caucasian separatism.
(NOTE: Then-Chechen "President" Dudayev held the "TRNC" up
as a model for Chechnya during his first "official" visit
abroad to Turkey and the "TRNC" in 1992, where he met with
then-"TRNC" "President" Denktash. END NOTE.) Turkey,
despite its recognition of the "TRNC," supports the
reunification of Cyprus as a bicommunal federation. Turkey
has urged the international community to end the isolation of
northern Cypriots but has never lobbied the international
community strongly on formal "TRNC" recognition.

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