Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA1633
2008-09-11 10:47:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

CJCS VISIT TO TURKEY

Tags:  PREL MARR GG IZ TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0517
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHAK #1633/01 2551047
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111047Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7432
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
RHMFISS/COMSIXTHFLT
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001633 

SIPDIS

FOR CJCS ADM MULLEN FROM AMBASSADOR;
JOINT STAFF FOR LTC BERRIER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2028
TAGS: PREL MARR GG IZ TU
SUBJECT: CJCS VISIT TO TURKEY

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001633

SIPDIS

FOR CJCS ADM MULLEN FROM AMBASSADOR;
JOINT STAFF FOR LTC BERRIER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2028
TAGS: PREL MARR GG IZ TU
SUBJECT: CJCS VISIT TO TURKEY

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (S) The timing of your visit to Turkey is ideal. The
President's commitment in November to provide enhanced
intelligence against the PKK immensely strengthened US
engagement here. But we are now at some pivot points:

-- in Turkey, a new CHOD and DCHOD, both critical people for
our work on a range of issues here;
-- in Iraq, a new MNF-I commander, the SFA and its related
documents, and upcoming changes in US troop deployments;
-- in the Caucasus, a new test to stability and security
literally at Turkey's doorstep; and
-- fresh fears about Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Domestically, Turkey got through the AKP closure crisis
without a political breakdown. Civil-military relations now
seem at least adequate. As we frame US-Turkish dialogue
toward 2009 and beyond, your talks here can serve to convey a
sense of our strategy, reassure Ankara of senior-level USG
interest and understanding, and enlist help where we need it.


2. (C) PM Erdogan, President Gul and CHOD General Basbug will
all express their commitment to US-Turkish ties and NATO, as
well as appreciation for cooperation on the PKK that Basbug
last month labeled "perfect." As DCHOD and Turkish lead at
our HLDG in 2003-05, Basbug was a friend. At his August 28
change of command ceremony, he said that one of his most
important responsibilities is to ensure that US-Turkish
cooperation continues. Basbug is a tough intellectual, a
student of military history and civil-military relations. We
hear he plans to keep TGS-government policy differences more
private than Gen. Buyukanit did. Basbug has observed that
force alone cannot defeat terrorism; economic, social,
diplomatic and other means are needed. To back this up, he
visited the southeast in his first week as CHOD and
studiously listened to Kurdish NGO leaders on the
complexities of politics, economics and terrorism.

PKK/Iraq
--------------


3. (S) Real-time intelligence provided to TGS through our
Combined Intelligence Fusion Cell has fueled almost 100
cross-border strikes against the PKK in northern Iraq since

November. Basbug has suggested that the PKK may be near the
breaking point and that this winter may be decisive.
However, fighting and attacks within Turkey are on their
annual, late-summer/early fall rise in the southeast,
Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin and elsewhere. If the usual PKK flow
back to northern Iraq occurs later this fall and/or if
large-scale PKK attacks within Turkey occur, pressure for a
land operation will rise, but it is just as likely that air,
artillery and possibly Special Forces strikes will remain the
tools of choice.


4. (S) Our work to implement the POTUS/Erdogan undertakings
on the PKK was with Generals Buyukanit and Saygun and their
TGS staff. Basbug stayed out of it, though Land Forces
artillery under his command firing on the PKK surely
benefited from it, as did his new DCHOD, Gen. Igsiz, who just
came from command of the army on the Iraq/PKK front. It will
be helpful for you to convey:

-- the interest you, Gen. Cartwright, Gen. Craddock and Gen.
Odierno have in similar (or better) collaboration with Basbug
and Igsiz;
-- our expectation of continued respect for the
notification/deconfliction understanding that works well;
-- concern that out-of-the-ordinary steps, such as another
land incursion, be thoroughly reviewed with us well in
advance (as happened last February); and
-- the suggestion that Turkey and we need to talk through the
implications of Baghdad,s assertiveness, our likely future
troop posture and the SFA for Turkey's work in Iraq and our
support of it.


5. (S) You may also wish to urge continued efforts with
Baghdad, Erbil and in the southeast by Basbug and the
government. Ankara remains frustrated by KRG inactivity
against the PKK; less direct engagement with it will not

ANKARA 00001633 002 OF 003


create incentives for action. Turkey proposed a mil-mil
cooperation agreement to Iraq. The Iraqis are ignoring it,
and the Turks aren,t pushing very hard, either. Finally,
you should note to military and civilian authorities our
concern about extending Air Cargo Hub operations at Incirlik
past December 31. Inability to use Incirlik will be harmful
to US-Turkish relations and our work in Iraq.

Georgia/Caucasus/Russia
--------------


6. (S) Events in Georgia reminded Turks they are NATO,s
front line in the Caucasus against Russia, on which they
depend for 3/4 of their natural gas. Turkey is deeply
concerned about the prospects for more instability or revived
East-West confrontation, does not see much strategy from the
West, and will not want to be tougher with Russia than
others. Despite misgivings, Turkey approved all our ship
transit and Global Hawk support requests and rebuffed
Moscow's complaints it was bending Montreux to suit us.
Since Georgia, Turkish authorities have not reprised their
whines about US aims in the Black Sea, but they do not want
problems. The mantra U/S Bill Burns got here September 5 was
that out of crisis come opportunities. Ankara's new efforts
with Armenia and attention to Nagorno-Karabakh reflect this.


7. (S) The Turks will likely highlight their commitment to
working with the US and NATO in support of Georgia, reaffirm
their support for Georgia's territorial integrity, promote
their Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, and ask
about our plans. They want reassurance that we will work
within Montreux and that we are not seeking confrontation
with Russia.

Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------


8. (S) The Turkish MFA told Bill Burns September 5 that it is
not optimistic about Afghanistan: too many armed groups, too
many areas of increasing Taliban influence, and too little
work to win hearts and minds. Gen. Saygun complained to Gen.
Cartwright in July that NATO needs a new strategy, more
emphasis on training and equipping the Afghans, and a
substitute livelihood for drugs. Turkey recently pledged an
additional $100m in economic aid, supports expansion of the
ANA (including via training in Turkey),and has pledged two
OMLTs, but has not budged on additional forces for ISAF or
taking on combat roles. Turks are very concerned about
recent developments in Pakistan.


9. (S) You may wish to review the results of recent
discussions in Washington, Kabul and elsewhere about Afghan
strategy and Pakistan. You should urge more support now for
the ANA, help to the Afghans as they consolidate control over
greater Kabul security, and additional forces for ISAF.
Perhaps there is a nice way to turn Turkish questions and
complaints about NATO's failures into an admonition that
while we appreciate past leadership of ISAF and on-going
engagement, Turkey needs to provide more commitment and force
if NATO is to succeed.

Other Items
--------------


10. (C) Other items of note.

-- Cyprus: The first comprehensive talks since the Annan
Plan's failure in 2004 began September 3. Difficult issues
and red lines abound, but initial signs are good. It would
be helpful for TGS publicly to embrace the UN-led talks and
to affirm support for the kind of Turkish troop withdrawals
envisioned in Annan if a suitable overall package is
negotiated.

-- NATO/EU: You know the NATO OPLAN problem and Turkey's
beefs (Cyprus and EU/ESDP stiff-arming of Turkey). As in
Afghanistan, there need at a minimum to be practical,
on-the-ground arrangements among elements in Kosovo. We
believe the long pole in the tent is TGS.

-- HLDG and Future US-Turkish Mil-Mil Cooperation: Our PKK

ANKARA 00001633 003 OF 003


efforts have revealed serious Turkish interoperability and
capability gaps. Short-term, our ODC responded to pleas for
help to develop offers of attack helicopters, a manned ISR
platform and a Predator capability for Turkey -- only to
watch the civilian procurement process here gum things up and
our efforts languish. Longer-term, we have promoted the idea
of a forward looking security cooperation plan with the
Turks. Its target: developing the allied military
capabilities Turkey needs to face upcoming challenges to NATO
and bilaterally (counterterrorism, counter WMD, energy
security, etc.) in ways that ensure interoperability and
compatibility with US and NATO systems. Your mention of this
to Basbug will help get TGS buy-in ahead of staff talks to
prepare the HLDG, which could then be elevated from gripes
about slow licensing and third-party transfer restrictions to
a more appropriately strategic cooperation.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON