Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA1628
2008-09-10 22:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

U.S.-TURKEY STRATEGIC DIALOGUE TALKS, SEPTEMBER 5

Tags:  TU AM GG IR IZ KNNP PREL RU US NATO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0100
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #1628/01 2542215
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 102215Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7424
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 4724
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001628 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE (GARBE) AND EUR/CARC (HUNT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2018
TAGS: TU AM GG IR IZ KNNP PREL RU US NATO
SUBJECT: U.S.-TURKEY STRATEGIC DIALOGUE TALKS, SEPTEMBER 5

REF: A. ANKARA 1611

B. ISTANBUL 482

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001628

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE (GARBE) AND EUR/CARC (HUNT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2018
TAGS: TU AM GG IR IZ KNNP PREL RU US NATO
SUBJECT: U.S.-TURKEY STRATEGIC DIALOGUE TALKS, SEPTEMBER 5

REF: A. ANKARA 1611

B. ISTANBUL 482

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. During a four-hour meeting and working
dinner with Under Secretary Burns September 5, Turkish MFA
Under Secretary Apakan:
-- underscored Turkey's desire for close cooperation with
the U.S.;
-- called for new impetus on the Nabucco pipeline;
-- stated that Ankara seeks to strengthen the
Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan axis and normalize relations
with Armenia;
-- promised to fix the Incirlik Hub Agreement renewal
issue;
-- complained that Turkey is often excluded from NATO
policy planning discussions, despite being a major troop
contributor; and
-- insisted that the Cyprus talks rely on the established
U.N. body of work.

U/S Burns emphasized that Russia's actions in Georgia
"cross the line" and that Moscow must withdraw its troops
and comply with the six-point agreement. Until then, the
international community cannot conduct business as usual.
He expressed concern that Ankara's proposed Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform may send the wrong
signal to Russia because it appears to give Moscow a
"respected place." END SUMMARY.


2. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
---

Under Secretary William Burns
Ambassador Ross Wilson
POL Counselor Dan O'Grady
Deputy POL Counselor Chris Krafft

Turkey
--------------

Under Secretary Ertugrul Apakan
Deputy Under Secretary Unal Cevikoz
Deputy Under Secretary Haydar Berk
Director General for Americas Vefehan Ocak
Director General for Middle East Huseyin Dirioz
Director General for Policy Planning Dicle Kopuz
Deputy Director General for Americas Ersin Ercin
America Department Head Damla Say
Special Advisor to the Under Secretary Mustafa Pulat


CAUCASUS
--------------


3. (C) Noting Russian FM Lavrov's recent visit to
Istanbul, Apakan said the Russians do not think they made a
mistake. Rather, they believe their recognition of South

Ossetia and Abkhazia has to be accepted. They also think
the Georgia situation has changed the regional and global
equation. Medvedev's five points all point to a "cold
peace." Russian expressions are quite different today from
one year ago. Russia does not intend to remain isolated,
but will act forcefully in regions where Russia believes it
should have a privileged position, including
Russian-speaking minorities and Russian business interests
(i.e., Gazprom). The Russian intervention was contrary to
international law, and contrary to Russia's own previous
positions.


4. (C) Apakan said that Turkey attaches great importance
to Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The
West should pursue unity with Georgia and ensure Georgia's
western orientation. Turkey would also like to strengthen
the Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan axis. At the same time, it
plans to pursue normal relations with Armenia and
contribute to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
through improvement of ties between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. As part of this effort, President Gul plans to
travel to Baku following his visit to Yerevan. Turkey
wants also to keep strong its political and economic ties
with Central Asia. Ukraine also needs attention.


5. (C) On energy, Ankara believes that the need for

ANKARA 00001628 002 OF 005


Nabucco has become increasingly apparent. For strategic
reasons, Nabucco must get a new impetus. The Georgian
crisis has shown how vulnerable pipelines are to regional
aggression. A trans-Caspian pipeline is also important.
Energy diversification and ties with Iraq -- both north
and south -- deserve special attention. U/S Burns agreed
with Apakan on the importance of Nabucco and energy
security in general. The U.S. strongly supports weaving
the Nabucco and trans-Caspian pipelines into the global
system. The U.S. supports Turkey's outreach to Baghdad,
that will be important not only for Iraq's political
stability but also for ensuring greater diversity of energy
supplies for Turkey and Europe.


6. (C) Apakan emphasized that we need a strong NATO. The
NATO-Georgia relationship should be bolstered, as should
the NATO-Ukraine Commisison. Apakan noted we all need to
consider how we can transfer OSCE principles to the Caucaus
region. He also stressed that Turkey's role in ESDP must
be increased so that Turkey can take part more actively.


7. (C) Turkey attaches great importance to the stability
of the Black Sea region. Still, there should be no
misunderstanding about Turkey's position vis-a-vis the
U.S., he said. Ankara is always thinking how it can be
helpful to the U.S. The recent Russian flights near the
Turkish coast were seen as a threat. With the U.S., Turkey
has shared objectives and a strategic partnership -- it is
a "permanent part of our foreign policy." We have a close
agenda with the U.S. "We count on the U.S. and you can
count on us." Recent events show that we should increase
our contacts and our cooperation, especially in the Eurasia
region, and if either of us has a problem, we should let
each other know. U.S. investment in Turkey is also a
stabilizing factor and continued political and economic
engagement by the U.S. and the West in the broader region
is critical to creating an area that is safe and welcoming
to democracy and open markets. Many in the region look at
Georgia and realize the same could happen in Ukraine and
other countries in the region.

RUSSIA
--------------


8. (C) U/S Burns said the Shared Vision document is a
significant framework for U.S.-Turkey partnership. He would
be pleased to meet U/S Apakan later in New York. There were
many areas where the two countries could make progress
together. Burns noted the increasing dangers posed by
Russian assertiveness. The challenge is when they "cross the
line." It was obvious that Saakashvili made mistakes, but
the Russian response was wildly disproportionate. Russian
troops had gone (and stayed) 200 kilometers into Georgia.


9. (C) Moscow has ignored the six-point plan and has
recognized South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence. This
requires a strong response, Burns said. Russia needs to
comply with he six-point agreement and get its troops out,
and we need OSCE monitors and an EU mission in. Until then,
the international community cannot conduct business as usual.
U/S Burns reviewed USG bilateral measures in response to
Russian actions, including: the U.S. will likely withdraw the
U.S.-Russia 123 nuclear agreement; cancelling some joint
military exercises; G-8 meetings have been postponed. U/S
Burns added that it is not the President's view that we
should look to kick Russia out of the G-8. We need Russia to
step back behind the lines it has crossed, and at the same
time, we need to help get Georgia back on its feet. We
appreciate Turkey's steps as custodian of the Montreux
Convention. U.S. naval vessels are simply delivering
humanitarian supplies and coming out. We remain mindful of
Turkey's Montreux responsibilities, and the U.S. is not
seeking an expanded naval presence in the Black Sea.


10. (C) Close coordination will be critical for Ukraine and
other countries. We are not seeking confrontation but we
want to make clear that these states can count on all of us.
The consequences of Russian over-reaching will become
apparent. Some economic consequences already are having an
impact, as overseas investors pull out of Russia and the
Russian stock market falls.

CSCP
--------------


11. (C) Apakan said Ankara hopes the Caucasus Security and
Cooperation Platform (CSCP) could provide a synergy for

ANKARA 00001628 003 OF 005


discussion. The immediate impetus was to underscore
Georgia's independence and territorial integrity, as well
as that of the region's other countries. It was not
intended to have a limited implementation, but rather to be
long range. The idea is not to leave the three independent
Caucasus countries to the discretion of Russia. On the
contrary, CSCP shows that we (Turkey and the West) are here
as well. Apakan stressed that Turkey does not view CSCP as
an isolated regional discussion, but rather part of a
broader international engagement with the region, noting,
"We don't want to be alone with Russia here."


12. (C) U/S Burns said he understands Turkey's motivation
and the potential utility of CSCP in the medium and
long-term. However, in the short term, it does not send the
right signal to Russia. It appears to give Russia a
respected place in this new formation in the immediate
aftermath of egregiously bad Russian behavior. In addition,
it was unfortunate that there was no U.S.-Turkey dialogue
ahead of time about this proposal. (Apakan responded that
the crisis had occurred suddenly and during the summer
vacation. He himself had just returned from holiday.
Everyone had been caught unaware. When Russia moved on
Tbilisi, we all understood what this meant for Georgia and
all of us.)

IRAQ
--------------


13. (C) Apakan said Ankara wants the U.S. to succeed in
Iraq. Iraqi stability and security will have a direct
impact on Turkey. Ankara does not want Iraq divided into
two or three entities. Ankara is focusing its efforts on
maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity. It also has good
ties with, and is supporting, the Maliki government.
Turkey is providing assistance to Iraq and is looking to
conclude its bilateral agreement on military-to-military
cooperation with Iraq so that it can help to arm and train
Iraq's armed forces and further strengthen the bilateral
relationship. The Iraqis appear to be waiting for the
U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework and Status of Forces
Agreements to be finalized first. Ankara is not asking for
early U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq. To the contrary, it
supports the U.S. troop presence as long as it is necessary
to create the stability needed for the GOI to maintain its
control. Turkey is thankful for U.S. cooperation on
intelligence sharing, as well as continued cooperation on
arms
smuggling from Iraq. The GOT continues to seek a separate
legal arrangement for Kirkuk that will ensure the rights of
all its citizens are protected and will continue to support
the efforts of the U.S. and UNAMI in this regard. Apakan
noted that Iraq's internal administrative boundaries are
not so important if we are all thinking in terms of
establishing one, unified Iraq. He also noted Turkey would
like to see international monitors in place to help ensure
local elections go smoothly, especially in Kirkuk. The GOT
is also pressing Iran to reduce its involvement in Iraq.


14. (C) U/S Burns agreed that we should keep in close
touch on strategic agreements with Iraq and expressed U.S.
support for Turkey's constructive role. He raised the
issue of the Incirlik Hub agreement, the renewal for which
is pending. Deputy U/S Berk said Ankara would "find a way"
to resolve this. Apakan noted that because the legal basis
for the Incirlik Hub agreement is a U.N. Security Council
resolution (which expires in December),Ankara needs to
find a different legal framework "to fix it." Ambassador
pointed out that 75 percent of the air cargo for U.S.
troops in Iraq goes through Incirlik. As they look ahead,
U.S. military planners will have to begin planning
alternatives within the next 4-6 weeks. The loss of
Incirlik would be expensive and unhelpful for U.S.-Turkish
Relations, the Ambassador added.

IRAN
--------------


15. (C) Apakan said Ankara has periodic contacts with the
Iran's leaders. He referred to President Gul's recent
meeting with President Ahmadinejad, noting that Turkey
delivered a strong message urging Iran to comply with
international obligations. (septel) Turkey does not intend
to mediate or play a direct role but it is willing to convey
a message if requested. Ankara views Iran's enrichment
activities as a clear threat. Apakan seemed to dismiss the
likelihood of concluding an energy cooperation agreement with

ANKARA 00001628 004 OF 005


Iran, while defending Turkey's rationale for pursuing such an
agreement. Apakan noted that decades of talks with Iran have
produced nothing. Turkey's main options for energy are
Iraq, the Trans Caspian and Nabucco. U/S Burns stressed that
Iran's current course would lead to further isolation and
further financial and other measures by the US, and
like-minded countries to raise pressure on Iran to change
direction. .

MIDEAST
--------------


16. (C) Apakan said Turkey supports the Annapolis process,
and views Palestinian unity as critical. Turkey has
supported the parties by advancing development and other
projects, specifically through industrial zone projects in
both Gaza and the West Bank, while Ankara's Bilkent
University is also trying to establish a university on the
Israel-Palestinian border in the West Bank. Turkey continues
to press Syria to disengage from Lebanon, in the long-term
hope that a new western-oriented Syria will eventually
emerge. Meanwhile, the GOT has facilitated four rounds of
Israel-Syria talks over the past eight months. Apakan
observed that Syria desires US involvement in the dialogue.
Ankara sees its role as a "starter" and "instigator" but does
not envision playing an intermediary role for the long-term.
U/S Burns welcomed Turkey's efforts and noted awareness that
Syria may welcome an eventual American role. Apakan said the
Turkish MFA is studying how OSCE principles could be
translated to apply to the Middle East and handed over two
papers laying out Turkish thinking on the issue (emailed to
EUR/SE). Burns said the USG has also explored this concept,
looking for a way to construct a framework similar to
CSCE/Helsinki principles, and then using it to break down
barriers, both internally and between nations in the region.
He suggested that this could be discussed in more detail when
he and Apakan meet in New York.

AFGHANISTAN
--------------


17. (C) Despite a half-century of Turkish contributions to
Afghanistan, Apakan conceded that he is not optimistic.
The Taliban appears resurgent. The Turkish PRT in Wardak
is in an area that is again falling under the influence of
the Taliban, and even in the Turkic-dominated northern
provinces there is a renewed infiltration of Taliban.
Still, Ankara is continuing its education and military
assistance programs. He noted that Ankara no longer sees
Dostum as a threat and urged that a way be found to leave
him alone. Further moves against Dostum would be unhelpful
with northern Afghans who are themselves helping to block
the Taliban. It would also create domestic problems in
Turkey. Apakan said Deputy U/S Sinirlioglu would visit
Afghanistan in mid-September to talk further on this
issue. U/S Burns said that the USG would greatly
appreciate anything more that Turkey could do for the
Afghan Army and suggested Sinirlioglu meet with Ambassador
Wood while in Kabul.

PAKISTAN
--------------


18. (C) Apakan expressed concern about the fallout from
the Pakistan presidential elections. Sharif was creating
problems. We should not lose Pakistan, he said. The GOT
will continue efforts to facilitate engagement between
Pakistan and Afghanistan. U/S Burns said he shares those
concerns, particularly since Pakistan is a nuclear state.
The government appears unwilling to make serious reform
efforts and security measures alone in the tribal areas
will not be enough.

BALKANS
--------------


19. (C) KOSOVO: Apakan suggested that more countries need
to recognize Kosovo. Meanwhile, he was encouraging
Ankara's Middle East Technical University to open a campus
there. U/S Burns asked if Ankara could encourage the
Saudis, so far reluctant to act, to recognize Kosovo.
Apakan said Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries are
sensitive about the issue of territorial integrity and will
wait for a longer list of nations to recognize before
moving forward themselves.


20. (C) MACEDONIA: Apakan said Ankara supports Macedonia,

ANKARA 00001628 005 OF 005


but does not want to hurt Greece. Therefore, as the USG
requested, Turkey will delay the signing of its security
agreement with Skopje until after UNGA and tone down any
language that might be objectionable to Athens.

NATO
--------------


21. (C) U/S Burns urged that Turkey work with us and others
to find pratical ways for NATO and the EU to work together on
the ground in Kosovo. Apakan disagreed, saying that Turkey
is one of the major troop contributors EU peacekeeping
missions, but is not part of the policy planning for such
operations. Apakan said this humiliates Turkey, which then
finds itself isolated. NATO should act on consensus and not
according to EU norms. NATO is the only place for real
strategic discussions. Turkey wants to be treated equally,
and NATO leaders should stand up and say that they need
Turkey.

CYPRUS
--------------


22. (C) Apakan noted that the Greek Cypriots' rejection of
the Annan Plan may have surprised many people, but it had
not surprised the professionals who had been working on
Cyprus. He underscored the many years of U.N. work that
had produced key points: ten years of effort on "political
equality"; 15 years of work on "equal status." It is
critical that the U.N. body of work and these U.N.
parameters be maintained. The Annan Plan had recognized
that security and soverance are the main concerns for
Turkish Cypriots, and property for the Greek Cypriots. It
provided for the drawdown of Turkish troops over 30 months
to a level of 650, and a continued Turkish guarantee, and
Turkey stand by these elements. On power-sharing, the
Dayton agreements could serve as a model. Apakan lamented
the "asymmetry" that the Greek Cypriots turned down the
Annan Plan but joined the EU, while the Turkish Cypriots
said "yes" but remain isolated. The real Cyprus settlement
will be Turkey joining the EU, he said.


23. (C) Apakan argued that the U.N. must retain its
consistency. There is no going back to the 1970s. Ankara
had complained about Annan but later understood that was
the best they could do. He regretted that so many of the
U.N. officials who worked on Cyprus -- De Soto, Camillion,
Feissel -- are gone. The new U.N. officials should not
ignore the previous U.N. work when they bring in new ideas.


24. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this cable.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON