Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA1611
2008-09-09 09:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: PRESIDENT GUL MEETS U/S BURNS

Tags:  TU AM GG IR IZ KNNP PREL RU US NATO 
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001611 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE (GARBE) AND EUR/CARC (HUNT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2018
TAGS: TU AM GG IR IZ KNNP PREL RU US NATO
SUBJECT: TURKEY: PRESIDENT GUL MEETS U/S BURNS

REF: A. ANKARA 1602

B. ANKARA 1597

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001611

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE (GARBE) AND EUR/CARC (HUNT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2018
TAGS: TU AM GG IR IZ KNNP PREL RU US NATO
SUBJECT: TURKEY: PRESIDENT GUL MEETS U/S BURNS

REF: A. ANKARA 1602

B. ANKARA 1597

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. During a September 5 meeting with Under
Secretary Burns, Turkish President Gul said his trip to
Yerevan the next day is intended to lay the foundation for
progress in bilateral relations. He spoke at length about
his private "blunt" discussions with Iranian President
Ahmadinejad and expressed disquiet at how the Iranians appear
"detached from reality." He insisted that Turkey is serious
about pursuing a Cyprus solution, but noted Turkish redlines.
On Caucasus, Gul called Russia the most powerful country in
the region. We must make the limits clear, but not
needlessly agitate them. Gul underscored the importance of
Turkey's close cooperation with the U.S., calling it a major
pillar of Turkish foreign policy. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) President Gul told U/S Burns that given the many
regional problems Turkey faces, problems where U.S. and
Turkish issues largely overlap, consultation and cooperation
with the U.S. is one of the main pillars of this country's
foreign policy. Gul acknowledged that there have been recent
misunderstandings, but insisted Turkey has been "very clear"
on its commitment to maintaining its strong place in the
Western alliance, its pursuit of common values and its
pro-U.S. direction. He appreciated the wide-ranging
telephone conversation he had with the President several days
earlier. U/S Burns agreed that the many common challenges we
face necessitates our close work together and that we listen
to one another.

Caucasus
--------------


3. (C) President Gul called the situation in Georgia "very
worrisome." Turkey belongs to both the Balkans and the
Caucasus, Gul noted, and peace and stability in both is
crucial for Turkey. What has worked out so well for the
former should also be applied in the latter. Turkey had come
out strongly in support of Georgia's territorial integrity
and sovereignty. This stance will continue. But, Gul added,

Russia is the most powerful country in the region. It is
necessary to act so as not to pull the region into greater
problems and at the same time make our redlines clear.
Turkey fully supports the position of the allies, but also
wants not needlessly to agitate the Russians.


4. (C) U/S Burns said the U.S. admires Turkey's support for
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia.
Russia's behavior has been dangerous and deeply disturbing,
and Russia needs to comply with the Sarkozy-Medvedev
six-point plan. The U.S. would do everything possible to get
Georgia back on its feet. Turkey's efforts in this regard
are important, too.

Iran
--------------


5. (C) President Gul described his 90-minute one-on-one with
Iranian President Ahmadinejad in Istanbul last month. The
discussion had focused almost exclusively on the nuclear
issue, and Gul was blunt. Gul said he told Ahmadinejad that
"closed" countries such as Iran have difficulty understanding
global developments and regional realities. For example,
Ahmadinejad had boasted that when Iran's relations with
Europe deteriorate, it is the Europeans who lose. Gul had
responded that if this is true, why is Tehran unable to
access its frozen assets in Europe? Cutting off Iran from
modernity, technology and globalization may create a
situation in which the country suddenly collapses. Gul
commented that Ahmadinejad seems detached from reality -- "a
day dreamer."


6. (C) Gul's impression was that while the Iranians may
appreciate the contents of the P5 1 package, the regime is
looking for security guarantees. He stressed that U/S Burns'
participation in the Geneva meeting with other P5 1 Political
Directors on July 19, had made an impression on Iran's
leaders. He added that Ahmadinejad was unfailingly courteous
when referring to the U.S. and to President Bush. Gul
observed that Iranian domestic politics are complex and that
no faction commands authority. This dynamic requires
outreach to a wide-range of influential players. He also
noted that many Iranians ("this segment is larger than you
think") are eager for good relations with the West, but are

ANKARA 00001611 002 OF 003


sensitive to Iran's treatment by the West.


7. (C) U/S Burns agreed that Iran faces dangers from within
its own society; Iran faces a number of contradictions,
including a gap between the regime and its increasingly
youthful population who yearn for modernity, and connections
to the West. Iran's continued pursuit of a nuclear program in
defiance of the international community's concerns is an
obstacle to Iran's integration but the P5 1 offer could serve
as an opportunity for Iran. In Geneva, the U/S had been
clear and firm: our presence represented P5 1 unity and
demonstrated that the USG stands behind the P5 1 offer but if
Iran does not accept the package, consequences will follow.
He said that Gul's blunt messages seem important and urged
that the U.S. and Turkey continue to coordinate. Burns also
urged Ankara to reconsider energy cooperation agreements with
Iran; these deals portray a business as usual attitude which
could lead the Iranians to believe that the international
community is not united against Iran's nuclear weapons
ambitions.

Armenia
--------------


8. (C) Gul said Turkey has set its course on resolving all
its neighborhood problems. The state of Turkey-Armenia
relations "saddens us." We want to be on a proper level with
all neighbors, he said. Accordingly, Ankara has made
gestures to Yerevan: inviting the Armenians to join the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation; extending aid; providing unhindered
air transport links; allowing 70,000 Armenians to work
illegally in Turkey without repercussions. Gul acknowledged
that President Sarkisian had made a "brave move" to invite
Gul to Yerevan. The move was appreciated. He noted they
will not be there "just to watch the game." The two
presidents planned to lay the foundation for an improved
atmosphere. They will not discuss details. They want to
initiate a process.


9. (C) Gul planned to talk in Yerevan about the Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP). The Armenians and
Azerbaijanis have problems between them. The region will be
at risk as long as these problems continue. Armenia becoming
part of the West, as well as a CSCP partner, is in Turkey's
interest. The Minsk Group process has only perpetuated the
status quo, which means much time has been lost. Solving the
Armenia-Azerbaijan problems would produce a "new unity" for
the entire region. If this were realized, Iran would "no
longer be so dearly needed." The Georgia events have
prompted Ankara to focus on the Caucasus. It hopes for USG
support.


10. (C) U/S Burns expressed admiration for President Gul's
trip to Yerevan. This shows both courage and initiative. He
agreed that opportunities often arise from crisis. Making
Armenia a partner of the West could open the door to a
Nagorno-Karabakh solution. The U.S. is ready to consult and
cooperate closely with Turkey on regional issues, although
it's important to think through carefully initiatives like
the CSCP, and not inadvertently send the wrong signals about
Russia's role.

Iraq
--------------


11. (C) Gul described Iraq as going through a critical
phase. Still, Ankara is pleased that things are improving in
terms of the security situation and in the Maliki
administration's ability to govern. Turkey is aware of USG
efforts to conclude a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) and
a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Baghdad. Ankara
would like to have closer consultation with the U.S., not
only on the SOFA but also on proposed laws regarding
elections and petroleum. Relations with the north of the
country are key. Turkey for years during the Saddam era
supported the rights of the Iraqi Kurds, and protected them,
but is concerned about their "maximalist" position. In
Kirkuk, the rights of the Turkomen should be protected. The
city is a microcosm of Iraq and, as such, should represent a
model for the entire nation. The proposed 32 32 32 4
powersharing formula for the provincial assembly is a good
one.


12. (C) U/S. Burns said we would try to arrange for Ankara
consultations with Iraq Coordinator Ambassador Satterfield.
We look forward to continuing our cooperation with Turkey on
intelligence sharing to combat the PKK. He expressed support

ANKARA 00001611 003 OF 003


for the work of UNAMI and di Mistura.

Cyprus
--------------


13. (C) Gul said that he discussed in late August with
visiting Turkish Cypriot leader Talat Turkey's support for a
lasting Cyprus settlement. This support is not a tactic;
Turkey is not trying to endear itself to the rest of the
world. Ankara wants a solution. However, it cannot turn
away from "basic tenets." These include the existing U.N.
parameters; bizonality; two equal political entities; and
Turkey as a guarantor state. Turkey already has shown its
good intentions through its strong advocacy of the Annan Plan
in 2004. This stance will continue. Gul said he only hopes
the Greek Cypriots' commitment is not tactical but rather a
genuine effort to achieve a settlement.


14. (C) U/S Burns said the U.S. will do all it can to
support the U.N. process, and will stay in touch with Ankara.
There have been too many missed opportunities.


15. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this cable.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON