CLOSING MAKHMOUR REFUGEE CAMP: HOW REALISTIC A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000158

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/SE AND NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PREF PTER PGOV PHUM TU IZ
SUBJECT: CLOSING MAKHMOUR REFUGEE CAMP: HOW REALISTIC A
SHORT-TERM GOAL?

REF: BAGHDAD 167

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Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Efforts to re-energize negotiations to close
Makhmour refugee camp in northern Iraq will continue to be
hindered by GOT and UNHCR security concerns related to the
camp. Working level GOT officials believe radical PKK
elements continue to control the camp. They believe a
permanent UNHCR presence and a viable, trusted security force
are needed to provide an effective cordon around the camp.
Both could help ensure such elements remain unable to
intimidate and unduly influence camp residents. Yet camp
residents have been there so long that most are likely well
indoctrinated. UNHCR-Ankara officials admit the lack of
permanent UNHCR staff at Makhmour makes monitoring camp life
impossible. Both MFA and UNHCR indicate that a Coalition
force security presence/control over the camp could make the
difference in breaking this long-standing stalemate. We
should consider what additional forces might be made
available as part of a clear and agreed strategy to close
Makhmour. END SUMMARY

GOT Not Ready to Resume Talks on Makhmour Under Current
Conditions
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2. (C) The GOT has not seen a change in the degree to which
the PKK exercises control over Makhmour refugee camp since
negotiations on camp closure broke off in April 2007, MFA
Security Affairs Department Head Ceren Etiz told us January

25. Noting she had discussed the issue with lead GOT
negotiator DG for Security Affairs Amb. Hayati Guven just
before meeting with us, Etiz emphasized the GOT's underlying
concern regarding the ability of Makhmour residents to make a
choice regarding their future free of PKK intimidation and
influence. It is not enough to describe the camp as
"civilian in nature" because a (January 2007) search for
weapons turned up nothing. The question is whether a group
of known radical, hard-core PKK members will continue to be
allowed to exercise control over the camp and its inhabitants.


3. (C) Etiz questioned whether most Makhmour residents would
want to return since those who wished to leave in years past
had done so. She argued that some Makhmour residents who had
spoken out against the PKK in years past had been cast out of
the camp. UNHCR has never provided the GOT detailed
information from previous camp censuses so Etiz said the GOT
does not have a comprehensive list of residents. Turkish
officials know from intelligence sources and open-source
reports that a number of hard-core PKK members remain in the
camp, some in leadership positions. Given the lack of
information, Etiz said the GOT does not know how many might
want to return but wants to ensure that when residents are
given a choice, they have the ability to make the decision
freely. She noted, for example, that residents with sons
fighting with the main force of the PKK at Kandil Mountain or
in other camps near the Turkey-Iraq border may be told by the
PKK who control the camp that they must remain if their sons
are to remain safe. It is in the PKK's interest to keep a
massive camp of ethnic Kurdish refugees open, both as a
recruiting ground and as a tool to help prop up the cause of
Kurdish nationalism.


4. (C) Etiz claimed the camp's mayor, Abdulkerim Tunc, is a
known PKK member who has been quoted as saying, "We do not
want to go back to Turkey unless we can return as what we
are" (i.e., PKK members). Etiz said the GOT has previously
indicated its willingness to provide information to those who
wish to return regarding any outstanding arrest warrants. A
problem arises, however, if previously unknown information
about residents' activities at Makhmour comes to light as
they return to Turkey. In such cases, prosecutors could open
cases against some individuals. Such individuals could avail

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themselves of Turkey's existing repentance law provided they
were not involved in violence. Most camp residents may not
be aware of that law, given the degree to which the PKK
controls communication to its members and followers,
according to Etiz.


5. (C) Any decision on Makhmour will be of a political nature
and require the attention of the highest levels of the GOT.
But, Etiz noted, some bureaucrat will have to sign the
tripartite agreement and additional protocol related to the
camp closure. That person will be taking responsibility for
the residents who may choose to return. GOT security
agencies will want to carefully screen returnees to ensure
the next suicide bomber is not among them. While no one can
ever guarantee that, GOT officials believe a permanent UNHCR
presence and a beefed-up, viable security cordon around the
camp may provide them the necessary confidence that hard-core
PKK members are removed from the camp's population.


6. (C) Etiz said the GOT would be willing to move ahead with
talks if it were clear the security plan agreed upon years
ago was being implemented. That, in the GOT's view, has not
happened. In 2003, the implication that Coalition forces
would provide security was the basis for this agreement,
according to Etiz. Events in Iraq had precluded that.
However, if the security situation in Iraq has changed
appreciably to allow an effective presence of MNF-I troops,
as well as the permanent presence of UNHCR staff, perhaps the
equation will change. Failing that, GOT officials do not
currently have confidence that ISF-hatted Peshmerga provide
sufficient security to enable the Turks to re-engage on the
issue. She gave several examples of cases in which Peshmerga
had in recent months given in to camp resident demands to
loosen control of access to the camp. Finally, according to
Etiz, the impact of the closure of Makhmour on the larger
struggle against PKK terrorism is not big enough to make it a
top GOT priority in that struggle.

UNHCR -- Willing to Consider Talks
--------------


7. (C) UNHCR Acting Country Representative Roland Schilling
and Senior Protection Officer Eduardo Yrezabal told us
January 25 they had had no discussions or substantive contact
with GOT officials on Makhmour since the April 2007 Geneva
meeting. At that time, all sides agreed the differences were
unlikely to be bridged. Schilling and Yrezabal agreed the
political situation had changed substantially in Turkey with
the July 2007 elections and military action by Turkish forces
against the PKK. As a result, it might be useful to ask
UNHCR headquarters in Geneva about resuming talks. Schilling
noted the principal stumbling block remains GOT concerns
regarding security at the camp. Yrezabal said UNHCR
officials in Iraq claim GOI-provided security is having some
impact on camp access. However, discovering the true nature
of PKK control over camp residents would require a permanent
UNHCR presence which current security conditions in Iraq make
difficult. Currently, UNHCR officials visit the camp
monthly, but given the logistical difficulty of arranging
such visits, any element of surprise is lost. This created a
de factor power vacuum which camp leadership filled.
Schilling noted UNHCR generally is more willing to place its
employees in dangerous situations but would likely have to
battle the UN's security bureaucrats to move a permanent
presence into Makhmour. Were Coalition forces able to
provide security, it might be easier for UNHCR to make a case
for permanent staffing.


8. (C) Regarding reports of 22 new families arriving from
Turkey and receiving permission to settle in the camp,
Schilling expressed surprise and said he was unaware. Since
only GOI authorities can make a determination to offer
refugee status to such individuals, he was curious how their
status was determined. Yrezabal promised to follow-up with

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UNHCR local staff in Erbil. Schilling agreed that fresh
movement of ethnic Kurdish citizens of Turkey into Makhmour
could complicate efforts to convince current residents of
improved conditions inside Turkey as a reason to return.


9. (C) COMMENT: As we engage with GOT leaders and urge them
to make continued progress on non-kinetic actions to counter
the PKK, it will be helpful to know whether we are able to
provide the security support envisioned by some here.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON