VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PM ERDOGAN

S E C R E T ANKARA 001565

SIPDIS

NSC PLS PASS OVP (CHRIS HAAVE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2038
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PM ERDOGAN

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

Mr. Vice President,

1. (C) Your planned September 6 meeting with Turkish PM
Erdogan offers an opportunity to consult on five sets of
issues: Georgia and the Caucasus, energy, Iran, Iraq, and
the need for renewed Turkish reform. Erdogan is in confident
form following relative victory in the closure case against
the AKP and a much needed vacation. He and the country are
anxious about regional instabilities and look especially for
clear indications as to the US strategy for Russia and how it
relates to Turkey.
Georgia/Russia/Caucasus
--------------


2. (S) Georgia is the principal focus here now. Erdogan
advisors express to us acute concern about finding yet
another combustible problem on a border fraught with
flammables in Syria/the Middle East, Iraq and Iran. They
recognize that the implications of revived, Cold War-like
confrontation with Russia are far worse for their country
than even the on-going problems in Iraq. Erdogan was
reportedly flustered when President Saakashvili told him
"victory is in sight" in South Ossetia during a phone call
shortly after fighting broke out in early August. While they
recognize that action against Georgia aims to thwart NATO and
Western interests there and to reassert Russian dominance in
the former USSR, the Turks also blame Saakashvili for
recklessly taking the bait and endangering others' vital
interests without prior consultation. Fears about wider
instability in the Caucasus, vulnerability to dependence on
Russia for energy and for trade access to Central Asia, and
the possibility of again becoming deeply dependent upon the
US in a revived confrontation with Moscow have led Ankara to
search for political ways of defusing the crisis. The same
caution had made Turkey hesitant with us.


3. (S) Two specifics bear highlighting. (1) Days after
Russia's invasion, Erdogan publicly revived a 1990s proposal
by then-President Demirel to create a Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform (CSCP) that would include Turkey,
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Turkish authorities
saw this as a way to get the parties talking, require
recognition of one Georgia (there would be no separate seats
for South Ossetia or Abkhazia),and engineer a four versus
one dynamic that might moderate obnoxious Russian behavior.
Unfortunately, they did not consult with us or others, did
not make clear what the CSCP would be, and now find the whole
idea overtaken Russia,s recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. (2) The government has been hesitant on US
intelligence collection proposals and our Navy straits
transit requests. It is concerned that these may further
provoke tension, fears the possibility of an August 1914-like
spiral out of control in the eastern Black Sea, and believes
that the Montreux convention limits on warship passage
through the Turkish Straits are one instrument for preventing
this. As of this writing, however, they have agreed to all
our formal requests.


4. (S) PM Erdogan will look for a sense from you of our
strategy on Russia/Georgia and how our day-to-day requests of
Turkey relate to it. Stung by criticism that he is handling
relations with the West over Georgia badly, Erdogan will be
looking for a sense of what active role Ankara can play in a
region where Turkey has vital interests. You may wish to
note that while the CSCP may have merit over time, pursuing
it now while Russian troops roam throughout Georgia sends the
wrong signal and undercuts Turkey's and our interests there
(whatever Saakashvili's flaws). On a different front, you
may wish to urge continued progress on normalizing relations
with Armenia. On the same day as your meeting with Erdogan,
a Turkey-Armenia soccer match takes place in Yerevan to which
President Gul has been invited. If he goes, it will be good
not only for Turkish-Armenian relations but also as a
powerful alternative vision for the Caucasus that isn,t
under a Kremlin thumb.
Energy
--------------


5. (C) Turkey is obsessed with the need for additional
energy supplies both to diversify away from over-reliance on
Russia and Iran and to meet rising demand. A nuclear power
tender comes due in mid-September (GE leads one of the
interested consortia),there is fitful attention to
alternative sources in this wind and sun-rich country, and
interest in both Caspian and Iraqi gas is acute. So much so
that despite the fact that Nabucco is Erdogan's stated number
one energy priority, his energy ministry has attached such a
high price tag in terms of Caspian gas that must be reserved
for the Turkish market as to crowd out downstream Nabucco
customers, blocking other work to get the pipeline financed
and built.


6. (C) Boyden Grady tried during a visit in early July to
urge Erdogan promptly to reach a gas supply understanding
with President Aliyev that would unlock the next steps on
Nabucco. Little has happened since, but energy was a topic
during two summer visits by Erdogan to Azerbaijan, and
Turkey's energy minister goes to Astana, Ashgabat and Baku
shortly. You may wish to reiterate the urgent need for
progress on Nabucco now and could add that doing so may
partially reassure the former Soviet states now anxious about
Russia's longer-term motives.
Iran
--------------


7. (S) Since you were here in March, FM Babacan has met with
FM Mottaki and other Iranian leaders at least five times, and
President Ahmadinejad paid a controversial visit to Istanbul
August 14-15. The Turks have privately pressed Iran
repeatedly to accept the P5/1 offer, aware of the costs to
their interests if diplomacy fails. There has been less
equivocation by Turkish leaders since Erdogan's waffling to
you in March, but you may wish again to urge more teeth in
Turkey's approach if diplomacy is to have any chance and to
note that this will be more necessary if Russia becomes less
cooperative on the Iran nuclear file. You may also want to
urge great caution on any further energy dealings with Iran.
Ankara did not take further steps during Ahmadinejad's visit
to bring to fruition a vague, July 2007 MOU on possible
natural gas cooperation and investment in Iran; non-action
should remain Turkey's posture.
Iraq/PKK
--------------


8. (S) The aggravation that you heard from CHOD Gen.
Buyukanit about how the US (Secretary Gates, in particular)
handled the end of Turkey's ground incursion into northern
Iraq in February has passed. His replacement, in public
remarks August 28, called US-Turkish mil-mil relations
"perfect." Turkish air and artillery strikes continue when
there is a target, but there hasn't been much controversy in
recent weeks. The PKK's annual autumn return to base may
revive interest in a land forces assault on them in coming
months, and we're watching this. While the organization
seems divided and weakened, PKK violence -- including in the
western cities of Izmir and Mersin -- is on the upswing. The
government has announced economic development plans for the
southeast and Kurdish language broadcasting, but no real
political-social-economic strategy for separating the
population from the PKK has materialized, and PKK recruitment
is reportedly up. With Iraq itself, Erdogan followed up
President Talabani's trip to Ankara in early March by
visiting Baghdad in July -- the first Turkish PM there since
1990 and the first regional leader other than Ahmadinejad
since before 2003. Erdogan and PM Maliki signed a strategic
cooperation agreement. Engagement with the KRG PM Nechirvan
Barzani has gone forward, too.


9. (C) You may wish to reiterate our commitment to continue
working the PKK problem with Turkey, welcome and encourage
more engagement with the Iraqis and Iraqi Kurds, and urge
more vigorous and visible steps to deal comprehensively with
the underlying issues exploited by the PKK in Turkey's
southeast.
Turkish Reform
--------------


10. (C) PM Erdogan's administration was strengthened by the
Constitutional Court's July 30 decision to fine, but not
close, the ruling AKP. The jury is still out as to whether
Erdogan views the decision as a victory or a warning; a
government agenda focused on liberalizing, EU-related reforms
and economic development will help discourage fears of
continued polarization and political tension. The opposition
remains primed to contest any step the government tries to
take, and local elections next March are likely to distract
politicians from tackling controversial issues. You may wish
to urge Erdogan to pursue EU-related reforms in the most
vigorous way possible and to more effectively make the case
for the EU to his people.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON