Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA1497
2008-08-19 12:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY URGES AHMADINEJAD TO ACCEPT P5/1 OFFER

Tags:  PREL PGOV ENRG EPET IR TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 191242Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7191
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001497 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE, NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG EPET IR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY URGES AHMADINEJAD TO ACCEPT P5/1 OFFER

REF: A. ISTANBUL 439

B. ANKARA 1405

Classified By: CDA Doug Silliman, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001497

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE, NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG EPET IR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY URGES AHMADINEJAD TO ACCEPT P5/1 OFFER

REF: A. ISTANBUL 439

B. ANKARA 1405

Classified By: CDA Doug Silliman, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. According to an MFA readout, President Gul
told visiting Iranian President Ahmadinejad August 15 that
Iran should take advantage of the P5/1 refreshed package and
urged the Iranians to be constructive on regional issues.
Ahmadinejad did not respond substantively, other than to deny
a military aspect to Iran's nuclear program. Gul advised
Ahmadinejad that the American public favors a tough approach
on Iran and he should not expect U.S. presidential elections
to soften U.S. policy. Ankara is not optimistic Iran will
respond positively in the near term, observing that the
Iranians are "not ready to make a decision yet." The GOI
fears it will "lose" if negotiations with the P5/1 fail,
while Iranian leaders eye each other warily for any sign of
weakness on which they can capitalize for political gain.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) As a neighbor, Turkey could not put off indefinitely
President Ahmadinejad's August 14-15 visit to Turkey (ref A),
new MFA DG for Middle East and South Asia Huseyin Dirioz told
CDA August 18. He emphasized the high cost of failure for
Turkey if the diplomatic process with Iran fails, resulting
in either military conflict or Iran developing a nuclear
weapon or nuclear weapon capacity. The GOT, he underscored,
opposes nuclear weapons in Iran. Turkey believes it is
uniquely positioned to deliver frank messages to the Iranians
without offending them, and sincerely hopes Iran will engage.



3. (C) Reading from a Presidency document marked "secret,"
Dirioz said Gul was blunt with Ahmadinejad, telling him Iran
should:

-- Take advantage of the P5/1 refreshed package, make good
use of the "freeze-for-freeze" offer and approach
negotiations positively.

-- Appreciate the U.S. effort to engage Iran more directly,
evidenced by Secretary Rice's signature on the package and
U/S Burn's participation at the Geneva talks.

-- Act responsibly in the Middle East and pursue constructive
regional polices.



4. (C) Gul argued there are major risks to Iran and the
region if the diplomatic process stays locked; it is in
Iran's interest to pursue the path of negotiations (a message
Dirioz said Gul underlined by reminding the Iranians that
Turkey told the Iraqis the same in 2003). If the GOI takes
steps to normalize its position in the international
community, the government can focus on economic growth and
development.


5. (C) Ahmadinejad responded neither positively nor
negatively to these messages. According to Dirioz, Gul's
impression is that Tehran believes that if it enters into a
second phase of negotiations which then fail, Iran will be in
a worse position than it is in now. In Tehran recently for
the NAM ministerial, Dirioz observed a heightened sense of
Persian nationalism and noted that Iranian leaders seemed to
be carefully watching each other for hints of softness and
betrayal from which they could gain political advantage.
None want to be the first to cave in.


6. (C) Gul advised Ahmadinejad not to wait for U.S.
presidential elections to engage. Gul told Ahmadinejad that
the U.S. public is united on a tough approach to Iran and
elections will not change that position.

NO ENERGY DEAL, YET
--------------

7. (C) As noted in ref A, the Turks and the Iranians
concluded minor agreements on tourism, transportation,
national archives, and environment. The two Presidents also
recognized the 50th anniversary of cultural relations between
Turkey and Iran in their respective statements, though no
formal accord was signed. Dirioz attached greater importance
to the protocol the two sides signed on counter-terrorism,

ANKARA 00001497 002 OF 002


counter-narcotics and border security. Turkey and Iran did
not conclude a new energy agreement. According to Dirioz,
the two countries achieved no progress since last year's
energy MOU, so there was nothing to agree on. Iran, however,
was keen on concluding an agreement: Deputy FM
Sheikh-Attar's large advance delegation to Ankara included
numerous energy experts (ref B).


8. (C) Ministry of Energy and MFA officials told us in the
weeks leading up to Ahmadinejad's visit that an agreement on
energy was unlikely, but also noted that technical
discussions on natural gas projects continue between Turkish
state oil company TPAO and the Iranians. Press reports
August 19 quoted Energy Minister Guler as saying he and FM
Babacan would travel to Iran in 15 days (on or about
September 2) to conclude an energy agreement. The GOT is
particularly eager to move forward on the electricity MOU,
and believes it can complete this deal without triggering the
Iran Sanctions Act.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

SILLIMAN