Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA1401
2008-08-05 13:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY/NATO-EU: NO SIGNS OF LET UP IN TURKEY'S

Tags:  MARR PREL EUN NATO TU KV 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001401 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL EUN NATO TU KV
SUBJECT: TURKEY/NATO-EU: NO SIGNS OF LET UP IN TURKEY'S
POSITION

REF: A. NICOSIA 490

B. E-MAIL READ-OUT OF JULY 22 NAC LUNCH

C. ANKARA 1138

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001401

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL EUN NATO TU KV
SUBJECT: TURKEY/NATO-EU: NO SIGNS OF LET UP IN TURKEY'S
POSITION

REF: A. NICOSIA 490

B. E-MAIL READ-OUT OF JULY 22 NAC LUNCH

C. ANKARA 1138

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, Reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: While acknowledging recent French efforts to
improve NATO-EU ties as a gesture of goodwill, Turkish
officials are unimpressed. They view the recent French
non-paper proposing a NATO-EU high-level working group with
suspicion, and believe it is designed to circumvent the
NATO-EU "Agreed Framework." Turkey continues to maintain
that the Agreed Framework must apply to KFOR support for
EULEX in Kosovo and has given us no indication of any
flexibility except for vague assurances that Turkey will not
oppose "on the ground cooperation." Turkish officials, both
at the MFA and TGS view the Agreed Framework as a key
instrument in protecting their principled position in support
of NATO's pre-eminence in transatlantic security and against
Greek Cypriot efforts to benefit from NATO support. They
have repeatedly told us that Turkey's priority in NATO-EU
relations is to keep Cyprus "out of NATO business." Turkey
views any arrangement that would create the possibility for
Greek Cypriots to receive direct support from NATO as
anathema, fearing such a development would lend legitimacy to
Nicosia's claim to represent all of Cyprus. Nicosia's
decision not to participate in the EULEX mission (ref a) will
help alleviate GOT concerns about keeping Cyprus out of
EULEX, but does not resolve concerns that any formal
KFOR-EULEX cooperation would further undermine the essence of
the Agreed Framework. We expect Turkey to continue to try to
leverage the intense interest in getting KFOR-EULEX
cooperation right to extract concessions from the EU, and
believe a visit by A/S Fried or Ambassador Volker in the fall
could be very helpful in obtaining Turkey's support on a
workable way forward in Kosovo. End Summary.

French Active, but Pessimistic
--------------


2. (C) Turkey acknowledges French efforts to improve NATO-EU
cooperation, including by hosting a July 7 seminar on NATO-EU
cooperation in Paris, and floating a non-paper proposing an

informal "NATO-EU high-level group" as signs of goodwill.
MFA NATO Desk Officer Barkan Kuloglu told us Turkey was
represented at the Paris meeting by Turkish ambassador to
NATO Tacan Ildem, MFA NATO Department Head Sule Oztunc, and
Turkey's NATO Parliamentary Assembly Head Vahit Erdem. He
characterized the French efforts as "useful, but
insufficient," and said Turkey's official position in
response to the French non-paper was articulated by
Ambassador Ildem during the July 22 lunch discussion at NATO
(ref. b). Specifically, Turkey would not be interested in
any further informal proposals that seek to supplant existing
mechanisms or circumvent agreements already reached by the
two organizations. According to Kuloglu, Ildem expressed
interest in the October 2007 French non-paper, but said
without movement on the earlier proposal, Turkey could not
support the current French non-paper. Kuloglu said Turkey is
willing to hear out the French proposal, but expects the EU
to live up to the commitments it has made to Turkey and to
NATO. He said the GOT noticed and appreciated points made by
U.S. representatives at the July 7 seminar and at the
"Friends of Kosovo" meeting in support of Turkey's EU
desires.


3. (C) France dispatched former ambassador to NATO and
current chief advisor to the National Audit Office Benoit
D'Aboville on July 24 to brief the GOT on the French White
Book on defense and security strategy. According to French
Embassy Deputy Political Counselor Francois-Xavier Reymond
(protect),D'Aboville met with Turkish National Security
Council SecGen Ambassador Tahsin Burcuoglu, and their
conversation focused on efforts to try to improve bilateral
security and defense ties. They covered difficulties in
NATO-EU cooperation but the discussions were "inconclusive."
Plans for Burcuoglu to visit Paris early in the fall are in
the works, but no dates have been set (Burcuoglu's visit to
Paris is not public information). Reymond characterized
French-Turkish bilateral military ties as "virtually
non-existent", citing the bill passed by the French National
Assembly in October 2006 which, if it had passed the Senate,

would have criminalized the denial of the Armenian Genocide,
as the reason for frosty defense relations. As a result,
Reymond was pessimistic about France being able to make
meaningful progress in NATO-EU relations or bilateral
French-Turkish defense cooperation during the term of the
French EU presidency.

Turkey Standing Firm on NATO-EU
--------------


4. (C) Officials at the MFA and TGS continue to underscore to
us in recent meetings (including ref c) that Turkey's
position on NATO-EU cooperation in general and KFOR-EULEX in
particular is centered on Turkey's principled position both
in support of NATO's primacy in Euroatlantic security, and
against Greek Cypriot efforts to interact with NATO. A
two-star TGS officer responsible for NATO-EU issues put it
bluntly: "We want to keep Cyprus out of NATO business."
Turkey's hard-line stance against any Cypriot involvement in
NATO-EU cooperation is in part linked to its view that
allowing Cyprus to have any role in NATO-EU cooperation would
be tantamount to giving tacit recognition to Nicosia's claim
of being the sole, legal representative of the entire island
of Cyprus. Turkey's position also reflects a visceral desire
to "get back" at Cyprus for blocking Turkey's ambitions for
closer links with ESDP, and for the difficulties Turkey has
experienced in its EU accession process.


5. (C) The Turks have a broad interpretation of the Agreed
Framework. In essence, Turkey believes the Agreed Framework
applies to all aspect of NATO-EU cooperation because, in its
view, all cooperation between NATO and the EU is strategic in
nature. Turkish officials consider the Agreed Framework the
key instrument in protecting Turkey's equities, and is deeply
suspicious of what they see as EU efforts to chip away at the
viability of the framework. In the case of EULEX's request
for NATO's military support, the Turks reject claims that the
Agreed Framework only applies to Berlin Plus operations in
which the EU requests NATO's military support, and not to
civilian ESDP operations. Turkey believes the Agreed
Framework should apply in any ESDP operation requiring NATO's
military support, whether civilian or military. While
Nicosia's decision not to participate in the EULEX mission
(ref a) will help assuage Turkey's concerns about keeping
Cyprus out of KFOR-EULEX cooperation, it does not resolve
Turkey's fear that any formal KFOR-EULEX cooperation (agreed
to by the NAC) would set a precedent that would further
undermine the essence of the "Agreed Framework."


6. (C) While Turkey understands that the EU will not be able
to reach consensus on offering Turkey closer links with ESDP,
Turkish officials assert that this is a problem of the EU's
own making. Both military and diplomatic interlocutors have
said that the EU decided to allow Cyprus into its club, and
now, it has to deal with the consequences. In Turkey's view,
it is a simple choice between "choosing Turkey" or "choosing
Cyprus."


7. (C) Comment: We expect Turkey will continue to try to
leverage the intense European interest in successful
KFOR-EULEX cooperation to extract long-sought concessions
from the EU. The EU, however, appears unable to offer Turkey
what it wants most. While we do not believe Turkey will be
ready to concede on broader issues of principle with respect
to NATO-EU cooperation, we may be able to persuade the GOT to
relent on blocking approval of the NATO OPLAN for the Balkans
as it too has a strong interest in ensuring Kosovo's success
(not to mention the security of the police officers it has
offered to EULEX). The GOT will want to point to some
tangible victory as a face saving way for Turkey to back down
from its maximalist position on KFOR-EULEX cooperation. We
could consider, in exchange for Turkey's consent to allow the
NATO OPLAN to move forward, offering assurances that the U.S.
will support the application of the Agreed Framework in
future instances when the EU requests NATO's military support
for ESDP missions: this might assuage Turkish fears about
continuing EU efforts to undercut the Agreed Framework. We
believe it would be very helpful for A/S Fried or Ambassador
Volker to visit Ankara in the fall to engage Turkey on
finding a constructive way forward on this issue.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON