AKP INSIDERS DISCUSS CLOSURE CASE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001342

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: AKP INSIDERS DISCUSS CLOSURE CASE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROSS WILSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: On the eve of Turkish Constitutional Court
deliberations in the AKP closure case that begin July 28, the
outcome is impossible to predict. A senior AKP-affiliated
journalist told Ambassador July 24 that he is hopeful the
Turkish Constitutional Court may avoid ruling to close the
party and ban its leaders. He believed a relatively quick
ruling is likely, probably in the July 30-August 8 period;
discounted the possibility that the AKP coalition might break
up in the wake of a closure decision; and expects the AKP or
it successor will have "learned the lessons" from the past
year's debacle and will stop pushing anything that could be
regarded as a cultural/religious agenda. Separately, a
senior aide to Erdogan reported to Ambassador July 25 that
the PM is optimistic, but also resigned to the difficulty of
reconciling the periphery that the AKP represents with the
old elites of the state. In Erdogan's mind, either closure
or vindication of the AKP will put further to bed the whole
phenomena of party closures and extra-constitutional
interventions against democracy. With these and other Turks,
Ambassador noted the importance, in the wake of whatever
decision the court makes, of reducing tensions, moving
forward in an orderly way, and putting EU-related reforms
back at the center of Turkey's agenda. End Summary.


2. (C) Likely Court Decision: A senior AKP-affiliated
journalist said that until a month ago, he was virtually
certain that the Constitutional Court would rule to close the
AKP and to ban PM Erdogan and many other top party figures.
But influential pro- and anti-AKP figures have been speaking
publicly and privately in recent weeks about how closure is a
bad idea. Many among the Kemalist elite and parliamentary
opposition now believe closure will weaken their long-term
position. They also recognize the damage to Turkey that
would ensue. This journalist believed that AKP exoneration
is a possibility, but perhaps one too "unthinkable" to those
who brought the case. A top aide to Erdogan was likewise
optimistic about the prospects for non-closure and even
wondered how serious the chief prosecutor was in initiating
the case. While Kemalists "instinctively" want the AKP and
Erdogan to go away, relatively few had really spoken up to
support closure/bans per se. The case's initiators, who are
not obviously a large, cohesive group, have made their point,
but won't be allowed to take things to a maximalist
conclusion.


3. (C) Black Clouds: Two scenarios were worrisome in a
non-closure scenario, the journalist suggested. One is that
the court might use the overall finding of "guilty" that
falls short of closure to justify a ban on Erdogan
personally. The other possibility is a ban on President Gul
that would purport to drive him from office. Both require
the court to rule beyond what the law and constitution
provide, but the court "has been legislating and re-writing
the constitution for over a year," the journalist complained
-- a remark that Erdogan and FM Babacan have made to us
privately, as well. The journalist believed that the closure
case's backers aim to eliminate both Erdogan and Gul; they
won't stop until they have achieved their objectives.


4. (C) Timing: The AKP-affiliated journalist cited a court
contact as saying that the court will decide on the
prosecutor's indictment "within a couple of days" after it
begins deliberations on July 28, with another several days
required to agree on a written opinion, which is required for
the decision to have legal effect. His time frame for an
outcome is July 30-August 8, sooner being more likely. He
expected the decisioQand opinion to be released
simultaneously. He agreed that the problem of premature
leaks may impel the court to act fast, but believed that
there will be leaks anyway and that these will exacerbate
uncertainty and speculation. Separately, a Western
journalist here said a court contact told him the court will
decide and publish its ruling during the week of July 28.


5. (C) Next AKP Steps: The journalist indicated that the
party leadership has a range of responses prepared depending
on what exactly the court does. Upfront, he highlighted the
leadership's inclination -- regardless of the court's
decision -- not to repeat mistakes of the past year, to avoid
actions that will re-provoke the 'threat to secularism'
debate, and to emphasize instead economic and social issues.
He confirmed post-closure plans to form a new party and
predicted there will be few, if any defections; the party
will remain united, though for how long is a question. He
was certain there will be early general elections if the AKP
is closed and expected the sympathy factor will swell the new
party's support to above 50 percent. (Some pollsters confirm
this.) If the party is not closed, then there would be no
point in holding a general election; the next voting would be
for local governments in March. The journalist disregarded
the new political movement being established by AKP founding

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member and former deputy PM Sener, observing that no one of
significance has come out in support of Sener and that, while
respected, he lacks much of a political base.


6. (C) Further Problems: The journalist described some
possible post-court ruling moves that could provoke further
tensions.

-- President Gul may try to appoint a banned Erdogan as
deputy PM under a figurehead government leader, behind whom
Erdogan would be the real power. (Turkish ministers do not
have to be MPs, though all current ministers are.)

-- Parliament might pass a measure purporting to undo a
Constitutional Court ban on Erdogan, whose own political
history (an overturned ban in 2003) offers a model.

-- While it is unlikely that Gul (if not banned) would step
down as president and re-enter politics to lead the post-AKP,
he believed that Gul may try more directly to influence
domestics politics from the presidency, even through his
legal prerogatives in this area are limited.

-- A number of prominent secularists put forward by faculties
to head some 20-plus Turkish universities are up for
appointment/reappointment now by President Gul. The
president will reject a number of them. Those he does select
"will be mindful of who appointed them" -- and so will adopt
the laissez-faire attitude regarding on-campus headscarves
that a sizeable minority of universities have adopted for
years.

Any of these things will infuriate the military, judiciary
and secular hardliners and provoke further tensions.


7. (c) Speaking about motivations, the PM aide stressed that
Erdogan's "mild" handling of the closure case has changed the
way future cases will be viewed. He said Erdogan defied the
advice of many senior colleagues, who urged a government push
to amend the constitution to strip the court of jurisdiction
or raise the number of votes required to convict in a closure
case. Instead, Erdogan made clear that he accepted the
legitimacy of the process and would accept the verdict, even
while complaining about it. This was intended to lower
tensions, and the aide thought it had to some extent. The
move also reflected what Erdogan regards as his mission to
reconcile Turkey's political periphery, the AKP's heartland,
with the Turkish state, which Erdogan now serves. And
Erdogan was also fatalistic: regarding himself as
politically "immortal," he believes he can come back
post-closure, just as Ecevit and Demirel did before him.


8. (C) US Stance: Asked to explain "mixed US messages" on
the closure case, Ambassador said that we have given clear
backing to policies that we support -- as APNSA Hadley did in
Ankara on July 17, and as Secretary Rice and others have done
earlier. We are cognizant of the sledgehammer impact of what
we do or don't say, and so have been cautious about going
beyond support for policies we back in ways that would enmesh
us in partisan politics. At the same time, Ambassador noted,
we have tried to send strong, private signals on the need to
reduce tensions -- which message remains current, perhaps
even more so now as a court decision and dealing with its
aftermath are imminent. Now is the time for pragmatism and
politics, not confrontation. Ambassador also said that we
have observed that a closure/ban decision will not be
understood in the West, and so all of Turkey's leaders have a
special responsibility to reaffirm in every way possible
their commitment to the goal of EU accession and the
political-economic reforms necessary to realize it. This
context will give both Turks and this country's European
partners a clear perspective of how to go forward.


9. (c) Comment: With three days to go, the Constitutional
Court's ruling is really impossible to predict. We suspect
that a certain amount of the speculation that a penalty less
than closure/ban reflects wishful thinking. Another senior
prime ministry aide told us this week that he is convinced
closure is looming. "I know these people" (Kemalists) and
they won't be influenced by rational concerns about how
closure might affect Turkey, he said.

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WILSON