Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA1340
2008-07-25 14:18:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:
(S) SHIPMENT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN DEMARCHE
how-toVZCZCXYZ0004 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHAK #1340 2071418 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 251418Z JUL 08 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6958 INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1031 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0998
S E C R E T ANKARA 001340
SIPDIS
EUR/PRA, ISN/CPI, EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2033
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC PK TU
SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN DEMARCHE
DELIVERED
REF: STATE 79656
Classified By: Acting Pol-Mil Counselor Christopher Rich, Reasons 1.4 (
b, d)
S E C R E T ANKARA 001340
SIPDIS
EUR/PRA, ISN/CPI, EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2033
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC PK TU
SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN DEMARCHE
DELIVERED
REF: STATE 79656
Classified By: Acting Pol-Mil Counselor Christopher Rich, Reasons 1.4 (
b, d)
1. (S) We delivered reftel demarche to MFA Acting Deputy
Director General Elif Ulgen on July 25. Ulgen said the GOT
determination that the machine in question was not controlled
by the Wassenaar Arrangement or the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) was made following consultations with interagency
experts. She disagreed that the machine is subject to NSG
controls. She intimated that in the last two months, the GOT
had stopped three separate shipments of CNC machining tools
originating from EU member states headed for Iran. In each
instance, the GOT held up the shipment until it received
assurances from the embassies of the countries in question
that the machines were: a) not subject to export controls;
and b) not directed to entities subject to sanctions under
the three UNSC resolutions related to Iran. In each
instance, including shipments that included two- and even
three-axis machining tools, the relevant embassy provided
written assurances that the items were not subject to export
control requirements. Ulgen queried why these EU member
states believe that two- or three-axis machining tools were
not subject to export controls while the USG is claiming that
they should be. She took the opportunity to reiterate GOT's
desire for countries of origin to be more vigilant in its
export licensing process.
2. (S) Ulgen undertook to review with GOT technical and legal
experts whether the provisions of 1.B.2 of the NSG dual-use
annex applies in this case. She pledged that if the GOT
determines that the USG position is correct, it will take the
necessary steps to conduct a post-shipment end-user check on
the machine. If there is a difference in interpretation of
what the NSG annex requires, Ulgen suggested, the NSG should
discuss this question and develop a common and clear
understanding on what type of CNC equipment ought to be
subject to controls.
3. (S) She requested time to consult with other GOT agencies
regarding our request to share the information from Turkey's
investigation into this case with the Government of Japan,
and pledged to provide a response soon.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
WILSON
SIPDIS
EUR/PRA, ISN/CPI, EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2033
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC PK TU
SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN DEMARCHE
DELIVERED
REF: STATE 79656
Classified By: Acting Pol-Mil Counselor Christopher Rich, Reasons 1.4 (
b, d)
1. (S) We delivered reftel demarche to MFA Acting Deputy
Director General Elif Ulgen on July 25. Ulgen said the GOT
determination that the machine in question was not controlled
by the Wassenaar Arrangement or the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) was made following consultations with interagency
experts. She disagreed that the machine is subject to NSG
controls. She intimated that in the last two months, the GOT
had stopped three separate shipments of CNC machining tools
originating from EU member states headed for Iran. In each
instance, the GOT held up the shipment until it received
assurances from the embassies of the countries in question
that the machines were: a) not subject to export controls;
and b) not directed to entities subject to sanctions under
the three UNSC resolutions related to Iran. In each
instance, including shipments that included two- and even
three-axis machining tools, the relevant embassy provided
written assurances that the items were not subject to export
control requirements. Ulgen queried why these EU member
states believe that two- or three-axis machining tools were
not subject to export controls while the USG is claiming that
they should be. She took the opportunity to reiterate GOT's
desire for countries of origin to be more vigilant in its
export licensing process.
2. (S) Ulgen undertook to review with GOT technical and legal
experts whether the provisions of 1.B.2 of the NSG dual-use
annex applies in this case. She pledged that if the GOT
determines that the USG position is correct, it will take the
necessary steps to conduct a post-shipment end-user check on
the machine. If there is a difference in interpretation of
what the NSG annex requires, Ulgen suggested, the NSG should
discuss this question and develop a common and clear
understanding on what type of CNC equipment ought to be
subject to controls.
3. (S) She requested time to consult with other GOT agencies
regarding our request to share the information from Turkey's
investigation into this case with the Government of Japan,
and pledged to provide a response soon.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
WILSON