Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA1304
2008-07-22 09:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY: DTP'S YEAR OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

Tags:  PGOV PTER TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3023
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #1304/01 2040902
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220902Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6904
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 4501
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001304 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: DTP'S YEAR OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

REF: A. ANKARA 559

B. ANKARA 964

C. 07 ANKARA 2807

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001304

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: DTP'S YEAR OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

REF: A. ANKARA 559

B. ANKARA 964

C. 07 ANKARA 2807

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b),(d)


1. (C) Summary and comment. The results of the 2007
parliamentary elections raised hopes that Turkey could
achieve progress on the Kurdish issue. Some 20 pro-Kurdish
Democratic Society Party (DTP) MPs, elected as independents
in districts throughout the Southeast, gave the party
parliamentary representation for the first time in over a
decade. However, hopes this would translate into progress on
Turkey's Kurdish problem soured quickly. Military operations
against the terrorist PKK in northern Iraq weakened party
moderates vis-a-vis hardliners, according to some. If the
experiment of Kurdish nationalist participation in Turkey's
parliament continues, DTP will be unable to translate its
electoral strength in the Southeast into concrete results as
long as it leaves unresolved the connection to the PKK that
is its strength -- and great weakness. End summary and
comment.

Sour Relations with AKP, GOT
--------------

3. (C) The sense of opportunity that accompanied DTP's July
2007 debut in parliament dissipated in a matter of days.
Despite a dramatic hand-shake between DTP leader Ahmet Turk
and far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) leader Devlet
Bahceli at parliament's opening, the pillars of the Turkish
establishment, the military and the judiciary, did not accept
the legitimacy of DTP's presence in parliament. The military
labeled DTP deputies as PKK representatives and refuses to
include them in official functions. The judiciary continues
to harass DTP officials with lawsuits for using Kurdish
language or for attaching the honorific "sayin" (sic) to
imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's name. While most
cases have resulted in symbolic penalties or acquittals,
Abdullah Demirbas, a Diyarbakir sub-mayor, was removed from
office for offering city services in multiple languages,
including Kurdish. In November 2007 the chief prosecutor
filed an indictment with the Constitutional Court calling for
DTP,s closure for being a "focal point of activities against
the sovereignty of the state and indivisible unity of the
country and the nation" in violation of the constitution.

The case is expected to conclude in the fall.


4. (C) Nationalist Kurds' relations have also deteriorated
with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government, once regarded as an ally because PM Erdogan
portrayed the Kurdish issue as part of AKP's broader
democracy agenda and won sympathy for resisting the
military's desire to launch attacks on PKK cells in northern
Iraq. Now many Kurds fault Erdogan for endorsing
cross-border operations. Instead of being seen as a victim
of the Turkish establishment, he is viewed as a coward or a
collaborator. Similarly, DTP politicians believe Erdogan and
AKP's interest in cultivating ties with Kurds in southeastern
Turkey is motivated by a desire to politically dominate the
region, including vis-a-vis the DTP, rather than addressing
the DTP version of nationalist Kurds' political agenda. As
evidence of the ruling party's hostile intentions, a
DTP-affiliated web-site claimed that in March, AKP issued
instructions to local officials stating that government
policy is to "assimilate" Kurds and that attempts to
establish Kurdish-medium education are tantamount to
separatism. Despite its perceived betrayal of Kurdish
political aspirations, AKP retains a strong base of support
in the Southeast thanks to its economic development
achievements and Islamic leanings.

DTP: Hawks and Doves
--------------

5. (C) DTP supporters contend pressure on the party from AKP
and the bureaucratic establishment, coupled with military
operations, have strengthened hard-liners within their
movement and perpetuated the cycle of violence. Hisyar
Ozsoy, an academic who served as an advisor to Diyarbakir
mayor Osman Baydemir, wrote that as DTP is ostracized by the
GOT, "confrontational" groups inside DTP grow stronger and
its supporters "increasingly tend to ignore civilian politics
and view the PKK as the only hope for Kurds." Baydemir told
us he thought Erdogan's 2005 speech in Diyarbakir ) when he

ANKARA 00001304 002 OF 003


famously acknowledged the Kurdish problem ) created an
opportunity for progress, but AKP's negative approach since
and the continuing military confrontations have strengthened
the PKK. Baydemir lamented that those who want a peaceful
solution are being squeezed by the Turkish military on one
side and the PKK on the other. "If you reject violence, you
need to show people another path, but the continuing clashes
will damage people's faith in a democratic and non-violent
solution."


6. (C) In recent months the friction between hard-liners and
moderates (inevitably dubbed "hawks" and "doves" by the
media) has spilled into the open (reftels). In November
2007, following weeks of vicious PKK cross-border attacks on
Turkey, Ahmet Turk was removed as DTP chairman and replaced
by Nurretin Demirtas, an unseasoned hard-line activist who
has since been forced to resign after being convicted of
evading Turkish military service. In May, during a visit to
northern Iraq, Turk reportedly said continuing PKK violence
is harmful to the interests of Kurds and the party should
distance itself from Ocalan. Though he quickly claimed he
was misquoted, Turk was removed from his position as head of
DTP's parliamentary group and replaced by Emine Ayna, known
as a member of the pro-Ocalan camp. Re-elected as party
co-chair with Ayna at DTP's July 20 party convention, Turk
said the time for arms has passed.


7. (C) While state and military pressure has likely
fortified radical sentiments within Kurdish politics, many of
DTP's wounds are self-inflicted. Observers of the Kurdish
movement say DTP's inner turmoil and confused messages mirror
fissures within the PKK itself, which has multiple power
centers: the insurgents in northern Iraq; the fund-raisers in
Western Europe; and Ocalan, who nominally leads the movement
from his prison cell. While the PKK now professes moderate
goals (a quasi-federal state for Turkey, increased linguistic
and cultural rights for Kurds),its continued use of violence
and terrorism contradicts and drowns out the voices of
Kurdish nationalist moderates. The violence also fuels
nationalist sentiments in western Turkey, curbing the
appetite of GOT leaders to undertake politically risky
initiatives on the Kurdish issue.


8. (C) According to Aliza Marcus, author of a book on the
PKK, the military wing's influence on DTP has been getting
stronger in recent years. DTP's new leadership generation
grew up with the PKK's dominance as a fact of life (older
Kurdish activists came from leftist politics and tend to be
more independent),and the PKK has institutionalized its role
by putting "political commissars" in the middle ranks of the
DTP to monitor and guide its activities. The candidate
selection process for the 2007 election showed the PKK's
heavy hand. Then-DTP chairman Turk favored forming alliances
with other Kurdish parties and recruiting talented
independents. One potential candidate, Diyarbakir Bar
Association Chairman Sezgin Tanrikoglu, told us Turk invited
him to be a candidate but the PKK removed him from
consideration. "Based on my discussions with the DTP about
my candidacy," he said, "it was clear that they do not want
independent thinkers in their group. They wanted obedient
servants."

What's Next?
--------------

9. (C) DTP has been dealt a bad hand )- it has only 21
deputies in parliament and has been shunned by the
establishment )- and played it poorly by internal bickering
and being seen as PKK apologists. DTP's next challenge will
likely be reorganizing itself if closed by the Constitutional
Court, as many here expect (refC). One party official told
us he is 100% certain DTP will be closed; the party is
already registering a successor, the Peace and Democracy
Party (BDP),which according to media reports has already
registered in 35 provinces. If there is an AKP
closure-induced general election, DTP or its heir might do
better than in July 2007, when AKP carried most of the
Southeast. Some tell us DTP's ban may produce a period of
creative destruction during which the party could fragment,
allowing the hawks and doves to go their separate ways. But
Diyarbakir-based free-lance journalist Yilmaz Akinci does not
believe a split is likely in the near future, as the
moderates would be unable to win many votes and could risk
retribution from the PKK. The idea of accelerating Kurdish

ANKARA 00001304 003 OF 003


politics into the post-PKK era is inviting, but it will take
considerable time and skillful leadership by Ankara and
leaders in the region to displace the PKK as the most
powerful force in Kurdish nationalism. While DTP and its
potential successors will remain the first or second most
popular party (along with AKP) in southeastern Turkey, its
ability to help resolve the Kurdish issue will remain hostage
to the continuing conflict between the PKK and the GOT.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON