Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ANKARA1303
2008-07-21 15:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY SO FAR UNHINDERED BY

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001303 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY SO FAR UNHINDERED BY
DOMESTIC EVENTS

REF: ANKARA 1223

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001303

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY SO FAR UNHINDERED BY
DOMESTIC EVENTS

REF: ANKARA 1223

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Domestic political uncertainty arising from
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) closure case
and Ergenekon prosecution (reftel) has not constrained PM
Erdogan from painting himself the statesman through bold
foreign policy activism. Turkey's foreign and security
apparatus continues to pursue energetic initiatives on Middle
East peace, Iraq, and Iran, for example, that show less
hesitancy to take risks and break new ground. There is
support for these policies across the political leadership,
MFA bureaucracy, and the military, and even the opposition
has held its fire. Involvement of MFA officials and elements
of the state bureaucracy imply that these foreign policy
initiatives will continue regardless of the outcome of
domestic political machinations. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Contrary to expectations, domestic political
uncertainty about Turkey's future leadership has not deterred
the government from pursuing an ambitious foreign policy
agenda. Possibly only weeks away from a Constitutional Court
decision that many expect will close the AKP and ban Erdogan
from politics, the GOT, often with Erdogan's direct personal
investment, is heavily engaged.

- Iraq: Erdogan visited Baghdad July 10 -- the first Turkish
PM in Iraq since 1990 -- and agreed to a joint declaration
that commits Turkey and Iraq to engage on a host of bilateral
political, economic, and security issues. Erdogan,s visit
followed the long-blocked visit of President Talabani here in
March and direct contact between GOT and Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG) officials in May. The GOT has pursued this
approach despite political risks in a period of continued PKK
attacks in southeastern Turkey and as military operations in
the border region continue. While the Turkish General Staff
(TGS) remains deeply skeptical about the KRG and Massoud
Barzani, TGS supports dialogue with Baghdad and decided no
longer to block government contacts with the KRG.

- Middle East: Erdogan and foreign policy advisor Davutoglu
have stepped up their efforts in the region. During the
April-May crisis in Lebanon, Erdogan and Davutoglu passed a
series of messages among multiple parties in Damascus and

Beirut, meriting an invitation for Erdogan to the new
Lebanese president,s swearing-in in May. Turkey has hosted
three rounds of mediation with Syria and Israel, the latest
occurring July 1-2; a fourth should occur late this month.

- Pakistan/Afghanistan: Turkey is seeking to calm tensions
between Kabul and Islamabad and within Afghanistan itself.
It is encouraging Afghan and Pakistani leaders to come
together in Turkey, preferably by September, for a second
"Ankara Summit." While continuing to believe President
Musharraf can play a role in Pakistan's future, the GOT has
pragmatically sought contact with other political factions.
Erdogan and President Gul asked visiting Pakistan People's
Party leader Zardari to consider co-participation by both
Musharraf and PM Gillani, arguing that that this
co-participation would send a message of unity. Separately,
the Turks have sought to defuse Dostum's clash with President
Karzai and worked to ease him out of his present, unhelpful
role.

- Caucasus: Senior officials have welcomed Armenian
President Sargsian's invitation to President Gul to attend a
Turkey-Armenia World Cup qualifier, September 6 in Yerevan.
That other work is going on behind the scenes is reflected in
the government's forceful defense when press leaks about a
move to normalize relations with Yerevan appeared recently.
There has been little opposition within the government to
date. In coming days, Gul will inaugurate with Presidents
Aliyev and Saakashvili construction of the Turkey portion of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway connecting Central Asia by rail
to Europe.

- Iran: FM Babacan has met with Iranian FM Mottaki four
times in June-July, most recently last week. He and MFA U/S
Apakan, during political consultations in Tehran in June,
have pressed Iran to accept the P5/1 offer. Ankara is
tacking between involvement in the diplomatic process (it
offered to be a venue for talks as it was in April 2007) and
mediation, which it wants to avoid.

ANKARA 00001303 002 OF 003



- Kosovo: One of the first countries to recognize Kosovo's
independence, Turkey has remained a staunch Kosovo supporter.
It contributed EUR 30 million at the Kosovo Donors'
Conference -- the fourth largest contribution after the U.S.
and the EU. Press reports indicate Kosovo will soon open an
embassy here.

- EU reforms: The GOT has been tepid, but not AWOL on EU
reform: an amended Penal Code Article 301 on "insulting
Turkishness," a revised foundations law to ease minority
problems, and steps toward Kurdish broadcasting on state-run
TRT television. The government has kept the EU train on
track and persuaded even Paris to relax its opposition to
opening new negotiating chapters with Turkey. Erdogan won
important concessions to attend the July 13 Mediterranean
Union summit in Paris, where his absence would have matched
only that of Qadafi. While there, he continued to help
mediate Syrian-Israeli talks by conveying messages between
Syrian President Assad and Israeli PM Olmert.


3. (C) Many contacts believe Erdogan and the AKP leadership
are motivated towards international activism by a desire to
project their indispensability to the Turkish people, and to
the U.S. and EU. While public opinion on the EU is highly
sensitive to perceived opposition to Turkey's accession, the
AKP has convinced most observers that it is the party most
capable of fulfilling Turkey's EU aspirations. Many of the
foreign policy initiatives discussed above support, directly
or indirectly, key U.S. and EU foreign policy objectives,
e.g., Middle East peace, and stability in Iraq, Pakistan and
Afghanistan, the Balkans and the Caucasus.


4. (C) Foreign policy activism is consistent with the AKP's
vision of Turkey as a determining actor in the international
arena. It wants to improve economic, cultural and security
ties with neighboring countries by seeking opportunities to
promote peace, stability, and a Turkish role. To implement
this agenda, Erdogan and Davutoglu have increasingly brought
in career MFA diplomats, who add non-partisan credibility and
have in turn taken on a strong sense of ownership. For
example, the MFA Iraq Special Envoy position, currently held
by Murat Ozcelik, has emerged as a driving force behind
improved Ankara-Baghdad relations. Ditto MFA Deputy U/S
Sinirlioglu on Israel-Syria and Deputy U/S Cevikoz on
Armenia. As a former FM with close ties to the MFA
bureaucracy and internationalist instincts, Gul has
encouraged and bolstered the standing of Turkey's diplomats.
While certain issues, such as Armenia, will require strong
advocacy from political leaders, many of these initiatives
will have enough momentum to continue through the closure
case and beyond.


5. (C) The Turkish military will continue its role as a
foreign policy actor. Despite changes in the senior
leadership to be decided upon at the August Supreme Military
Council (YAS),we expect little foreign policy change. We
expect bilateral military cooperation to continue apace and
have no indication that current political uncertainty will
cause TGS to rethink this, including on such issues as access
to Incirlik Air Base and other military facilities. We do
not anticipate any change to Turkish commitments to the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan. The military has raised no objections to the
AKP government's Middle East initiatives; expected in-coming
Chief of Defense GEN Basbug has publicly welcomed them.


6. (C) An exception to these good pictures may be Cyprus,
where the military has big equities and where nationalist
sentiment runs broad and deep. The MFA's approach since
Cypriot President Christofias and "TRNC" President Talat
started talking earlier this year has been to keep as quiet
as possible. With some exceptions, Turkey has taken a
backseat and allowed Talat to negotiate. Closure of AKP and
the resulting political uncertainty in Ankara could frustrate
Talat in the coming months. The longer-term prospects are
harder to assess and probably depend on how far beyond the
Annan Plan Chistofias wants or needs to go, especially on
matters affecting TGS interests.


7. (C) Political opponents accuse Erdogan and Babacan of
turning to the U.S. and EU for their defense against AKP's
closure, but attacks on the government have largely stopped
at the water's edge. With the exception of EU political

ANKARA 00001303 003 OF 003


reforms, neither the Republican People's Party (CHP) nor the
far right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) have complained
about most of the GOT's foreign policy initiatives and may
even support some of them. An MHP Deputy chairs the
Turkey-Syria parliamentary friendship committee, and MHP led
Turkey's coalition government the last time Turkey and
Armenia approached normalization of ties, in 1998. For its
part, CHP has tried to profess its support for Turkey's EU
accession and opened a representative office in Brussels,
even as it challenges nearly every AKP-sponsored, pro-EU
political reform in court.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON