SCENESETTER FOR NSA HADLEY'S VISIT TO TURKEY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001265

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG ECON IZ SY IS IR AF PK CY TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NSA HADLEY'S VISIT TO TURKEY

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b),(d)

Dear Mr. Hadley,


1. (C) Summary. US-Turkish relations have been transformed
in the nearly three years since your last visit in 2005. You
come right after Erdogan's visit to Baghdad (July 10),Boyden
Gray's visit here (July 11) and President Bush's July 11
condolence call to President Gul over the Istanbul consulate
shootings. Turkish leaders continue to work a range of
issues, including Iraq, Israel/Syria, South Asia, Armenia and
Cyprus, and they will want to discuss these with you --
despite the pending AKP closure case. End Summary.


2. (C) Your last visit in Fall 2005 was a catalyst that
revived senior-level dialogue. Visitors in the months that
followed include then-SACEUR Gen. Jones, CIA Director Goss,
FBI Director Muller and Secretary Rice. Progress was slow,
but Secretary Rice and then-FM Gul concluded a Shared Vision
paper in June 2006 that kept our relations on even keel
despite the PKK and other problems. PM Erdogan's Oval Office
meeting in November 2007, and the sharing of actionable
intelligence on the PKK that followed, marked a big turning
point. We have been busy with high-level exchanges since:
Secretary Bodman (12/07),President Gul (1/08),Secretaries
Mukasey and Gates (2/08),the Vice President (3/08),
Secretary Chertoff (5/08) and FM Babacan (6/08). It's
emblematic that Secretary Gates was the first SECDEF to come
here since 2002. Visits by Generals Cartwright and Petraeus
in November, February, April and July have spearheaded our
PKK collaboration.

IRAQ/PKK
--------------

3. (C) Turkish strikes against the PKK has removed the PKK as
a contentious issue in Turkish-US and Turkish-Iraqi
relations, to facilitate a revival of contacts with the Iraqi
Kurds, and to isolate and degrade the PKK. Besides their
military losses, the PKK has been hit by defections, and
Murat Karayilan, its most prominent leader other than jailed
Abdullah Ocalan, may be looking for a way out. That progress
made possible what had previously been an unimaginable visit
July 10 by PM Erdogan to Baghdad -- only the second regional
head of government (after Ahmedinejad) to visit Iraq since

2003. Erdogan and PM Maliki signed a Strategic Agreement
that provides for regular, PM-led dialogue and is a framework
for developing bilateral political, security, mil-mil and
economic ties. Erdogan publicly commended Iraqi and Iraqi
Kurd help on the PKK. An opportunity to break the ice with
Massoud Barzani fell victim to the KRG leader's late June
public statement that the PKK is not a terror organization;
the Turks invited Nechirvan Barzani, but he was out of the
country.


4. (C) Looking ahead, the Turks are nervous about the
prospects for US presence in Iraq after January 20. They
regard Kirkuk as an ethnic time bomb and have tried to
leverage their nascent dialogue with the KRG to encourage at
least short-term compromises in exchange for the possibility
of eventual acceptance of a consensual outcome, even one
dominated by the Kurds. The annual rollover of our
authorization to use Incirlik for Iraq support operations has
been held to six months, when the relevant UNSCR expires, but
officials tell us they will find a way to continue current
arrangements. You should highlight our intention to remain
in synch with Iraq, appreciation of Erdogan's efforts to
develop Turkish-Iraqi relations, and critical need for Turkey
to facilitate US support via Incirlik and the ground transit
of supplies.

IRAN
--------------

5. (C) FM Mottaki will arrive in Ankara as you depart July
17, apparently to follow-up on June-July discussions with FM
Babacan at the Paris Afghanistan donors' conference, the OIC
FM meeting in Kampala, and the D8 summit in Kuala Lumpur.
The Turks have reportedly urged Tehran strongly to work with
the P5/1 proposal on the nuclear issue. Mottaki may propose
more active Turkish engagement, perhaps even as a mediator;
having provided a venue for a Solana/Larijani meeting in
2007, Ankara is prepared to reprise that role and otherwise
"facilitate" progress, but has not been willing to get
directly involved. Their relations with Iran remain wary but

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good. You should encourage them to continue to deliver
strong messages to Tehran and to slow-roll progress on future
gas deals.

MIDDLE EAST
--------------

6. (S/NF) Turkey has engineered a role for itself that more
engaged and less at the margins of the Middle East. It has
troops in UNIFIL, and Erdogan and PM foreign affairs advisor
Davutoglu were deeply involved in talks to resolve Lebanon's
political crisis in April-May. Via soft diplomacy and NGOs,
Turkey has tried to promote economic development in the West
Bank and Gaza and to build Israeli-Palestinian ties. Most
importantly, it has hosted three rounds of proximity talks in
Istanbul between Israel and Syria, the latest occurring July
1-2; a fourth should occur late this month. The Turks have
been clear in discussions here they expect to take matters
only so far and then, when the parties are ready, hand the
process off to us. Ankara believes both sides are serious,
focusing on security and land once they got past the
preliminaries. MFA officials told us both Turkey and Israel
have committed to continue these efforts whatever may happen
to PM Olmert and PM Erdogan.

CAUCASUS and CYPRUS
--------------

7. (C) Turkish officials have expressed wariness about
potential instabilities in the Caucasus. Developments in
Georgia are particularly alarming, and Ankara is also worried
about the potential for a negative slide in relations between
Armenia and Azerbaijan as Nagorno-Karabakh continues to
stalemate. Perhaps in part for this reason, Turkey and
Armenia are in mutual overture mode. Among other elements
are Turkey's congratulatory messages to Armenia's new leaders
and President Sargsian's invitation for President Gul to
attend the Turkey-Armenia World Cup qualifier in Yerevan
September 6. We have strongly urged Ankara to work to
normalize its relations with Yerevan, noting how supportive
this would be of progress on N-K. Domestic political
weaknesses in both Armenia and Turkey, of course, complicate
their ability to come together.


8. (C) Turkey is cautiously hopeful about UN efforts to
revive comprehensive Cyprus negotiations as long as they're
based on the "UN body of work" (aka the Annan plan and its
predecessors). The next Christofias/Talat meeting is set for
July 25 and should produce an announcement of direct
negotiations to begin in September. MFA officials insist
Ankara has given Talat broad latitude. PM Erdogan will
reportedly visit Turkish Cyprus on July 18.

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
--------------

9. (C) Two trilateral Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey "Ankara
Summits" have provided a helpful forum for direct dialogue
between Karzai and Musharraf. Turkey strongly supports
hosting another meeting, possibly in September. The issue of
who represents Pakistan has been a stumbling block, with
Nawaz Sharif rejecting any role for President Musharraf. The
Turks say either or both PM Gillani and President Musharraf
would be fine, and they reportedly urged PPP leader Zardari
to authorize them to travel to Ankara together on the grounds
that co-participation would project political unity.

ENERGY
--------------

10. (SBU) Turkey is the key southern corridor for Caspian gas
to Europe, but it hopes to leverage that role to secure more
gas for itself to augment the country's overall energy
supplies and supplant Russian and Iranian gas on which it is
over-reliant. PM Erdogan reaffirmed to Boyden Gray last
Friday that Nabucco and the Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) gas
pipelines are top priorities. However, his energy minister's
tough bargaining over gas price and supplies for Turkey
itself has irritated Baku, left Europeans confused about what
Turkey wants, and delayed Nabucco. The goal of augmenting
overall supplies for Turkey and for Nabucco/TGI put energy
atop Erdogan's agenda in Baghdad. Ankara especially wants to
see gas flow north and has proposed a new gas pipeline to
follow the existing Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil line route. It also
hopes to see Turkish firms participate in the development of
Iraqi oil and gas, but waits like everyone for passage of
hydrocarbon legislation.

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Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
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WILSON