TURKISH-IRANIAN ETHNIC OPPOSITION GROUPS UNDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001237

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH-IRANIAN ETHNIC OPPOSITION GROUPS UNDER
PRESSURE, ACCORDING TO IRANIAN-TURKISH ACADEMIC

REF: 07 ANKARA 1577

Classified By: Political Counselor Daniel O'Grady, reasons 1.4 b,d


1. (C) SUMMARY. The Iranian regime is suppressing
Azeri-Iranian (Turkish) ethnic opposition groups in Iran,
leading those groups to become more militant and espouse
armed struggle, according to Center for Eurasian and
Strategic Studies (ASAM) Middle East Expert Arif Keskin
(protect). Ethnic nationalism throughout Iran has expanded
beyond the regime's capacity to control. At the same time,
Persian, pro-Shah and People's Mujahadeen opposition groups
are advocating a vision for a democratic Iran that does not
take into account the country's ethnic diversity. PJAK,
Keskin claims, is a PKK subsidiary, manufactured by Iran to
bolster ties with Turkey and weaken Azeri demographic and
political strength. Azeri-Iranian opposition groups in
Turkey fear a perceived rapprochement between Turkey and
Iran, and have lowered their profile. According to Keskin,
Turkey has no policy to quash "South Azerbaijani" political
activism, no matter what they may fear. END SUMMARY.

AZERI-IRANIANS UNDER PRESSURE
--------------


2. (C) The Iranian regime is "mercilessly" suppressing
ethnic opposition groups in Iran, particularly in Azeri
regions, Arif Keskin told us June 23. Keskin, who recently
became a Turkish citizen (he is an Iranian-Turkish dual
national of Azerbaijani ethnicity),described property
confiscation and political murders at the hands of Iran's
Revolutionary Guards. As a result, he reports, the
Azeri-Iranian political opposition is becoming militant; a
serious debate about launching an armed struggle is underway
among its leaders.


3. (C) The balance has changed since last year (reftel),
according to Keskin. Whereas the regime had previously
exploited ethnic nationalism in order to divide its political
opponents, ethnic nationalism has now expanded beyond the
regime's security capacity, emerging as its primary security
concern. He noted that discussion of ethnic issues was off
the agenda during recent parliamentary elections. The
situation is not at a breaking point, but there has been a
major linguistic shift away from FARSI and toward Turkish in
all aspects of daily life in Azeri-Iranian regions; all the
satellite dishes there are pointed at Turkey. This ethnic
nationalist trend is found among other Iranian ethnic groups,
and the regime is reportedly nervous.


4. (C) Unfortunately, according to Keskin, the Iranian
regime's opponents are divided. Pro-Shah groups and the
People's Mujahadeen are fundamentally Persian-nationalist, he
said. Shah supporters admire Turkey's Western orientation
and secular structure, but disdain Turkish culture and resent
Turkey's recent economic success. The People's Mujahadeen
claims to promote democracy, but its views on ethnicity,
women's and minority rights is unclear. The People's
Mujahadeen, according to Keskin, is, along with PKK/PJAK,
targeted by Turkey-Iran intelligence sharing and cooperation,
forcing its activities in Turkey and presence in Istanbul to
decline greatly. Six years ago, he estimated, you could
easily access their representatives in Turkey; today it is
very difficult. The Iranian opposition, especially in
Tehran, Keskin stressed, must become more pluralistic to
prevent the country's disintegration.

PJAK: A PRODUCT OF THE IRANIAN STATE
--------------


5. (C) PJAK is "a product of the Iranian state," according
to Keskin, designed to allow the regime to militarize Kurdish
regions and sow fear amongst the Kurdish people; it does not
constitute a serious threat to the regime at this time.
Anti-PJAK operations also allow Iran to further pressure the
Iraqi government and to create a basis for strengthening
strategic partnership with Turkey. "The regime kills ethnic
Kurdish leaders and then distributes Abdullah Ocalan books
among the people," said Keskin. PJAK militants, he
maintained, can move freely among Iranian-Kurdish villages,
while evidence of collaboration between PJAK and the regime
is suppressed. Turkey, he said, is what binds PJAK and the
PKK. PKK is the parent organization; the two have a "unity
of vision." The organizations share senior level officials

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and PKK handles PJAK's propaganda operations and provides its
security. Keskin believes that if the PKK is defeated in
Turkey and northern Iraq, PJAK can allow the PKK to sustain
its conflict against Turkey. (COMMENT: A more detailed
analysis from Keskin on PJAK and Iranian Kurds can be found,
in English translation, at the Turkish Center for
International Relations and Strategic Analysis (TURKSAM)
website: www.turksam.org/en/a210. END COMMENT.)


6. (C) PJAK supporters have helped advance proposals in
Tehran to create a majority-Kurdish province in western Iran
out of West Azerbaijan province, Keskin told us. Kurds
number 700,000 in this province of 2.5 million, but most are
recent arrivals. Tehran had accepted this proposal, which
even reformists had endorsed, but conservative mullahs,
fearful of creating a majority-Sunni province, rejected the
idea, he said. Warmer bilateral relations between Turkey and
Iran have also lessened the urgency of creating a "buffer
zone" between Azeri-Iranian regions and Turkey, though state
tension over this issue remains high. He pointed out that
since 1906, when Iran had four provinces and the largest was
Azeri, Azeri regions have been divided into nine provinces
(seven majority-Azeri) and increasingly Kurdified.

AZERI-IRANIANS LOOK WARILY TO TURKEY
--------------


7. (C) Azeri-Iranians' approach to Turkey has started
changing. There is growing apprehension about warmer
Turkey-Iran relations, but Keskin believes these concerns are
exaggerated. The only limits to "South Azerbaijani"
opposition activism in Turkey are: no armed conflict and
don't agitate too loudly; modest protest demonstrations have
been authorized. Nonetheless, Azeri-Iranians have not been
able to overcome their fear of a Turkey-Iran rapprochement
and have become "passive," he said. Keskin noted that, even
before he became a Turkish citizen, he detected no policy to
interfere with his activities. He often has to convince his
Azeri-Iranians contacts in Iran that they will not be
arrested when they travel to Turkey. (Iranian tourists can
travel to Turkey visa-free.)


8. (C) The Iranian regime is aware that Turkey is the
country with the biggest potential to exploit Iran's ethnic
divisions; Iranian intelligence is highly focused on
Turkish-"South Azerbaijani" relations, said Keskin. Turkey
wishes to avoid instability in Iran and has thus far not
sought to organize the "South Azerbaijani" opposition. But
the historical divide between Turks and Azeri-Iranians is
breaking down. Whereas Azeri-Iranians primarily saw
themselves as Shiite, today their identity is largely secular
and culturally Turkish. At the same time, he contended that
the Iranian people as a whole admire the United States. He
argued that if "Persian-nationalist" opposition groups can
seek to better accommodate and collaborate with Iran's
restive ethnic groups, then a secular democratic transition
be achieved in Iran. Turkey, he posited, would benefit from
such an Iran -- more influential on the world stage and with
normalized relations with the United States. Azeri groups,
he recalled, have been at the vanguard of every major turning
point in Iranian history, include 1979, only to be pushed
back to the periphery. This time, Keskin believes,
Iranian-Azeris will need to maintain a central role in any
democratic future for Iran.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Keskin's claim that Azeri-Iranians are wary of a
perceived Turkey-Iran rapprochement might explain why "South
Azerbaijani" activists keep such a low profile in Turkey.
(Keskin had also noted to us earlier that Iranian
intelligence monitors their activities closely.) While
Azeri-Iranian issues have not garnered significant popular
attention here, Keskin's views have helped shape a widespread
Turkish belief that Turkey has a lever to pull against Iran
if Turkish interests were ever violated. ASAM, where he
serves as an expert, is one of Turkey's leading foreign
policy think tanks, with strong nationalist credentials. It
is headed by a former Turkish Ambassador to the United
States. Keskin, who is one of the few ASAM experts permitted
to write for outside publication, and who appears on TV
frequently, seems to have a wide audience and strong contacts
within Turkey's Iranian refugee community. While his

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understanding of the dynamics within the Iranian opposition
and of PJAK is not wholly consistent with our own, we will
remain in contact with him and seek opportunities to gain
additional perspectives from others on these issues,
including Azeri-Iranians and their relationship to Turkey.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

WILSON