JORDAN MAINTAINS STRIDENT POSITION ON MUGHRABI GATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 003389

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA AND NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2018
TAGS: PREL SCUL UNESCO KWBG IS JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN MAINTAINS STRIDENT POSITION ON MUGHRABI GATE

REF: A. AMMAN 3080

B. AMMAN 2965

C. TEL AVIV 2043

D. AMMAN 2483

E. AMMAN 2453

F. AMMAN 2147

G. AMMAN 1998

H. AMMAN 1483

I. AMMAN 536

J. AMMAN 394

K. TEL AVIV 2589

Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In response to the Ambassador's questions
about the ongoing Jordanian-Israeli dispute over work on the
Mughrabi Gate ascent to the Temple Mount/Haram Al-Sharif, the
King tasked a formal white paper laying out Jordan's position
on the issue. The paper underscores Jordan's position that:
Jordan wants to implement its own design; the U.S. must play
a role in resolving the dispute; if the matter is not
resolved, Jordan will not hesitate to use all the political
and legal tools available, even if it undermines "the
important work achieved in the past." By continuing to up
the ante the King may be leaving himself less room to walk
back from an all-or-nothing position. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador met on December 4 with King Abdullah and
inquired about Jordan's next steps on the controversial
ascent issue, particularly if a resolution satisfactory to
Jordan was not reached. The King reiterated previous
comments he and others have made about the issue's importance
to his legitimacy and for local and regional stability (Refs
A-J) and tasked Royal Court Chief Nasser Al-Lozi with
preparing a formal position paper answering the Ambassador's
question. On December 18, the Ambassador met with Lozi, who
offered the appended white paper - and treated it as a
Jordanian initiative.


3. (SBU) Text of the white paper is as follows:

Talking Points for meeting with US Ambassador on the
Magharbeh Ascent in Jerusalem

December 18, 2008

(1) I have asked to meet with you today to transmit a direct
message from His Majesty to the US administration on where
Jordan stands on the Magharbeh Ascent.

(2) The Haram is a red line Jordan will under no
circumstances be silent (about) or stand idle as efforts to
expand and consolidate the Israeli hold on the Holy Basin
accelerate and threaten both the legitimacy of the Hashemite
Kingdom, the Monarchy's credibility and standing, as well as
the stability of Jerusalem and the two-state solution, which
are key to Jordan's national security.

(3) The Magharbeh Ascent is an inseparable part of the Haram
and any action taken on that Ascent directly infringes and
impacts the Haram. This is an entrance to the Haram and any
transformations will affect the surface area, underlying bed,
as well as the walls of the Haram.

(4) The Israeli design will have an extremely dangerous
impact on the Haram by allowing APCs to move into the Haram,
as well as hundreds of people within a short period of time,
in addition to changing the status of the area beneath the
ascent and expanding Israeli prayer sites and excavations at
the expense of Muslim archeological sites.

(5) Jordan has prepared a design that has been looked on
favorably by UNESCO experts to reconstruct the Ascent in line
with its original state. Israel refuses to allow Jordanian
experts to undertake on-site measures to finalize its design,
which will be submitted to UNESCO.

(6) Jordan would like to be responsible for the design and
implementation of the Magharbeh Ascent as part of its
historic and legal responsibilities on Muslim Holy Sites (in
accordance with the Jordan Israel Peace Treaty as well).

(7) Israel insists that the only design can be its own and
under its own implementation. It is only willing to listen
to Jordanian comments on its own design. Jordan cannot
accept to be used as a rubber stamp to legitimize an Israeli
design and sign on to (an) Israeli role on the Muslim Holy
site.

(8) Recognizing or accepting Israeli plans will set a
precedent endorsing an Israeli role and undermining Jordan's
historic and legal role. We cannot accept that.

(9) Complacency to Israel's plans will lead to the erosion
of Jordan's role and responsibility. The vacuum will be
filled up by radicals and extremist elements and others in
the region using the sacred Muslim sites as the key weapon
fueling a religious war.

(10) Israel is already changing the character of Jerusalem
by transforming full Arab neighborhoods to Jewish areas.
Implementation of the Israeli plans on the Magharbeh Ascent
will lead to a violent eruption in Jerusalem and transform
the political conflict into an intractable religious war -
with grave regional and global ramifications.

(11) This is a matter of grave concern for His Majesty
personally and Jordan will save no effort to counter Israel's
plans and will not hesitate to use all the political and
legal tools and measure available.

(12) The US role is key in preventing us from having to make
difficult decisions and reach a situation forced upon us by
Israel's plans. The key to this is with Israel and we hope
that the US Administration will give this issue its most
serious consideration.

(13) His Majesty had raised this personally with the
Secretary of State in Aqaba seeking US support. Israel
continues to refuse to engage on the Jordanian design for the
Ascent.

(14) It will not be in the interest of Jordan, the US or
Israel to allow this situation to turn into a major crisis.
We hope we will not be forced to take measures that may
undermine the important work achieved in the past.

End Text of White Paper.

Comment: Is Jordan Reaching the End of Its Rope?
-------------- ---


4. (C) While the white paper largely repeats positions we
have been hearing for some time and does not remove ambiguity
regarding Jordan's ultimate plans, we note the following
significant points:

- Although there are some in the GOJ (Foreign Minister Salah
Al-Bashir, for instance) who have hinted - albeit without
detail - that a compromise might be possible short of
Jordan's ideal, none of that spirit of compromise is evident
in this paper, written on directive from the King. The text
is as strident and emotion-laden as anything we have heard
orally.

- Jordan explicitly acknowledges possible negative
consequences that could "undermine the important work
achieved in the past" if Jordan takes unspecified strong
"political and legal measures" in response to an outcome not
to its liking. However, the paper argues, Jordan would have
no choice.

- While we have urged Jordan to focus its efforts on seeking
a bilateral solution directly with Israel, the paper places
an onus on the U.S. to help resolve the situation before it
reaches true crisis proportions.

- The paper puts in ink accusations that Israel's design is
meant to facilitate the movement of armored personnel
carriers onto the Haram Al-Sharif. (Note: A Jordanian
official had previously cited media reports of this claim to
illustrate a point about the level of distrust, but that
official had also expressed doubts that this was Israel's
plan (Ref F). Interestingly, the Israeli position as
articulated in Ref K appears to be that the new ascent must
be built soon so that its police forces - albeit with no
mention of APCs - have ready access to the Haram to ensure
law and order. End Note.)


5. (C) We do not pretend to be able to precisely divine
Jordanian intent if they get no satisfaction on the Mughrabi
Gate issue, and they seem disinclined to tip their hand.
However, by continuing to up the ante the King may be leaving
himself less room to walk back from an all-or-nothing
position. Other elements influencing the Jordanian strategy
on the Mughrabi Gate issue are the public's extreme anger
over the situation in Gaza, concerns that a Likud-led
government in Israel may be in the offing, fear of rudderless
Palestinian polity after the expiry of Mahmoud Abbas's tenure
on January 9, renewed (and popular) talks with Hamas, and
significant strides toward easing strained relations between
the GOJ and the indigenous Islamic Action Front. The
instinct to "do something" in the face of perceived Israeli
intransigence on an issue where Jordan has such a special
interest could prevail over cooler heads.


6. (C) Jordan seems unlikely to halt its close (but quiet)
security cooperation with Israel, but withdrawing its
Ambassador seems neither beyond the pale nor unprecedented:
From November 2000 until 2005, Jordan did not fill the
Ambassadorial vacancy in Tel Aviv in protest of Israel's
actions during the second Intifada sparked when Ariel Sharon
visited the Haram Al-Sharif/Temple Mount in late September

2000. In a meeting with the Foreign Minister on December 25,
Ambassador noted that the white paper remained ambiguous
about Jordan's plans and asked Bashir pointedly whether steps
could include withdrawal of the Ambassador or court action.
Bashir simply responded "all of the above." End Comment.

Visit Amman's Classified Website at
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Beecroft