JORDANIAN FOREIGN POLICY REACHES INTO CENTRAL ASIA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001983

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ELA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KISL ZK ZJ TU IR JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN FOREIGN POLICY REACHES INTO CENTRAL ASIA

REF: A. AMMAN 1329

B. AMMAN 898

C. 07 AMMAN 4678

D. 07 AMMAN 4430

E. 07 AMMAN 4207

F. 07 AMMAN 3755

G. 04 AMMAN 9152

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Jordan, with the heavy personal engagement
of King Abdullah, has been reaching beyond the Middle East
for partners on a variety of energy, economic, and political
issues. Of particular note are the efforts expended on
improving and expanding ties with former Soviet republics in
Central Asia, particularly Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The
motivation for extending Jordan's foreign policy reach seems
to be a mixture of diversifying energy and food sources,
finding new strategic allies, enticing foreign investment,
spreading Jordan's brand of moderate Islam, countering Iran,
and even a dose of the King's boyish adventurism. End
Summary.


2. (C) We spoke recently to a number of foreign policy
experts and practitioners about Jordan's budding relations
with former Soviet republics in Central Asia, especially
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. A consensus formed on several
points:

--Jordan needs more reliable sources of energy and wheat.
Both are potentially available from those countries.

--Arabs are unreliable. While the King has substantially
improved the poor relations with Gulf dynasties that he
inherited from his father, those improved ties are not
delivering sufficient economic benefits or a strategy to
defeat Iran's regional agenda on the scale of Jordanian
expectations.

--The King is looking beyond the Arab cesspool. Unlike his
father, Abdullah has little patience for inter-Arab politics
and develops practical foreign policies to promote an
ambitious program for economic development. As a result, he
casts his eyes beyond the immediate neighborhood. He also
believes moderate Islam can be a binding factor, both in
challenging extremists and finding common ground on other
issues. He sees the Hashemite legacy - descent from the
Prophet - as a useful tool in this effort.

--Diversification is good. Commentators saw a benefit in
developing new markets for trade and the export of Jordanian
labor, although they had a harder time identifying what goods
Jordan could export there or what language Jordanian laborers
would use to communicate in those non-Anglophone markets.

--Countering Iran is also in play. The King believes, and
some commentators concur, that Central Asia could function as
a counter to Iran's agenda, by showing an alignment with
like-minded states fearful of Iranian hegemony. The King
advocates stronger intelligence and military cooperation with
the states on Iran's northern border. He also sees an
opportunity - not very well defined, or shared in Baku - to
use the sizeable Azeri population inside Iran as a pressure
point on the Tehran regime.

--Personalities Matter. The King is also partly motivated by
the sheer fun of projecting Jordan into frontier territory,
such as Central Asia, where money, oil, security challenges,
and grand strategy all mix. The fact that this causes him to
look at tyrants as possible comrades doesn't faze him.
According to an Azeri diplomat here, there is a longstanding
personal friendship between Abdullah and President Aliyev,
stemming from the 1990s. (The Azeri diplomat acknowledged
the many common interests between Jordan and his country, but
downplayed the importance of a shared Iran strategy, seeing a
gap between Azeri and Jordanian interests and issues, given
the Azeri-Iranian shared border.)

--Military Cooperation? We know the Azeris and Jordanians
have talked about arms transfers and other areas of security
cooperation - something the King thinks makes sense
strategically, and also provides a market for his budding
domestic arms industry. Ambassador has made clear to the
King directly U.S. policy on the transfer of U.S.-origin
military equipment to Azerbaijan, but this area bears close
monitoring.

Comment
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AMMAN 00001983 002 OF 002




3. (C) The King sees his relationship with the U.S. as the
foundation of his national security strategy. However, he
sees in an increasingly multipolar world the need to expand
ties elsewhere, so long as they do not conflict with his U.S.
relations. Frequent trips to China and East Asia aim at
developing Jordan's relations there, and leadership changes
in Western Europe have opened up the prospect for better ties
there, as well, especially with the French and German
leaders. The King's effort to knit together a "Group of 11"
- eleven countries from around the world with similar lower
middle income rankings - has gotten less traction, primarily
because the group has little else in common.


4. (C) The idea of developing relations with historically
marginal areas like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan appeals to the
boy adventurer in him - which is reflected in the somewhat
furtive fashion in which this portfolio is being handled (by
a palace aide who is uncomfortable talking about his role).
Moreover, he sees those countries as able to engage with him
in below the radar activities such as arms sales or
containing Iran. For the moment, Jordan has not seen a big
payoff on the oil issue with either of the two former Soviet
republics. As one contact said, nobody in the palace is
overly-optimistic about the prospects of Jordan's outreach
strategy (except perhaps the King),but nonetheless these are
avenues to pursue.

Visit Amman's Classified Website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman
Hale