Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08AMMAN1753
2008-06-12 06:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN JORDAN, PART 4:

Tags:  PGOV ECON KPAL KISL KREF JO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #1753/01 1640643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 120643Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2858
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 001753 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV ECON KPAL KISL KREF JO
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN JORDAN, PART 4:
ISLAMISTS AND THE PULL OF EXTREMISM

REF: A. 07 AMMAN 4733

B. AMMAN 1466

C. AMMAN 391

D. 07 AMMAN 4430

E. AMMAN 1724

F. AMMAN 1725

G. AMMAN 1744

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 001753

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV ECON KPAL KISL KREF JO
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN JORDAN, PART 4:
ISLAMISTS AND THE PULL OF EXTREMISM

REF: A. 07 AMMAN 4733

B. AMMAN 1466

C. AMMAN 391

D. 07 AMMAN 4430

E. AMMAN 1724

F. AMMAN 1725

G. AMMAN 1744

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Note: This is the fourth cable of a four-part
series examining the world of Jordan's Palestinian refugee
camps. Part one focused on the different categories of
refugees, and the basic structure of the camp system as it
exists in Jordan. Part two examined the isolation of the
camps - how they are largely cut off from Jordanian society,
politics, and economics. Part three looked at the economic
situation of the camps and their inhabitants, particularly in
light of recent strains on Jordan's economy. Part four
examines Islamist politics and extremism in the camps. These
cables are the result of focus group meetings with diverse
residents of nine camps in Jordan. End Note.


2. (C) Summary: The political and social position of
Islamists in Palestinian refugee camps is nuanced and
complicated. Despite recent electoral setbacks, Islamists
dominate the political life of the camps. The appeal of the
Islamists is due in large part to their integration into the
social network of the camps rather than the influence of
charities run by the Muslim Brotherhood. Even so, economics
is a factor that cannot be ignored when assessing the roots
of political and social support for Islamist groups.
Islamists have also filled a political void in the camps by
championing the Palestinian cause. Theories about the
decline of political Islam in the camps are ill-founded and
little more than wishful thinking, although there are some
long-term trends that may allow for a political shift.
People in the camps see support for terrorism as a social
problem with multiple causes. End Summary.

The IAF's Base
--------------


3. (C) Despite recent electoral setbacks and public displays
of disunity (Ref A),the Muslim Brotherhood is still the
primary political force in the camps. The Brotherhood's
political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF),is the party

that most contacts in the camps look to represent their
interests. Note: Not all camp residents can vote. The
gradations of Jordanian citizenship are described in Ref B.
End Note. Jordanian elites have a series of theories about
why this is the case - they assume that residents of the
camps support the IAF out of ignorance, lack of other
political options, or because they are heavily influenced by
power brokers. Yet our contacts in the camps paint a picture
that is more nuanced and complex.


4. (C) Ahmad Awad, the UNRWA camp services officer in Baqa'a
Camp, maintains that the IAF genuinely represents the
political preferences of camp residents. Discussions with
residents of the camps bear this out - they talk freely about
the solidarity they feel with the IAF's view of the world,
both in their canned diatribes and in franker private
conversations. Our contacts particularly stress that Islam
is a critical pillar of daily life, not just in the mosque
but in the community and in the relationship with the state.
It is clear that religion is a core element of their
worldview - one that informs their political beliefs just as
much as it informs their social lives. Said Ajawi, a
resident of Irbid camp, put it simply: "No country, no
people, no land...God is all we have left."


5. (C) Part of the natural appeal of the IAF in the camps is
that some of its main proponents, the imams and clerics, hold
positions of social and cultural authority and are considered
pillars of the community. "They are in a place of trust,"
says Abu Ra'ed Darash, a resident of Zarqa camp. "Those who
believe in Islam must be good people." Government contacts
frequently note that it is hard for them to compete with
Islamists who can reach their target audience five times
every day. Note: For example, Royal Court Chief Bassem
Awadallah recently made such an argument to a visiting
delegation, adding that the "mosque was more important than
media outlets." End Note. Contacts in the camps essentially
confirm this - even though contact with religious authorities
is more often than not an interaction that has little to do
with politics or economics. Yet for those who are interested
in those topics, there is ample opportunity to engage with
the Islamist point of view.

An Emotional Bond

AMMAN 00001753 002 OF 005


--------------


6. (C) Equal to, if not more important than, the social
position of IAF members is the fact that the party is an
integral part of the social and economic network of the camp.
"The IAF follows the minute daily details of our society.
They know when people get married. They know when people
have children. They are involved in all of this. They are
experts," Awad notes. Residents of the Jebel Hussein camp
talk about Muslim Brotherhood-linked charities helping out
with funeral expenses, and creating an "adopt an orphan"
program that assists the camp's most vulnerable children to
attend school.


7. (C) The IAF's use of Muslim Brotherhood-linked charitable
organizations is frequently cited in the Jordanian and
international media as the hook that is used to create
electoral leverage with residents of the camps. In talking
to residents of the camps, it is certainly the case that the
charities create an emotional bond in addition to any
economic one. The camps are tightly knit communities that
are largely isolated from the rest of Jordanian society. In
this context, person-to-person contact is what drives the
social (and therefore political) preferences of people in the
camps. "It is important to look at the closeness people feel
with the (IAF) candidates," says Suzan Ladhabit of Jebel
Hussein camp. On the other side, residents of the camps talk
about alienation from the Jordanian government. Awad
asserts: "The government is not part of the social network
of the camps. They deal with the residents of the camps only
through rigid procedures, not on a human level."

Manufacturing Consent
--------------


8. (C) This is not to say that economic considerations are
not part of the equation. Awad says that monetary and other
aid funneled through Muslim Brotherhood-oriented charities is
more than that given by the so-called "safety net" of UNRWA
and the Jordanian government combined. People from the Jebel
Hussein camp talk about the restrictive, paperwork-heavy
process of obtaining assistance from the Jordanian government
and UNRWA, comparing it unfavorably with the targeted,
immediate, and relatively bureaucracy-free assistance they
receive from Islamist charities.


9. (C) A prime example of the perceived inflexibility of
international aid to people in the camps is a rule (recently
eliminated by the Jordanian government for its own
assistance, but still in place for UNRWA) that families
cannot receive economic assistance if even one of their male
children is over nineteen years old and not studying, serving
in the military, or in jail. It was originally assumed that
this "breadwinner" status would allow older children to begin
work, thereby sharing the proceeds of their labor with their
families and pushing the family towards self-sufficiency.
Yet for families with many children, the reaching of that
majority age by the eldest son or daughter can have a
disastrous impact on family finances. "If a family of seven
kids has even one nineteen-year-old, they're sunk," says
Salam Hamdan. Contacts indicate that Islamist charities then
rush in to fill this gap, propping up families who would
otherwise fall through the cracks.


10. (C) Residents of the camps realize that there are
ideological strings attached to aid flows from Islamist
charities. "In principle, humanitarian aid is the goal, but
ideology also comes with it," says Afaf Mejdelawi of Zarqa
camp. Still, economic desperation leads people in the camps
to take whatever they can get, regardless of what is said in
their names as a result. "There is simply no other way,"
says Abu Ra'ed Darash, also from Zarqa camp. In addition,
recipients of economic assistance from Islamist charities
have little knowledge about where it originates. Since the
Muslim Brotherhood's charities receive funding primarily as
anonymously donated zakat (alms for the poor which are
required of all Muslims),there is rarely a connection
between benefactor and recipient. "We don't know exactly
where the money (from Islamist charities) comes from," says
Ibrahim Natour of Baqa'a camp. "We assume that it comes from
outside the camp, since people here are too poor to donate
that kind of money."


11. (C) Residents of the camps are grateful for any kind of
economic assistance, and have a keen sense of what money can
be squeezed from what source. While they bash American
policy freely and openly, contacts in the camps are always
careful to note that America "helps them" economically
through its contributions to UNRWA. They are very aware of
the health centers and schools that American money
constructs, and are not shy about asking for funds for future
projects. ("Tell Congress..." is a constant refrain.) Note:

AMMAN 00001753 003 OF 005


One resident of Souf camp wondered why American funding
flowed indirectly through UNRWA for refugees, but through
direct, publicized projects for the remainder of Jordan's
population. "UNRWA is no USAID," he complained. End Note.

A Palestinian Champion
--------------


12. (C) Meetings with any political contact in Jordan,
regardless of origin or political persuasion, are likely to
descend at some point into a fervent criticism of U.S. policy
towards the Palestinians. In meetings with camp residents,
however, these speeches are based on personal experience.
More often than not, the people of the camps use the hawkish
talking points of the IAF when they talk about normalization
of relations with Israel, the peace process, and a solution
to the conflict. While it is unclear whether the IAF mirrors
refugee opinion or vice versa, there is clearly wide support
in the camps for what the IAF is saying about the political
situation of Palestinians in Jordan and the region.


13. (C) Contacts in several different camps realized that
the IAF's public support for Hamas was unpopular in Jordanian
society as a whole, but claimed that it has cost them little
among the Palestinians in the camps. In a discussion with
refugees in Souf camp, it was clear that support for
extremists played a role in their political choices - one
contact admitted that he considered the suicide bombers who
attacked two hotels in Amman in 2005 "martyrs," although he
qualified his statement (likely for our benefit) by saying
that "there are degrees of martyrdom."


14. (C) Oraib Rantawi, a prominent commentator of
Palestinian origin, believes that the Jordanian government
has essentially ceded the camps to the Islamists, while at
the same time denying them sanctuary elsewhere in Jordan.
"It's easy to demonstrate for the Palestinian cause in Wahdat
camp. But it's impossible to organize such a demonstration
in (the East Banker stronghold of) Salt," he says. Rantawi
thinks that Islamists have capitalized on this strategy,
creating a deep cultural and political division between the
camps and the rest of Jordanian society. In the end, Rantawi
wonders why "members of the Muslim Brotherhood have the
chance to contact every resident of the camps five times
every day," yet the government has no operational
person-to-person contact that can compete.


15. (C) Mohammed Al-Masri, a researcher at the Center for
Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan who frequently
conducts focus groups in the camps, believes that as a result
of limiting political space for Palestinians, the IAF has
become essentially the only option for the people of the
camps (Ref C). "The IAF represents Palestinians more than
any other organization in Jordan. There are very few
Palestinians in parliament. There is no
'Jordanian-Palestinian Friendship Organization' which can
advocate for their rights in society. The only organization
that is actively pushing the agenda of the Palestinian
community is the IAF," Masri asserts.

Support on the Decline?
--------------


16. (C) The IAF performed poorly across the board in the
November 2007 parliamentary elections, but it did especially
poorly among its traditional supporters in the camps.
Several theories surfaced about why this was the case - a
split in the party, the unpopularity of the IAF's pro-Hamas
rhetoric, or the decline of Muslim Brotherhood-linked parties
throughout the Arab world were all put forth as theories for
the IAF's loss (Ref A). Yet our contacts in the camps
attribute the IAF's declining support to one factor only -
its inability to deliver services.


17. (C) Said Ajawi, a resident of Irbid camp, told us that
residents of the camps are looking for members of parliament
who can deliver essential government services that would
otherwise fall through the cracks between UNRWA and the
government of Jordan. "People want to elect someone who will
be able to do something. The residents of the camps used to
see the IAF members as good men who could accomplish
something. Yet when they got into parliament, they didn't do
anything." Mohammed Akel, a resident of Souf camp, agrees,
saying: "Do they represent me? No, they do not. Their
economic program has been a disaster."


18. (C) It is clear in talking to the people of the camps
that while the assistance of Muslim Brotherhood-linked
charities is appreciated and needed, it is no substitute for
concrete action on the part of the Jordanian government. Abu
Ra'ed Darash, a sheikh from Zarqa camp, points out that
Islamists have the ability to provide short-term aid to the

AMMAN 00001753 004 OF 005


camps, but are essentially unable to deliver long-term
support in the form of jobs, training, and infrastructure.
"We are looking for government action," he says.


19. (C) Contacts in some camps also mentioned that
assistance from Muslim Brotherhood-linked charities is
beginning to take on the unseemly qualities that were
previously used by Islamists to characterize the Jordanian
government - nepotism, inefficiency, and corruption. "It's
not an open door," says Afaf Mejdelawi, a resident of Zarqa
camp. "They prefer to support their relatives and those who
have 'wasta' (connections) within the organization."
Suleyman Abu Takhayneh, a resident of Sukhna camp, asserts:
"If they come here, we'll cut off their beards." He claims
that the Muslim Brotherhood-linked charities selectively
distribute zakat to blood or ideological allies. Note: Just
a few minutes later, however, Abu Takhayneh remarked,
"whoever gives me more money, I'll vote for him." End Note.


20. (C) Regardless of its ability or inability to deliver
services, contacts in the camps talk about the IAF as a much
needed check on state power. Bajis Hueitah, a community
leader in the Baqa'a camp, told us that people voted for IAF
member Mohammed Akel "just to vote against the government -
they know that he won't do anything." Ibrahim Natour,
another Baqa'a resident, insists that people in the camps
"don't like decisions to be imposed on them from above" and
see the IAF as a grassroots voice that those in the camps can
rely upon to reflect their interests.


21. (C) Throughout Jordan, our contacts noted a sharp
increase in the amount of money spent during the November
2007 parliamentary election cycle (Ref D). The advent of the
businessman-turned-politician meant an uptick in the amount
of "walking around money" disbursed by candidates of all
stripes. Residents of the Souf camp talked about a bidding
war of sorts between these candidates and the IAF. Realizing
that the IAF candidates were politically vulnerable on the
service front, independent candidates (who were largely East
Bankers) stepped into the void to assert their ability to
deliver where the IAF could not. As a consequence, several
residents of Souf camp noted that the IAF candidate won a
much closer contest than usual, with the majority of his
support coming from outside the camp.


22. (C) Despite the decreased numbers of IAF representatives
in parliament, it is clear that the IAF still casts a long
shadow in the camps, both as a result of its grassroots
machine and as a function of its policy preferences. Many in
the camps chalk up the popular theories on the IAF's decline
as nothing more than wishful thinking. Said Ajawi says that
contrary to popular opinion, the IAF is "not as Islamic as
most people in the camps would like" and that residents of
the camps are "becoming more conservative" over time.

The Roots of Extremism
--------------


23. (C) There is a clear divide in the minds of camp
residents with whom we spoke between support for political
Islam and support for terrorism. Discussions with camp
residents on the subject often produce vocal condemnation of
Islamist terrorists and their actions. Yet the line between
support for "legitimate Palestinian resistance" and support
for terrorism is less clear cut, especially when talking
about the situation in Palestine proper rather than in
Jordan. Regardless of the ideology behind it, contacts in
the camps realize that some of their friends and neighbors
are among the "misguided". When asked about what the
community is doing about extremists in their midst, the
people in the camps that we talked to were divided.


24. (C) The relatively closed social network of the camps
can help to stigmatize extremism among friends and relatives,
but residents of the camps are careful to point out that
self-policing only goes so far. Ibrahim Natour, a resident
of Baqa'a camp, acknowledges that while there are distinct
advantages of the "tight relations" between members of the
camp community, that community is often remiss in bringing
those tilting towards extremism back into the fold. He
believes that fear of retribution is behind the lack of
self-policing within the camps - people know who the
extremists are, but the extremists are part of the same
social networks and are likely to know their accusers as well.


25. (C) Camp residents are cognizant of the internal factors
that allow extremists to find sanctuary in their communities,
but also realize that the problem is far bigger than that.
Lack of employment opportunity and social despair are
frequently cited as reasons that extremism persists in the
camps, but the analysis sometimes goes beyond these factors.
Contacts in the Jebel Hussein camp drew a direct connection

AMMAN 00001753 005 OF 005


between extremism and the "brain drain" from the camps.
Salam Hamdan talks about the proliferation of geographically
single mothers in the camps. These women have husbands that
work in the gulf or elsewhere, and rely on remittances to
feed themselves and their children. Yet in the absence of a
strong (and present) father figure, Hamdan argues that many
of the youth in the camps are easily led astray by the
prospect of belonging to a social network. Note: Even those
remittances may not be enough. A 2006 study of UNRWA's
special hardship program showed that of the families who
receive extra financial assistance, forty-five percent had a
female as their effective head of household - four times more
than the refugee population as a whole. Eighty-four percent
of special hardship cases were dependent primarily on
remittance income. End Note.

Comment
--------------


26. (C) Diverting support away from political Islam in the
camps will not be easy. It will require a concentrated
effort that deals with the economic, political, and social
problems in the camps while creating a workable compromise
between liberal ideals and a conservative, religious
ideology. Yet perhaps most importantly, it will take a
Jordanian government that can connect to the people of the
camps on an emotional level. Since the 1971 expulsion of
Fatah from Jordan, successive, resource-strapped governments
have left the provision of services to UNRWA, while the GID
was used to stifle any threatening revival of Palestinian
political parties. That left the field fertile and open to
exploitation by the Jordanian Muslim Brothers. With issues
of identity still dividing Jordan, the fate of the refugees
still subject to Israeli-Palestinian negotiation, and a
strapped budget, the Jordanian government is unlikely to be
motivated to take on controversy by better meeting the needs
of its refugee population. In the context of a two-state
resolution, however, Jordan will have to face squarely the
question of the identity and loyalty of Palestinians who will
remain in Jordan, and the obligations of the state toward
them. International support and assistance will be essential
for Jordan to face successfully what Adnan Abu Odeh called
"the moment of truth." Meanwhile, many of the refugees will
remain on the margins, drifting further into despair, and
possibly seeking more radical solutions.

Visit Embassy Amman's Classified Website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman
Hale