Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ALGIERS739
2008-06-28 17:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

BOUTEFLIKA SAYS HE WANTS BETTER U.S. TIES

Tags:  PREL PHUM PTER MARR AG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5727
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAS #0739/01 1801735
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 281735Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6048
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2785
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2418
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7272
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6439
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000739 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2028
TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER MARR AG
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA SAYS HE WANTS BETTER U.S. TIES

Classified By: CDA Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b, d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000739

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2028
TAGS: PREL PHUM PTER MARR AG
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA SAYS HE WANTS BETTER U.S. TIES

Classified By: CDA Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: During the Ambassador's farewell call June
24, a reasonably healthy-looking President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika wistfully wondered why American relations with
Algeria couldn't be more like those the U.S. enjoys with
Morocco and Tunisia. The Ambassador noted that as Algeria
opened up more politically and economically, the U.S. was
engaging more. However, weak Algerian administrative
capacity limited what we and our private sector could do with
the Algerians. When Bouteflika hinted that he would like to
see more senior American visitors in Algeria, the Ambassador
observed that the U.S. does not judge the quality of a
relationship on the basis of visits but rather of concrete
cooperation. In addition, the Algerians have not tried to
send any high-level delegations to the U.S. Bouteflika
bemoaned the failure to sell night-vision goggles to the
Algerian military and the Ambassador reminded him that the
end-user verification issue had to be resolved first.
Bouteflika sighed that moving the Algerian generals would
take time. Bouteflika thanked the U.S. for our efforts to
improve education in Algeria, especially English teaching.
He agreed to the Ambassador's request that Algeria accept
some detainees back from Guantanamo Bay, clearing the way for
another attempt which may or may not succeed. Bouteflika was
less flexible on the issue of pressuring evangelical
Christian groups here, calling it a major security issue. He
said local officials and the evangelicals need to have a
better dialogue as a start. As we think about how to advance
bilateral relations during the rest of the Bouteflika
government -- however long that is -- we need to recognize
that this government is keenly risk-averse and lacks vision.
We should work with those government officials and private
Algerians who are trying to advance reform in their small
ways. When the issue is urgent and really important, we need
to by-pass the usually unhelpful Algerian bureaucracy and
make high-level representations to Bouteflika himself since
he genuinely appears to want closer bilateral relations.

Discussions on Iran and Western Sahara reported septels. END
SUMMARY.

BOUTEFLIKA WISHES FOR VISITS
--------------


2. (C) President Bouteflika told the departing Ambassador
June 24 that Algeria wanted better relations but he felt that
the U.S. hadn't tried very hard. He wondered why bilateral
relations could not be more like those the U.S. enjoyed with
Morocco and Tunisia, although he then readily acknowledged
our history with those two states had been different back to
the 1960s. The Ambassador told Bouteflika that the U.S.
perceived that relations in many areas were improving,
including cooperation in fields such as fighting terrorism,
education, judicial reform, parliamentary reform, banking and
tax administration reform and increased business. The
Ambassador noted that we had proposed additional programs in
all these areas, but the Algerian administrative capacity was
limited and there were obvious limits to what we, or our
companies, could do in the current climate. Bouteflika
acknowledged the greater activity in the relationship, but he
wanted more. Sensing that what Bouteflika really meant was a
high-level visit, the Ambassador told Bouteflika directly
that while we understood the utility of senior visits, the
U.S. also measured the quality of a relationship by the
cooperation between the states and the resources the two
sides put into it. Bouteflika immediately perked up and said
that in Algerian culture, high-level visits were an important
indication of the importance given to a particular country.
The Ambassador noted that the President and the Secretary
were spending copious amounts of time trying to advance the
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and this left less time for
visits to other countries in the region. Bouteflika also
acknowledged this point. The Ambassador added that while
there have not been high-level visitors from the U.S.,
neither have the Algerians sent delegations to Washington,
and Bouteflika acknowledged this as well. (Comment: It is
no accident that MFA Secretary General -- the number two at
the foreign ministry -- volunteered to the Ambassador on June
25 that Algeria should be more proactive in sending
high-level visitors to Washington. End Comment.)

AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT
--------------


3. (S) Bouteflika then threw out another complaint: the U.S.
had refused to share advanced reconnaissance equipment such
as infra-red vision equipment with the Algerian military.
Bouteflika said this was hard to understand, as we both face
a common threat from Islamist extremists returning from

ALGIERS 00000739 002 OF 003


places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, the U.S. was
going much farther with Morocco, preparing to sell F-16s
there. Ambassador rejoined that we had repeatedly stressed
our willingness to consider sales of vision equipment.
However, Algeria had to accept the same end-user
verifications that other military sales recipients accepted;
we had sent multiple teams here to discuss this. Bouteflika
clearly knew the issue. The problem, he acknowledged, was
that even if the verifications were a mere bureaucratic
process for the Americans, as a result of the bitter
independence war against France the Algerian military was
very sensitive about allowing any foreign state leverage over
its equipment. The generals will be hard to budge, he
observed. (Comment: It was clear from his comment that
Bouteflika didn't think he could budge them. End Comment.)
Bouteflika concluded that the U.S. should be patient while
the Algerian military's thinking slowly evolves. If there
were additional inducements the U.S. could provide (he named
nothing specific and said specifically he didn't mean money)
that might help shake a change in the Algerian army's
thinking.

EDUCATION - A THANK YOU
--------------


4. (U) Bouteflika noted that he knew the U.S. was putting
more effort into education programs here and he appreciated
it. He said Algeria needed to have more people able to do
business in English. U.S. engagement in Algerian education
was very welcome, he stated. (Comment: The MFA Secretary
General highlighted this enhanced work on education as a
major advance in relations during his conversation with the
Ambassador June 25. End Comment.)

GTMO - POSSIBLE MOVEMENT
--------------


5. (S) The Ambassador said there were issues troubling us as
well. He noted that we wanted to move forward on closing
Guantanamo, but the disposition of Algerian prisoners was a
problem for us. We had been ready to return a small group in
August 2007 and the Algerians at the last moment had stopped
the transfer. Since then, while we have indicated our
willingness to be flexible on how the transfer is undertaken,
the GoA has refused even to talk to us. Bouteflika asked if
we were sure the detainees were Algerian and Ambassador
stressed that they were. In a rambling commentary,
Bouteflika said that if the U.S. was still holding these
Algerians they must be dangerous men. They might pose a
security problem for Algeria, and Algeria already has enough
security problems, he observed. Bouteflika said the transfer
of the group from last year should be allowed to go forward,
but the Americans could help Algeria by sharing what it knows
about the individuals so that the Algerians understand what
they have to deal with. (Comment: Later that evening, a
senior Algerian security official telephoned to start working
out details of a transfer. It is still too early to say this
will work smoothly, but it is the most movement we have seen
in ten months. End Comment.)

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM - TOUGH LINE
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador raised also the issue of the Christian
community in Algeria and the damage to Algeria's reputation
as a tolerant society from some of the actions taken against
Christians. He pointed to the recent letter from a group of
members of Congress to Bouteflika about the issue. The
Ambassador noted that we were not telling Christian groups to
disobey Algerian law, but if the Algerian government insisted
on groups registering for approval for their activities, the
government should not just automatically refuse requests.
Bouteflika said that the Algerian government had no problem
with the Catholic or Protestant churches: it knew them and
their activities were fine. He had sharper words for
Evangelicals who, he said, were causing political and
security problems, especially in the Kabylie region. The
Ambassador asked what Bouteflika meant by political problems,
and in a rambling response Bouteflika indicated that major
efforts to convert Algerian Muslims recalled French colonial
practices and provoked Islamist extremist responses. He
underlined again that above all he considered the Evangelical
issue to be a security problem. Bouteflika said that there
needed to be more of a dialogue with the Evangelicals and
that the U.S. should encourage Evangelical groups in Algeria
to seek out local officials and discuss how they could
conduct their activities legally.

COMMENT

ALGIERS 00000739 003 OF 003


--------------


7. (C) Bouteflika always speaks softly, but he was animated
and in apparently good spirits. His complaints were a rehash
of what we heard in March during the visit of A/S Welch from
either Bouteflika or then-Prime Minister Belkhadem.
Interestingly, however, Bouteflika several times in the
conversation wanted a sense of how to work with Washington --
he asked about the effectiveness of his ambassador in
Washington, for example.


8. (C) Looking forward, as we think about how to improve
relations with the Bouteflika government, we see a frail
Algerian president whose health and term of office are
uncertain. He wants better relations with the U.S., but his
political weight within the system has limits and he cannot
fix in any short term the bureaucratic failings of his
government. Largely isolated in his big palace, Bouteflika
appears to follow foreign policy events fairly closely, but
he is not a creative thinker. We are thus left with the need
to help the sclerotic Algerian state try to implement changes
and reforms that can help it forestall even worse discontent
on the streets here. We have to find those Algerian
officials and private Algerians who can and will work with us
in reform areas like economic and business climate,
education, democratic processes and the judiciary. At best,
the state here is inherently very risk-averse and cumbersome;
some elements are simply against more liberalization. Thus,
reforms in whatever time is left for the Bouteflika
government will be halting and always tenuous. When the
issue is urgent and important enough to us, and we are
blocked, we need to go around the mid- and upper bureaucratic
levels and via a high-level message reach Bouteflika
directly. This was the only way we may finally get movement
on the GTMO issue, for example.
DAUGHTON