SAHEL SECURITY: MFA SAYS ALGERIA REENGAGING ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000704

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER AG ML NG
SUBJECT: SAHEL SECURITY: MFA SAYS ALGERIA REENGAGING ON
ALGIERS ACCORDS

REF: ALGIERS 422

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 18 discussion with a visiting U.S.
delegation led by Bureau of African Affairs Deputy Assistant
Secretary Todd Moss, MFA Director General (Assistant
Secretary equivalent) for African Affairs Ismail Chergui
highlighted Algeria's commitment to the Algiers Accords, but
only if the parties involves accept Algeria as the sole
mediator. Chergui said that Algeria shares the U.S. interest
in fighting Al Qaeda in northern Mali, and asked for help in
putting pressure on ATT to follow through on his commitments
under the Algiers Accords. According to Chergui, Algeria is
encouraging the international community to donate to an
economic development subcommittee within the context of the
Accords, while believing firmly that replacing Malian
military forces with specially trained security units is the
key to restoring confidence and security to civilian areas of
northern Mali. Both Chergui and DAS Moss viewed the
prevalence of fragmented and self-interested units among the
Malian military and Tuareg groups as the biggest challenges
to the Accords. Moss highlighted American support for the
Algiers Accords and the Algerian mediation effort and said
the U.S. would look for ways to be helpful. Turning to the
Tuareg problems in Niger, Chergui made clear Algeria's
preference for dealing with Nigerien president Mamadou Tandja
over Malian president Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT),believing
Tandja to be "more sincere" despite his weakness. END
SUMMARY.

NOT OK TO SEE OTHER PEOPLE
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2. (C) As we reported in reftel, Chergui recounted Algeria's
displeasure at overtures by Libya and others, attempting to
mediate various elements of the Tuareg conflict in northern
Mali it felt belonged within the framework of the Algiers
Accords. Chergui said Algeria had not been treated
faithfully by ATT and the Malian media in particular, and
therefore "froze" its role. "We said if you are really not
happy with us, we will withdraw," Chergui said, noting that
almost immediately, this action triggered a Malian
ministerial visit to Algeria, at which time the two nations
agreed in principle to reengage on the Algiers Accords.
Chergui said Algeria was now ready to resume work, "but only
if we are the sole intermediary." Shaking his head, Chergui
said that even after these discussions, a delegation of
Libyan, Sudanese and other regional personalities had visited
Niger and Mali and even met with ATT himself. "This is not
helpful at all," Chergui said, pointing out that Algeria's
second condition for reengaging is that the Algiers Accords
be binding for all three parties involved - Algeria, Mali and
the "Alliance du 23 Mai," the Tuareg representatives who
agreed to the Accords. Moss underlined that the U.S.
supported the Algiers Accords and Algeria's mediation effort
and perceived that Libyan involvement, including payment for
hostages, was unhelpful.

WHY CAN'T YOU BE LIKE MAMADOU?
--------------


3. (C) Chergui expressed continued frustration with ATT
(reftel),questioning his commitment to follow-up on specific
provisions of the Accords, and stating his belief that ATT
was more focused on a regional conference because it wanted
others to "bear witness to their own troubles" rather than
actually taking action. By contrast, Chergui said Algeria
was "satisfied with what we have in Niger." Although
conceding Tandja's material weakness and need for Algerian
and international support, Chergui praised Tandja's integrity
and clearly saw him as a more trustworthy interlocutor. "We
must do justice to Tandja," he said, noting he was the first
to propose a regional conference, and "is very good in the
fight against terrorism." DAS Moss pointed out that Tandja
lacked the military capability to handle the situation in
northern Niger and that Tandja did not even see the Sahel as
a security issue but rather as a local problem of smuggling
and contraband. Chergui agreed, believing that the influence

ALGIERS 00000704 002.2 OF 003


of other countries through the regional ministerial
preparatory meeting in Niger and the proposed heads of state
meeting in Bamako could steer Tandja's perspective towards
broader regional security. "Only through results and action
on the field can we convince him," Chergui concluded. He
added that Algeria also had "no doubt" about the commitment
of another neighbor, Mauritania, to efforts to enhance
regional security.

THE WAY FORWARD FOR NORTHERN MALI
--------------


4. (C) The Algerian view of the way forward, according to
Chergui, falls into two phases. The first phase involves
bringing all disparate Tuareg groups back into the May 23
Alliance, which would be a challenge since "there are many
contradictory messages coming from Mali, with everyone acting
for themselves." The second phase concerning Mali, Chergui
said, was the "full and formal" engagement of ATT himself, to
demonstrate to Algeria and others that he is sticking to the
Accords. On the international front, Chergui said Algeria is
committed to a conference of regional neighbors that would
include Algeria, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Chad, Libya and
Burkina Faso. The goal of this conference would be a
mechanism for permanent cooperation between these countries,
in security, food aid, humanitarian assistance and
development projects.


5. (C) In Chergui's view, there were three things that
Algeria, the U.S. and others can do to ameliorate the tenuous
situation in northern Mali. First, establish special
security units, so that when civilian areas in the north are
demilitarized, police functions will be in place and will
restore the confidence of a population many of whom fled into
the mountains after the recent killing of a military
commander in Kidal. Second, withdraw Malian troops from
those civilian population centers, especially Kidal.
Chergui's third area for cooperation was to encourage
economic development projects and assistance.

CHALLENGES IN TRAINING MALIAN SPECIAL SECURITY UNITS
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6. (C) According to Chergui, Algeria has an active military
training program for Malian troops, although it was focused
more on standing up special security units to serve as police
forces. These units, Chergui said, would offer permanent
employment to people who know the area very well, and would
transform those who had previously taken up arms against the
government into a "tool in the hands of the system." Chergui
said that 220 out of a planned 600 Malians were finishing
their training in Mali at present. The problem, he said, was
that people were afraid of the army but had no confidence in
the security units, since Mali created two units "on paper
only," weak in resources, equipment and facilities. Chergui
said Algeria had offered to help train them, but Mali
politely refused, wanting to handle the job on its own. "We
do not want to impose," Chergui said, suggesting that perhaps
the U.S. should discuss greater engagement in training these
units with ATT. Above all, he said, Algeria and the U.S.
should help pressure the Malians to make these units a
reality. Meanwhile, Chergui shared DAS Moss' view that the
Malian military "had the right" to move freely within its own
borders, but that a visible and active military presence was
"unhelpful" to winning over the population and achieving
sustainable security in the region.

JUMP-STARTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
--------------


7. (C) Chergui shared frustration expressed by members of DAS
Moss' delegation that, due to a weak security situation,
development projects in northern Mali often wound up
stillborn, looted within months of construction. Still, he
asserted that small projects "send the right signals" to the
local population, and outlined Algeria's efforts to solicit
international aid. The Algiers Accords, Chergui explained,
provided for several subcommittees to drive implementation
forward at the working level. Up until now, Chergui lamented

ALGIERS 00000704 003.2 OF 003


that "only the security subcommittee" had actually been
active. He went on to say that Algeria was committed to
re-energizing the development subcommittee, and had already
contributed at least USD 1 million to its fund. So far,
Chergui said Algeria was the only country to contribute to
the fund, although it had reached out for contributions to
countries such as China, Japan, Canada and others. The
development fund, Chergui explained, targeted some 2400
former rebels who had handed over their arms.

REBUILDING THE TUAREG ALLIANCE
--------------


8. (C) Responding to DAS Moss' query about how to handle
Tuareg rebel leader Ibrahim ag Bahanga, Chergui asserted that
Algeria was trying to bring him back into the alliance, along
with all of the other Tuareg groups. Chergui asserted that,
despite doubts on many sides about Bahanga's sincerity and
intentions, it was "not wise" to reopen a debate on whether
or not he belongs within the alliance. With time, Chergui
believed, "we will see if there is enough unity on the Tuareg
side, but for now we want to stick to the Algiers Accords."
Chergui repeated his request that the U.S. help put pressure
on ATT to honor his commitments and to demilitarize the
northern part of the country. Chergui said that Algeria was
grateful for the visit of the DAS Moss delegation, and
emphasized the need for further coordination to ensure that
the complex web of actors concerned with the stability of the
Sahel were all sending the same message. Chergui highlighted
the importance of the Algerian ambassador in Bamako as a key
interlocutor.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) The Algerians were genuinely pleased to have these
consultations about the situation on their borders; it is the
first time an interagency delegation from Washington has come
here to consult on strategy regarding non-Middle Eastern
regional security issues in at least two years, if not much
longer. Chergui was quite familiar with the different actors
and angles. He is soon to leave his MFA position as senior
Africa hand, and it is not clear who will replace him as the
lead Sahel policy implementer. This might reduce the MFA's
role for a period vis-a-vis the Algerian military
intelligence organization which also has a big hand in
Algerian Sahel policy. (The meeting between the Moss
delegation and the Algerian military intelligence was useful
and had a positive tone, and we will report it separately.)


10. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Todd Moss.

FORD