ALGERIA AND POLISARIO SLAM WESTERN SAHARA ENVOY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000483

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2028
TAGS: PREL PBTS PREF UNSC WI MO AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA AND POLISARIO SLAM WESTERN SAHARA ENVOY
VAN WALSUM AND THE AMERICAN POSITION, TOO

REF: SECSTATE 43370

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate meetings April 27 and 28,
Ambassador and DCM delivered reftel demarche to the Algerian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Polisario ambassador
in Algiers. The two recipients shared the same reaction to
the recent statement of UNSG Special Envoy Peter Van Walsum,
saying he had lost credibility and could not continue to
serve the role of impartial moderator. Both professed
themselves "shocked" by what they saw as the clear U.S.
decision to take sides, and told us that a referendum was the
only way to reach a solution to the Western Sahara impasse.
Imposing a decision, they said, would be a "waste of time"
and would not encourage regional stability. From our vantage
point in Algiers, we are not sure if the Polisario would
accept to attend a fifth round of talks under Van Walsum's
stewardship; it seems unlikely that Algeria would encourage
them to accept. End Summary.

A CLEAR U.S. MESSAGE
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2. (C) Ambassador met with MFA Director General (Assistant
Secretary equivalent) for African Affairs Ismail Chergui on

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April 27 te discuss reftel demarche. (Chergui had told us he
would be our designated interlocutor for Western Sahara
issues - see ref B.) DCM delivered the same message to
Polisario Ambassador Ibrahim Ghali the morning of April 28.
In both meetings, we stressed that independence is not a
realistic option and that negotiations must work towards a
mutually acceptable solution of autonomy within the context
of Moroccan sovereignty. We told both officials that the
unstable Sahel situation compelled regional actors to
reinforce stability, which would not be served by adding a
new, weak state to the equation. We extended an invitation
to the Polisario to visit Washington at a high level, to
discuss how to move forward, and reminded both that we would
welcome a constructive proposal from the Polisario.
Ambassador underlined to Chergui that the U.S. genuinely
wants better relations between Morocco and Algeria but the
Western Sahara issue seems to block any steps forward.

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ALGERIA: SHOCKED BY VAN WALSUM ACTIONS
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3. (C) Chergui told the Ambassador he was surprised by the
"illegal way" in which Van Walsum produced his own
independent paper. "He broke the rules," Chergui claimed,
saying that Van Walsum should have stuck to the line of the
Secretary General. Chergui said that by taking sides, Van

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Walsum "has no more credibility" and probably cannot continue
in his job. Chergui added that this was not Algeria's
decision, and that we should ask the Polisario about Van
Walsum's future. Chergui added that Algeria was "surprised"
by the statement of U.S. Ambassador to the UN in support of
Van Walsum's statement, accusing the U.S. of taking sides as
well. He cautioned that it was dangerous for the U.S. and
its image that the U.S. role should be "to try and make the
UN work properly." Chergui called it "dangerous" to create
precedents, especially in Africa, believing the push toward
autonomy could destabilize the region. In conclusion,
Chergui clarified that the Algerian position has never been
"independence" but rather "self-determination," and if the
Sahrawis chose autonomy on their own rather than having it
imposed from outside, this would be acceptable to Algeria.
This Algerian position, he stated, was the only one
consistent with international law.

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POLISARIO: VAN WALSUM'S ARE "YOUR IDEAS"
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4. (C) Polisario Ambassador to Algeria Ibrahim Ghali, not
surprisingly, responded to the DCM on April 28 with many of
the same arguments heard the day before from Chergui. Ghali,
diplomatic but dour, initially took pains to make it clear

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that the Polisario would "never" reject dialogue with the
U.S., despite its dismay with the current U.S. position.
Ghali told us the Polisario "could not believe the U.S., with
all of its history and values, could confiscate the right of
a people to choose their destiny at the ballot box." In
response to the points given in the demarche, Ghali replied
that the Polisario knew that Van Walsum's ideas "were your
ideas," and that now the U.S. had formally taken sides,
"showing us you are obstructing international efforts to
resolve the conflict." Ghali said that he did not think Van
Walsum could continue his work, as "he has lost our
confidence," but he noted that before either party formally
considered whether Van Walsum could continue, it appeared he
had already recused himself on his own through his statement.



5. (C) On the subject of regional stability, Ghali stressed
that the Polisario did not want to destabilize anyone, "as
Morocco says." Calling the Sahrawis "a small but proud
people," Ghali asserted the Polisario was ready to fight
terrorism and cooperate with all of its neighbors towards
this end, including Morocco. "You can buy our cooperation,"
he said, "we are a small people."

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POTHOLES ON THE ROAD AHEAD
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6. (C) Both Ghali and Chergui cautioned that imposing a
solution without a referendum risked destabilizing the region
and radicalizing the Polisario, with Ghali going so far as to
warn against "pushing the Sahrawis to become another Hamas."
While both officials stressed that autonomy would be
acceptable if approved in a popular referendum, Ghali said
that he "could not imagine" a referendum featuring choices
that did not include independence. Chergui, who has served
in Morocco during his diplomatic career, said that Algeria
wanted a "strong and stable" Morocco on its borders, but that
imposing autonomy on the Sahrawis would run counter to this
goal. "One day, Morocco will pay for this autonomy," Chergui
warned, "it will dismantle their country." Chergui stressed
his belief that in the end, "neither the U.S. nor Algeria"
can choose for the Sahrawis, so any approach that did not
include a referendum was "merely wasting time." Each time
the Ambassador reminded Chergui that dangling independence
was not a realistic way forward, Chergui brushed it aside.
Near the end of our meeting Chergui urged the U.S. to stop
using the word 'realism' when discussing the Western Sahara.

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COMMENT
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7. (C) From our vantage point in Algiers, a fifth round of
Manhasset negotiations, at least with Van Walsum in the
moderator's chair, appears in doubt given that both our
Algerian and Polisario contacts say they have lost confidence
in him after his recent report. Ghali thanked us for the
invitation to send a Polisario delegation to Washington, and
said he would transmit the invitation to Polisario leadership
and get back to us.


8. (C) As we noted ref B, the MFA's Chergui is a thorough
professional with excellent connections at the Ministry and
in the broader government. We know him well from
collaboration on Sahel issues. Algerian MFA ambassadors like
Chergui and Abdallah Baali are the friendly face of the
Algerian government. As such, their reactions to our
evolving stance on the Western Sahara are relatively mild.
Other Algerian officials are far less polished. We likely
will hear some fairly blunt public criticism from them as our
position becomes clearer in the public domain.
FORD