Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ALGIERS449
2008-04-23 10:27:00
SECRET
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

SECURITY UPDATE: AQIM NOT GETTING STRONGER IN

Tags:  ASEC PTER AG 
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DE RUEHAS #0449/01 1141027
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 231027Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5663
INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0518
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1567
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6337
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2678
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2303
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7156
RUZEHAA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000449 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2028
TAGS: ASEC PTER AG
SUBJECT: SECURITY UPDATE: AQIM NOT GETTING STRONGER IN
ALGERIA BUT STILL VERY PRESENT

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000449

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2028
TAGS: ASEC PTER AG
SUBJECT: SECURITY UPDATE: AQIM NOT GETTING STRONGER IN
ALGERIA BUT STILL VERY PRESENT

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: According to information collected from press
reporting, the number of terrorist attacks remained
approximately the same in March 2008 compared to previous
months but there appear to have been fewer casualties. The
majority of these March attacks have been attributed to
Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) despite
fewer official claims of responsibility from them than in
previous months. One significant incident was a successful
attack that took complete control of the town of Tizi Rachid
in Tizi Ouzou province for several hours on the night of
February 29. The violence in Algeria for the past three
months has remained mostly localized in the mountains east of
Algiers; we are watching carefully to see if it spreads again
elsewhere. Perhaps the most significant recent incident was
one that did not take place, when a would-be suicide bomber
was neutralized in the western city of Oran on March 29. In
April, there were several terrorist attacks that appear to
have targeted a Chinese company building a major highway
project east of Algiers. The Danish embassy also closed
temporarily due to security concerns, prompting an unfriendly
Algerian government response.


2. (C) March also saw diminished AQIM rhetoric and fewer
communique website postings. The AQIM unofficial website
(www.dlalseuf.co.cc/vb) was active in January and February
but less active in March. Members that have normally posted
daily AQIM messages and updates have now cut back to several
postings a week, but AQIM media committee communiques and
videos continue to be posted quickly. Urgent calls for
donation of funds and kidnapping for ransom suggest serious
money problems. If AQIM gets a big ransom for the two
Austrian hostages it is holding, that would help the
terrorist group significantly. Overall, we judge that AQIM
is not getting any stronger in Algeria, but they retain a
capacity -- albeit limited -- to strike. END SUMMARY.

FEWER ATTACKS, LESS VIOLENCE
--------------


3. (U) According to press reports, March 2008 saw the number
of terrorist attacks basically the same in Algeria but with

fewer casualties compared to the monthly totals for the
months of January and February of this year. In March there
were 19 attacks targeting military and security personnel,
killing 17 soldiers and wounding 36, according to press
sources. January and February 2008, in contrast, saw 26
attacks (9 in January and 17 in February) on military and
security personnel resulting in 43 security personnel killed
and 107 wounded. Terrorist attacks for the past three months
stayed focused primarily on Algerian military and security
personnel. Tactics involved in the attacks remained the
same, mostly using improvised explosives devices (IEDs) and
traditional ambushes. Most attacks in early 2008 were again
in the provinces of Tizi Ouzou, Boumerdes, Batna and Bouira
(in the mountainous Kabylie region). A few incidents
occurred in neighboring provinces such as Jijel, Tebessa and
Biskra, and we are watching closely to see if attacks
increase in these provinces in the coming months. The
eastern city of Constantine is also starting to show signs of
an increase in attacks.

SOS CALLS FOR FUNDS
--------------


4. (C) AQIM appears to have resource problems that are
hindering its operational capacity. On March 4, El-Ekhlass
jihadi website (www.ekhlass.ws) and dilalseuf
(www.dlalseuf.co.cc/vb) posted a message from blogger
Phoenixshadow about AQIM's urgent need of funds.
Phoenixshadow admitted that by posting the message he was
exposing his identity and putting fellow jihadis in harm's
way, but he was willing to take that risk due to the
seriousness of the situation and the jihadis' urgent need for
funds. Phoenixshadow emphasized that donating funds for
jihad was as important as the physical jihad itself. He
added that they did not seek equipment such as "uzis", "night
vision goggles" or "GPS" systems. Instead, he claimed, the
funds would be used for medicine for jihadis who were
wounded, hungry and cold. Phoenixshadow urged donors to
contact another jihadi named "Khanzadar al-Jihad," who would

ALGIERS 00000449 002 OF 003


provide them with necessary information to send funds without
being detected by the government.

SMALL TOWN FALLS, BRIEFLY
--------------


5. (U) On March 2, the Algerian press buzzed with a story
about a group of terrorists dressed in military and security
uniforms and armed with AK-47s who had seized control for
several hours of the town of Tizi Rachid (Tizi Ouzou
province). The attack came in the middle of the night
February 29. According to the press, the police did not try
to intervene. Press reports state that the terrorists blew
up the Agricultural and Rural Development bank and the local
post office, seizing a total of about 1500 USD. One civilian
was wounded and one security officer was killed in the
assault. (Comment: this incident reminds of the kinds of
assaults we saw in Algeria frequently 1994 - 1996. End
Comment.)

ORAN ATTACK THWARTED
--------------


6. (S) A would-be suicide bomber wearing an explosives-laden
belt was killed by Algerian security forces in the western
Algerian city of Oran on March 29. Mohamed MAHDJOUB was a
24-year-old AQIM associate from the eastern city of Relizane
who allegedly traveled to Oran on the morning of March 29.
Newspaper reports speculated that MAHDJOUB intended to target
either the Sheraton or Royal Hotel in Oran, but security
forces have indicated that he was targeting military or
police installations. At the time of his death, MAHDJOUB was
wearing an explosive belt containing approximately 3.5
kilograms of TNT that police were able to defuse. In
addition to being the second time we have seen use of the Al
Qaeda tactic of an explosive belt, this attack would have
been significant for the fact that it took place in Oran,
Algeria's second largest city and one that has been
relatively incident-free in terms of terrorist attacks.

KIDNAPPING: EVOLUTION IN TACTICS OR DESPERATE FOR MONEY?
-------------- --------------


7. (U) Kidnapping wealthy Algerians for ransom is another old
technique being used by AQIM to obtain cash. According to
the Algerian press, in March an employee of an Algerian
tourist company in Tizi Ouzou was kidnapped at a false
checkpoint, but was later released. On April 11, according
to Arabic-language daily Ennahar, the son of a wealthy
Algerian businessman was kidnapped, also in Tizi Ouzou. The
paper reported that terrorists contacted his parents and
demanded a ransom of 40 million dinars (equivalent to 580,000
USD). The wilaya of Sidi Belabes (500 km south of Algiers)
witnessed another crime that brought back memories of the
1990s civil war. A group of terrorists cut the throats of
two shepherds, who happened to be brothers, stealing 60 of
their cattle and booby-trapping their bodies. Stealing
cattle to feed on, erecting false checkpoints to terrorize
and rob civilians, and breaking into local grocery stores and
cafes are all indications that AQIM is resorting to
techniques used by other Algeria
n terrorists in the past.


8. (S) The kidnapping of Algerians has proven successful as a
way to obtain quick funds, but the successful kidnapping of
two Austrian tourists in the Tunisian desert may indicate
another evolution in AQIM tactics toward kidnapping Western
targets for more than money. Although the abduction did not
take place within Algeria's borders, the strong indications
that the kidnappers traversed undetected across the Algerian
desert and into northern Mali suggest a regionalization and
cooperation of AQIM across North African and Sahel states.
The kidnappers' latest demands were for the release of named
Muslim prisoners by the Austrian government, the withdrawal
of Austrian troops from Afghanistan and 20 million Euros. If
any of these demands are met, especially the ransom payment,
it could encourage AQIM to continue to target Westerners for
kidnapping.

APRIL STARTS WITH CLOSE CALLS FOR FOREIGN ENTITIES
-------------- --------------


ALGIERS 00000449 003 OF 003



9. (C) Newspapers reported April 15 about an attack that
proved to be a close call for a Chinese company operating in
eastern Algeria. Two explosions occurred in the wilaya
(province) of Bouira targeting a military guard tower and a
Gendarmerie patrol. The tower was part of the security
forces protecting the base camp of Chinese workers building
the east-west highway across northern Algeria. The
Gendarmerie unit was hit as it was responding to the first
explosion. Although there has not been any claim of
responsibility, the attack had an AQIM modus operandi and,
more important, may have been an attempt to penetrate the
camp and target the actual workers. This was the second
attack in April against targeting a camp of Chinese workers;
a similar attempt occurred in Boumerdes a week earlier.
Newspapers reported that a group of ten terrorists attempted
to penetrate the camp but were pushed back by the communal
guards. A successful attack against foreign workers in
eastern Algeria would be a major setback for companies
operating in that region. (Note: American company Brown &
Root Condor is in the logistical planning stages of a project
in the eastern wilaya of Skikda that will require them to
have 300 - 500 Western workers on the ground. American
company Raytheon is also starting a project in the eastern
provinces in which large numbers of American employees will
be transported daily from Algiers. End Note.)


10. (C) Another close call occurred April 19 outside
Constantine when the security escort that had taken a
Japanese business delegation to the airport was attacked late
at night on its return from the airport. Constantine is a
city where the Embassy supports an American Corner and where
American diplomats travel frequently on official business.
All diplomats and foreign businessmen traveling in
Constantine are provided with police escorts.


11. (S) Although April 11 (the anniversary of the first AQIM
suicide car bombs in Algiers) passed without incident, the
Embassy developed credible information that the Danish
embassy was to be attacked on the morning of April 11 by a
suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED).
The information prompted the Danes to issue a travel warning
advising Danish citizens against traveling to Algeria. The
Danish mission also chose to vacate their chancery for the
remainder of April. In an April 22 meeting with RSO, the
Danish embassy said they had been unsuccessful in persuading
the Algerian security services to close the road in front of
the chancery or, absent that, erect any kind of security
barrier. The Danes told us that the Algerian Foreign
Ministry's protocol office had been very unfriendly in
response to the Danish concerns.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) In spite of AQIM's low profile over the past four
months, we do not believe that the threat of it striking a
Western target has diminished. AQIM is still capable of
pulling off spectacular attacks, though apparently not every
day nor even every week; the capital, for example, has been
quiet for more than four months in the wake of a massively
increased police presence. Despite the Algerian security's
crackdown on AQIM in the eastern provinces over the past
several months and the increased number of security personnel
protecting the capital, the Algerian government has not
crushed AQIM. It is possible that AQIM will learn the lesson
from Iraq and shift operations to other major cities in
response to the heavier security presence in the capital.
Meanwhile, Algerian security forces are once again announcing
through media campaigns the dismantling of several AQIM cells
and the killing/capturing of several key AQIM leaders at
once. This type of sensational journalism preceded the April
11, 2007 and December 11, 2007 attacks in Algiers. The
"Lovers of the Hower" video has all of the hallmarks of a
suicide recruiting advertisement, highlighting AQIM's
logistical expertise, discipline and commitment to jihad
(septel).
FORD