Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ALGIERS439
2008-04-22 10:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT URGES SIMPLE MINURSO ROLLOVER

Tags:  PREL PREF UNSC WI MO AG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4436
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAS #0439 1131033
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221033Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5650
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0497
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1788
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8896
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6334
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2675
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2300
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7153
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3371
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000439 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PREF UNSC WI MO AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT URGES SIMPLE MINURSO ROLLOVER

REF: USUN 0369

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000439

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PREF UNSC WI MO AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT URGES SIMPLE MINURSO ROLLOVER

REF: USUN 0369

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs abruptly
convoked the Ambassador late afternoon on April 21 to discuss
Western Sahara. Director General for African Affairs
(Assistant Secretary level) Ismail Chergui asked for our help
in securing a MINURSO renewal resolution that he called
technical and neutral. He also urged Morocco and the
Polisario engage in quiet diplomacy on less controversial
issues like confidence building messages in the next round of
direct talks. Chergui told us that his message was being
delivered to the Polisario and to the UNSC Permanent Five.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Chergui, who enthusiastically praised the mid-April
Secretary General written report, urged U.S. help in securing

SIPDIS
a MINURSO renewal resolution that would be technical and
neutral in language. The Algerian Government wants the
rollover resolution to accent the following three points:

-- Supports the UNSC and for the Manhasset negotiation rounds
in order to find a political solution that is quote mutually
acceptable to Morocco and the Polisario and that leads to
political self-determination for the Sahrawi people end quote.

-- Calls for Morocco and the Polisario to negotiate without
preconditions, in order to facilitate substantial
negotiations.

-- Extends the mandate of MINURSO for six months, though
with flexibility on the timeline depending on the UNSC
members' preferences.


3. (C) Chergui urged strongly that the members of the UNSC
make no public statements in favor of any side involved in
discussions on Western Sahara. If important countries
publicly lean towards one side or another, he claimed, it
would complicate the negotiation process. Chergui added that
the GoA understands that human rights issues do not belong in
the MINURSO resolution and that other UN bodies can address
those. Meanwhile, between Morocco and the Polisario "qiet
diplomacy" is needed, he stressed. He also told us that the
Algerian government prefers that UN Special Envoy Van Walsum
work with Morocco and the Polisario, perhaps separately, on
less controversial issues now, such as confidence-building
measures. (Chergui suggested resources might be another less
controversial topic too.) More difficult issues can be
addressed later, he added.


4. (C) Ambassador asked Chergui if the GoA message was being
delivered to the Polisario. Chergui responded affirmatively,
noting that the Polisario and the Permanent Five members of
the UNSC were being given the same message on April 21 - with
the U.S. first on the list.


5. (C) Ambassador told Chergui that the U.S. wants to be
practical and pragmatic about progress on the Western Sahara
issue and noted that we have not seen progress in the direct
talks to date. Ambassador stressed that we believe it would
be better if the Polisario seriously considered Moroccan
proposals as a way to move forward. When Chergui pointed
briefly to the Baker Plan, Ambassador reminded Chergui that
the U.S. government did not believe that the Moroccan
government would accept the Baker Plan's formulation that
includes independence for Western Sahara. Interestingly,
Chergui agreed that the Baker Plan was dead, adding that it
was "too bad."


6. (C) COMMENT: Perhaps the most interesting item from the
meeting was to hear a senior MFA official admit in private
that the Baker Plan is dead; we very rarely hear this. We
deal with Chergui quite a bit, typically on issues connected
with the Sahel, although today he held several paragraphs of
instructions, all in French. We find Chergui to be one of
the more professional Algerian diplomats at the MFA, and he
is slated to be Algeria's next ambassador to Russia come
next July.
FORD