PREPARING THE WAY FOR THE 2009 PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000437

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA DAS KENT PATTON
TUNIS FOR MEPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2028
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM AG
SUBJECT: PREPARING THE WAY FOR THE 2009 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION IN ALGERIA

REF: A. 07 ALGIERS 1749

B. 07 ALGIERS 716

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Algeria is scheduled to hold its next
presidential election in April 2009. Parliamentary and local
elections in 2007 saw very low turnout and our contacts warn
us of broad disinterest in the political system. In order to
help avoid radicalization of some elements of the
disenchanted here, we recommend steps to make the election
process more open and hence more credible. Election
monitoring will be an important component of the process.
The Algerian government has already dismissed a proposal for
international monitors from the European Union, and has
become publicly sensitive to the issue since a prominent
opposition leader formally called for international observers
during a recent visit to the U.S. It thus appears unlikely
that the government will permit a meaningful international
observation effort. A substantive and well planned domestic
observation effort remains the best hope to inject legitimacy
into a flawed process. Algerian electoral law limits the
right to observe elections to "candidates' representatives."
Given that, U.S. support for the election monitoring effort
should be focused on training a spectrum of political parties
to improve their monitoring capacity. This cable describes
how we might best leverage our resources to provide technical
assistance in the area of election monitoring in preparation
for the 2009 presidential elections in Algeria. END SUMMARY.

WHAT WE'D LIKE
--------------


2. (C) A perfect Algerian presidential election would look
something like this:

-- Several hundred independent international election
monitors would be deployed in Algeria to observe the 2009
presidential election campaign and, importantly, to observe
the actual vote tabulations and certifications;

-- At least ten thousand trained Algerian election observers
from political parties, with the ability to observe vote
counts and certifications and a capacity to relay
observations up their parties' hierarchies, also would be
deployed;

-- The media would have broad access during the entire
process; and

-- An independent election commission would be formed,
providing a forum for challenges and redress regarding
polling station irregularities and inconsistencies between
official and observer vote counts.

In contrast to this ideal, the May 2007 elections involved no
international observers; party representatives were permitted
to observe voting and on-site vote tabulation, but none were
allowed to observe the crucial tally compilation process, and
observation was not uniform across the country; media access
was restricted. There was an election monitoring commission
composed of political party representatives, but it did
nothing. In addition to these shortcomings, for the November
2007 local elections the government opted not even to create
an electoral commission (ref A).

WHAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET
--------------


3. (C) Democracy promotion is a challenge generally in
Algeria, and lately election monitoring has become a
particularly sensitive subject. The European Union sounded
out the government privately on the idea of an international
observer effort in 2009 and was brusquely rebuffed. Any
similar suggestion from us would be greeted even less
enthusiastically. Absent broad-based and coordinated support
across Algeria's political spectrum for such observers, it is
highly unlikely the government will agree. So far only one
opposition leader -- the RCD's Said Sadi -- has publicly
advocated international observers, and he chose to do so
during a visit to North America. His call fell largely flat
here because parties believe they can cut backroom deals with
"le Pouvoir" and get acceptable vote shares. This may not
change during 2008: President Bouteflika has not yet
announced whether he will stand for reelection, and the
parties will not act until he does. Thus, at this point we
do not believe it is likely that a groundswell of political

ALGIERS 00000437 002 OF 003


support for international observers will build inside Algeria
in 2008.


4. (C) If the U.S. wants to contribute positively to the 2009
electoral process in Algeria, we should focus our attention
on domestic observers. The primary focus of training must be
on Algerian political parties across the spectrum, rather
than on NGOs or civil society, because the parties are the
only organizations with a legal right to engage in polling
station monitoring (ref B). Given the vast difference in
human and financial resources between the ruling National
Liberation Front (FLN) and smaller opposition parties like
the Socialist Forces Front (FFS),election monitoring by
political parties often reinforces the advantages of the
ruling coalition. Our effort should therefore include
strategies for the smaller parties to concentrate their
limited observer capacity and cooperate in ways that will
maximize their limited effectiveness. Because of the large
number of polling stations, poll monitor coordinators must be
trained to identify key electoral areas and target
high-density voting districts to draw a statistically
relevant sample of vote counts that can force the GoA to
respond if the overall vote counts are falsified.


5. (C) In addition to watching people cast their votes, party
representatives should also observe the election campaign to
determine how freely and fairly the Ministry of Interior
operates. Observers should also watch vote counts and
certifications. Training for them in the lead-up to the
elections should include encouragement to the parties to make
a concerted push in advance of the voting for the right to
observe tabulation and certification. Similar encouragement
should be made for parties to call on the government well in
advance of the polls to create an independent electoral
commission to monitor the process.

WHAT WE SHOULD DO
--------------


6. (C) USG resources are limited, and Algeria is a large
country. Our approach to observer training thus needs to be
as focused and large-scale as practicable. We propose to
minimize the number of one-off programs funded in favor of a
single program of sufficient breadth and depth. The legal
limits of who can be a poll observer in Algeria dictate that
we not waste resources on programs for civil society
representatives who ultimately will not be eligible for
accreditation as poll watchers. We believe that an
observer-training program by the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) could provide the best option for observer
training, if the program is designed to be Algeria-specific
and takes place in Algeria over a sustained period of time
leading up to and including the actual election. The program
should be structured to include a train-the-trainers element
so as to maximize the number of observers trained. Ideally
we should aim to train, either directly to indirectly, at
least ten thousand Algerians. Recent experience in
legislative and local elections has also shown us that it is
important to have trainers on the ground during the campaign
season to identify irregularities in the voter-list process.


7. (C) There is, of course, no guarantee that the Algerian
authorities will permit a U.S.-based implementer like NDI to
carry out an observer training program here. The Department
is aware of the difficulties NDI has experienced here in the
past. Therefore, we urge the implementer to have a
contingency plan, such as hosting the training in Morocco if
the Algerian government refuses visas for trainers. By
necessity, the number of people trained will decrease if that
occurs, so the contingency plan should include a broader
train-the-trainer element.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) After being rebuffed on an offer of election observers
by the Algerian government, the head of the EU delegation in
Algiers told us that election monitoring is not high on their
agenda. An open election campaign and credible and
transparent elections process is critical for Algeria,
however, to avoid a situation in which the Algerian
electorate abandons hope in a democratic approach to
improving their lives.


9. (C) We can expect some major GOA pushback on this.
Already, the government has fired warning shots at us through
press leaks about alleged American interference in domestic

ALGIERS 00000437 003 OF 003


Algerian politics. The Said Sadi visit, during which he
accented the need for international observers given the
problems of the election process, hit a raw nerve here.
Given Algerian government sensitivities to foreign
involvement in their election process, and the lack of broad
public support for it, our approach to monitoring efforts
will need to be delicate to avoid adverse effects on the
bilateral relationship. If we base the program firmly in
Algerian electoral law and are careful to ensure that the
entire spectrum of political parties has access to the
training, we should be able to limit -- but not eliminate --
government complaint.
FORD