MFA OFFICIAL: SAHEL HEATS UP AS MALI PLAYS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000422

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER AG
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIAL: SAHEL HEATS UP AS MALI PLAYS
"UNHELPFUL" ROLE

REF: A. BAMAKO 357

B. BAMAKO 366

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In an April 13 meeting, MFA Director General
(Assistant Secretary equivalent) for African Affairs Ismail
Chergui told Ambassador that Algeria perceives that the
security situation in northern Mali and Niger is
deteriorating. Chergui said Algeria was frustrated by the
"unhelpful" role played by Malian President Amadou Toumani
Toure (ATT),who claimed he was committed to the Algiers
Accords peace agreement but did not back words up with
action, according to Chergui. Chergui confirmed that the
Algerians have informed the Malian government that Algeria
will no longer work to implement the Algiers Accords.
Chergui said he didn't anticipate Algeria would change its
(annoyed) stance in the immediate future, but he confirmed
that the Malian foreign minister is due in Algiers April 15.
According to Chergui, Algeria was also fed up with the role
played by Libya, charging that the Libyans had paid ransom to
the Tuaregs to resolve hostage situations, money that was
being used to arm and fuel the growing conflict in northern
Mali. The Ambassador told Chergui we are concerned about
areas in the Sahel that are unstable and ungoverned and can
be used by al-Qaida in the Maghreb as staging areas. The
U.S. is anxious, therefore, to build up the capacity of Sahel
states to control their borders, and Algeria has a similar
interest. Ideally we would do more security-related training
activities on a multilateral basis, the Ambassador observed.
Chergui agreed with the Ambassador that multilateral
exercises in the Sahel were preferable to bilateral activity,
as all parties involved, including the U.S, "need to speak
the same language" in order to avoid being played off of one
another by either the Tuaregs or the government of Mali.
Chergui also said Algeria shares the U.S. primary goal of
fighting AQIM in the Sahel. He commented, however, that
Algeria was bothered that ATT seemed to lack the political
will to focus on anything other than fighting the Tuareg
rebellion in northern Mali. END SUMMARY.

ALGERIA PULLS OUT OF ACCORDS, BLAMES MALI
--------------


2. (C) Chergui told us that Algeria had informed the
government of Mali on April 10 that it was withdrawing from
the Algiers Accords (see ref A). He stated flatly that "we
do not want to be involved and will no longer help in
implementation and negotiation." Chergui said that Mali and
its president must bear the responsibility for actions
Algeria felt were insincere and unhelpful to peace. Chergui
continued that Algeria had not yet decided whether to pull
its observers out of the northern Mali city of Kidal. The
Algerian decision, according to Chergui, provoked an
immediate reaction from the Malians, as Chergui expected a
Malian delegation to arrive in Algiers on April 15,
consisting of the foreign minister and intel chief, among
others.


3. (C) Charging that ATT, who "is king there and can do
whatever he wants," lacked the political will to carry out
Mali's commitments under the Accords, Chergui said that ATT
was not focused on fighting AQIM and terrorism but rather on
fighting the Tuareg rebellion led by Ibrahim ag Bahanga.
Citing specific examples given by Algerian observers in
Kidal, Chergui said that ATT had failed to win the trust of
the local population in and around Kidal. For one thing, ATT
promised to remove a military barracks in the city, but had
not done so. Chergui said it was well known to everyone in
the region that Kidal's unpopular governor and regional
military commander needed to be replaced in order to calm the
situation and help win over the local population. He said
that ATT had shown no will to replace either man, and,
instead of making conciliatory gestures, had actually sent in
its elite "berets rouges" forces into the region,
demonstrating a will to fight rather than adhere to the
Accords. Finally, Chergui charged that ATT had done nothing
to stimulate the economic development of the Kidal region,
further prompting locals to sympathize with the Bahanga
rebellion.


ALGIERS 00000422 002 OF 003


SAHEL SECURITY DETERIORATES
--------------


4. (C) Chergui told us that the Malian interior minister
visited Algeria last July as part of a united delegation that
included Tuaregs. At that point, Chergui said, Algeria felt
reasonably confident that the peace agreement would hold, and
its role as mediator was clear. However, he said, no sooner
had the delegation returned to Mali than ATT sent the
military into the northern region, a highly visible act which
"insulted" Bahanga and the local Tuareg population.
Following this, Assane Fagaga, a colonel responsible for a
special military unit in Kidal, deserted and joined Bahanga,
taking some 60 fighters with him. According to Chergui, the
Algerian observers in Kidal have seen many more people
leaving Kidal in the months since Fagaga's departure, afraid
of the military. Many of these people have joined Bahanga,
according to Chergui, because ATT has continued to militarize
the region and failed to make conciliatory gestures to
convince locals and Algerian observers alike that he is
sincere in seeking peace.


5. (C) Two days prior to our meeting, Chergui said that the
Mali army had killed two Tuaregs, one of whom was a commander
and whose throat had been slit (see ref B). A frustrated
Chergui said that the fight against AQIM was suffering
because of Mali's preoccupation with the Tuareg rebellion.
"This could have been resolved long ago," Chergui said, if
Mali had acted less aggressively. "Believe me," Chergui
said, referring to AQIM in northern Mali, "the Malians know
where they are" and could easily send troops to fight
terrorists instead of the rebels.

ALGERIAN ASSISTANCE IN THE SAHEL
--------------


6. (C) Chergui provided us with some insight into Algeria's
cooperation and assistance programs in the Sahel region. He
said that Algeria has active border and customs training
programs with both Mali and Niger, with a primary goal of
border control and enforcement. He insisted that Algeria
provides some food aid to the Tuaregs but nothing more, and
was adamant that it certainly provides no military
assistance. (Note: We have not yet asked the same question
of Algeria's security services. End note.) Saying Algeria
has a "great" security and training relationship with Mali
and Niger, Chergui said that Algeria was providing "almost
all" of the Nigerien army's fuel needs in northern Niger, as
Niger "is a very weak state." Chergui confided an Algerian
preference for dealing with Niger, as he found them to be
"more honest." He explained by saying that Niger "had fewer
friends" while Mali had many, which allowed ATT to play them
off of each other, he said. Because Algerian assistance to
the Tuareg was limited to food and humanitarian aid, Chergui
said that Algeria was also upset by "unfair treatment" in the
Malian press, which has blamed Algeria for fanning the flames
of the Bahanga rebellion.

THE LIBYAN FACTOR
--------------


7. (C) Algeria was upset that Mali and Tuaregs alike had
talked to Libya as an alternative and informal mediator,
Chergui said that under the Algiers Accords, Algeria was
supposed to fill this role. Chergui charged that the Libyans
had not helped the situation either by paying the Tuaregs
over USD 3 million recently to resolve a hostage situation.
This money, he said, goes directly to buy arms and strengthen
the Tuareg rebellion against the Mali government, further
contributing to instability and creating a lucrative hostage
market in the Sahel. Libya, Chergui conceded, "may have good
intentions," but seems to lack the ability to carry them out.
He referred to recent discussions in Tripoli with an
unofficial Tuareg spokesperson which had been diverted to
"discussions of autonomy" for the Tuaregs, something Chergui
asserted Algeria does not support and which is not part of
the Algiers Accords.

CROSS-BORDER LINKAGES
--------------


ALGIERS 00000422 003 OF 003



8. (C) In the vast Sahel region where national borders are
inexact and largely theoretical, Chergui pointed out that the
same unofficial Tuareg spokesperson representing the Tuaregs
in Mali was also related by a family marriage to the Tuaregs
in northern Niger. Chergui asserted that Algeria was aware
of several hostage situations in northern Mali in which the
hostages had ultimately been held by the Movement for Justice
in Niger (MNJ) in northern Niger. According to Chergui, the
government of Niger viewed the MNJ as mere "drug dealers" and
as such would not talk to them. Chergui claimed that the
Nigerian president remained open to allowing the MNJ to
become a political party, but at the same time, the MNJ was
evolving, even demonstrating an ability to attack the
capital. Chergui said that Algeria had offered mediation
between the GoN and the MNJ as well, which the MNJ was ready
to accept, but the situation remained deadlocked because the
government still refused to talk to the MNJ.


9. (C) The Ambassador briefly reviewed discussions of the
TSCTP meeting of ambassadors and Washington officials in

SIPDIS
Tunisia two weeks ago, highlighting our concern about the
risk of ungoverned spaces that provide opportunities to
groups such as AQIM. The Ambassador pointed to State
Department Anti-Terrorism Assistance programs in areas like
border controls that ideally would involve Algeria with Mali
and Niger. Above all, the Ambassador noted, we want to help
develop a capacity among the Sahel states to control their
own borders. Chergui applauded this and said Algeria should
participate in border-training activities with its neighbors.
(Comment: He is not high enough ranking here to make such a
decision, however. End Comment.) At the end of the meeting,
Chergui pulled the Ambassador aside to note that while we
help build up the Malian forces, we should be insistent that
those forces are deployed against AQIM and not the Tuaregs,
as more fighting will not restore stability in the Malian
North.

COMMENT: TOWARDS A REGIONAL APPROACH TO THE SAHEL
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Chergui asked the U.S. to tell Bamako that Mali
should not further destabilize the situation by militarizing
the North and should be consistent to its committments under
the Algiers Accords. ATT, according to Chergui, needed to
decide whether he favored a millitary option or not, and if
he did, he should be clear about it and accept responsibility
for the consequences. (Chergui seemed confident that Bamako
would eventually understand no military solution is possible
for the Tuareg problem.) Given the complex web of state and
non-state actors in the Sahel, Chergui said that success
depended on all primary actors giving the same message,
including the U.S, particularly to avoid being played off of
each other by AQIM and Tuareg rebels. He said Algeria
supported a regional conference, in the form of a summit or
heads of government meeting in Bamako, and the first such
attempt at regional coordination should involve "those
countries immediately concerned": Libya, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Algeria and Chad. In order to prepare for this
meeting, Chergui said that Algeria supported Niger's offer to
host a ministerial meeting in the near future, and was
deferring to Niger on the logistics. Chergui agreed with the
Ambassador's assessment that Algeria and the U.S. need to
have a much deeper discussion of their perceptions of the
Sahel state of play and what each is doing with the various
Sahel states.
FORD