Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ALGIERS357
2008-03-26 11:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

DECODING PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS LEAKS ATTACKING

Tags:  PREL PGOV ODIP KDEM AG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4893
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAS #0357/01 0861101
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261101Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5530
INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8876
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2637
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2260
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7112
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6306
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1540
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0489
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3337
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000357 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ODIP KDEM AG
SUBJECT: DECODING PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS LEAKS ATTACKING
THE EMBASSY

REF: A. 07 ALGIERS 1658

B. ALGIERS 293

C. ALGIERS 27

D. ALGIERS 274

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000357

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ODIP KDEM AG
SUBJECT: DECODING PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS LEAKS ATTACKING
THE EMBASSY

REF: A. 07 ALGIERS 1658

B. ALGIERS 293

C. ALGIERS 27

D. ALGIERS 274

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The publisher of an Arabic-language daily
told the Ambassador on March 24 that the paper's March 22
front page story alleging that the Ambassador had refused to
appear at the MFA when convoked by the Foreign Minister was
printed as a result of direct pressure from the Prime
Minister's office and the Ministry of Communications. He
told the Ambassador that Belkhadem is waging a media campaign
against the Embassy and the Ambassador to reinforce his own
position within the flagship National Liberation Front (FLN)
party, which is currently facing serious divisions (ref A).
Another well-connected FLN source told us the same thing
March 23. Meanwhile, a well-placed Interior Ministry contact
told us on March 23 that Interior Minister Noureddine Yazid
Zerhouni never issued written instructions forbidding
organizations from meeting with the Embassy (ref B),but that
Belkhadem was irritated by several of the Ambassador's
meetings, notably one with the FLN-linked organization whose
director sought to use the Ambassador's elevated profile to
boost his status to Belkhadem's detriment. The Interior
Ministry source, meanwhile, also indicated concern with our
ready access to the media. Like their military counterparts,
Algerian political leaders are hardly transparent. Only as
we expanded our contacts did we discover how bitter the
divisions within the FLN truly are. Mindful of the visit of
staunch political opposition leader Said Sadi to the US
earlier this month, Belkhadem appears worried that we will
shift to oppose directly and publicly Belkhadem's plan to
amend the constitution and promote President Bouteflika for a
third term. We are toning down our media outreach for a few
weeks while we keep sending the message to the GoA that we
are not taking a specific position for or against
constitutional amendments and/or third term for President
Bouteflika. END SUMMARY.



2. (C) On March 22, El Djazair News featured front page
headlines accusing Ambassador Ford of refusing to appear at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after being summoned to
justify the Embassy's recent press statement concerning
meetings with NGOs and political party representatives. The
article cited "sources" at the MFA who said "the government
of Algeria is concerned about the U.S. Ambassador's
persistence in meeting with civil society leaders and
political party representatives, in spite of Prime Minister
Abdelaziz Belkhadem's warnings not to do so." On March 24,
Ahmeda Ayachi, the publisher of El Djazair News, asked to see
the Ambassador and told him that his editor-in-chief was
called directly by the Prime Minister's office and the
Ministry of Communication with instructions to run the story
"criticizing Ambassador Ford." Ayachi ensured that his
editor also ran the Embassy's official denial in the story.
(Comment: Major Algerian newspapers on March 23 ran our
press release officially denying the Djazair News story
claiming the Ambassador had been convoked. End Comment.)


3. (C) Interior Ministry Communications Adviser Miloud
Baghdadi on March 23 offered us further insight into the
recent government press campaign. Baghdadi said that he had
no official documents providing instructions forbidding
organizations from meeting with the Embassy because, contrary
to press reports, "there were none." Baghdadi also hinted
that much of this was directed at Ambassador Ford, commenting
that he "had never seen an Ambassador in direct contact with
so many journalists on his cell phone." Baghdadi mentioned
two specific meetings in particular that annoyed Prime
Minister Belkhadem. The first was the Ambassador's meeting
with Children of the Martyrs organization director Khaled
Bounejmaa on February 17, and the second was the Ambassador
and DCM's visit on March 8 to senior FLN official Salih
Boujil. Meanwhile, another high-ranking FLN contact told
Ambassador on March 22 that the March 8 meeting between the
Ambassador and Boujil had created a stir, since Boujil had
ignored Belkhadem's instructions not to do the meeting. This
other FLN source added that the visit of prominent Algerian
political opposition figure Said Sadi to the U.S. earlier in
March, and Sadi's very public broadsides against the Algerian

ALGIERS 00000357 002 OF 002


government while there, suggested to the Prime Minister and
other officials that the Americans may be taking Sadi's side
against the GoA.


4. (C) COMMENT: Like their military counterparts, Algerian
political leaders are hardly transparent. Only as we pushed
harder to expand our contacts did we discover how bitter the
divisions within the FLN truly are. The Ambassador's
meetings with the Children of the Martyrs director and his
meeting with senior FLN politico Boujil appear to have
demonstrated Belkhadem's weak control over the FLN.
Bounejmaa's organization allegedly has close informal ties to
the FLN and any organization pertaining to the families of
War of Liberation veterans retains powerful symbolic value
(hence, our desire to know them). Our contacts tell us that
Bounejmaa, whose extreme initial eagerness to meet with the
Ambassador raised our eyebrows and caused us to postpone the
meeting and change the venue, sought to demonstrate his own
increased clout within the FLN by courting the U.S.
Ambassador without reference to the Prime Minister. The
Boujil meeting did the same thing. It is especially ironic
that the March 8 meeting with FLNer Boujil annoyed Belkhadem
since the entire point of the meeting on our side was to send
a message to Belkhadem - in his role as FLN leader - that we
were not taking sides in the political debates here.


5. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: In addition, our constant access
to the press highlighting our expanding cooperation programs
has shown Belkhadem and Interior Minister Zerhouni (no friend
of expanded liberties himself) that they don't completely
control the media messaging, and that we could level a
painful attack against the constitution amendment and third
term if we wanted to do so. The visit to the U.S. of
political opposition leader Sadi, although entirely private
and at Sadi's initiative mainly to raise money among Algerian
expats, likely added to Belkhadem's concerns. Taken
together, these vignettes paint a picture of a prime minister
not fully secure with influence and nervous about talking to
us. Newspaper publisher Ayachi opined to the Ambassador on
March 22 that there is a possibility that Belkhadem could
lose his job if a cabinet reshuffle occurs as rumored around
April 8. From our vantage point, we doubt that President
Bouteflika has lost confidence in his prime minister.
Therefore, we expect Belkhadem to prevail in the argument
about amending the constitution and moving Bouteflika towards
a third term. Belkhadem might well even be named vice
president in a new government under an amended constitution,
although that seems still very undecided. In any case, we
will scale back our media outreach for a time and keep
sending the message through various channels that we are not
taking a specific position for or against a constitution
amendment and/or third term for Bouteflika.

FORD