Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ALGIERS335
2008-03-20 10:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

NEW POLISARIO LEADERSHIP DEFIANT, SAHRAWIS

Tags:  PREL PBTS PREF UNSC WI MO AG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000335 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS PREF UNSC WI MO AG
SUBJECT: NEW POLISARIO LEADERSHIP DEFIANT, SAHRAWIS
DISILLUSIONED

REF: A. ALGIERS 21


B. ALGIERS 199

C. ALGIERS 294

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Thomas F. Daughton;
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000335

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS PREF UNSC WI MO AG
SUBJECT: NEW POLISARIO LEADERSHIP DEFIANT, SAHRAWIS
DISILLUSIONED

REF: A. ALGIERS 21


B. ALGIERS 199

C. ALGIERS 294

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Thomas F. Daughton;
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a March 12-14 visit to Tindouf by Emboff
and visiting PRM officers, Polisario leaders expressed
increasing frustration with the Manhasset negotiation
process, consistent with recent public statements by
Polisario officials in Algiers. Although the Polisario
leadership was vague as to how it intends to act on its
frustration, it implied that its future actions will be more
aggressive and will seek to invoke more direct third-party
intervention in the conflict. Its relations with MINURSO,
meanwhile, appeared strained. The refugee population in
general seemed to be well informed concerning Polisario
activities and supportive of the new political leadership
elected during the December Tifariti conference (ref A).
Humanitarian assistance to the refugees, particularly food
aid, has been complicated by the inability of the UN or its
implementing partners to conduct a census in the refugee
camps. END SUMMARY.

NEW POLISARIO LEADERSHIP DEFIANT
--------------


2. (C) Emboff and visiting officers from the Bureau of
Population, Refugees and Migration visited the Sahrawi
refugee camps in and around Tindouf, in southwestern Algeria,
from March 12-14. During their visit, Polisario Prime
Minister Abdelkader Taleb Omar, after recounting a long
history of the Sahrawi people, stated that the Polisario
expected nothing to come out of the Manhasset talks. He said
the Polisario had been "patient" for the last 16 years,
adding cryptically that they would "take the necessary
steps." He said that if the UN or a third party did not step
in after the "failed" negotiations in Manhasset, "tension"
would return. Though careful to avoid any direct mention of
a return to armed conflict, Taleb Omar made it clear that the
Polisario was considering other means to achieve its
political objectives. Taleb Omar, who was reelected for a

second term as prime minster at the December congress in
Tifariti, has a reputation for being well spoken and choosing
his words carefully. He appealed for a more direct U.S. role
in the negotiations and referred to the now-defunct Baker
Plan as "close to acceptable."


3. (C) Khadija Hamdi, newly elected minister of culture and
wife of Polisario President Mohamed Abdelaziz, told us that
her mandate was to create a platform for the "country" of
Western Sahara. She indicated that there was some unrest
among the younger refugees. According to the Hamdi, "the
Sahraoui people have two choices: remain refugees or prepare
for independence," and she chose the latter. Hamdi urged the
U.S. to recognize the Western Sahara because "it would be a
stable country and would be a friend of the United States."
She concluded her political discourse with an appeal for U.S.
help to pressure Morocco to accept the Polisario position on
a referendum.

STRAINED RELATIONS WITH MINURSO
--------------


4. (C) We met with the civilian head and military observer
force commander of MINURSO, which maintains a liaison office
in Tindouf. MINURSO's primary mission in Tindouf consists of
liaison activities with the Polisario Front. MINURSO
personnel complained that relations with the Polisario were
strained and that MINURSO had virtually no access to the
refugee camps. As such, we were told, MINURSO is unable to
assess the capacity of the Sahrawi military within the camps
in Algeria. Note: UNHCR personnel confirmed that the
relations between MINURSO and the Polisario had been strained
and one UNHCR official attributed it to inappropriate
behavior on the part of military observer personnel. End
Note.) The MINURSO civilian chief indicated that the
December Polisario congress in Tifariti included much talk of
returning to armed struggle. According to MINURSO, Morocco
has shown decreasing patience for Polisario activities in the
"liberated" zone east of the berm, such as the congress in

ALGIERS 00000335 002 OF 003


Tifariti and other activities, though they remain well
outside the exclusion zone prescribed under the ceasefire
agreement. (Comment: The Polisario appeared frustrated with
the UN in general and seemed to see MINURSO as ineffective in
its mission to carry out a referendum. The tense relations
between MINURSO and the Polisario may be a result of
political disagreements rather than actions by the military
observers. End Comment.)

REFUGEES RESILIENT, DETERMINED
--------------


5. (C) Polisario Minister of Cooperation Salek Baba Hassena
told us that the Sahrawi people "depend entirely on the
international community." His job to coordinate the
provision of international aid to the refugee camps is
clearly a powerful one within the Polisario leadership since
he has considerable influence over the distribution of food
as well as the allocation of nonfood resources such as
funding for water and education projects in the camps.
Unlike the other Polisario officials, Hassena did not deliver
the standard Polisario political speech.


6. (C) The Sahrawi refugees reside in five camps spread
across a fairly wide swath of desolate Saharan landscape.
Despite the rather harsh desert environment, most refugees
appear to be in relatively good health and most benefit from
technology such as satellite television and solar power.
Many have their own vehicles (mainly old Land Rovers). Most
refugees appear to be well connected to the outside world via
satellite TV and radio and are well informed concerning
Polisario activities. Several families we spoke to knew the
dates of the Manhasset negotiations, and many watch the news
on al-Jazeera. Many families said they have sons in the
military and all families we encountered stated that they
received food aid from the WFP. During our visit to Tindouf,
the WFP finalized an agreement with the Algerian government
to distribute food rations to 125,000 refugees. WFP pointed
out, however, that the number did not represent the actual
number of refugees in need of food aid since the UN has not
been permitted to conduct a census.

WHERE IS EVERYBODY?
--------------


7. (C) During a visit to the public market in Tindouf, we saw
unopened bags of WFP flour, containers of vegetable oil and
high-energy biscuits for sale. Though the refugees admitted
to selling small quantities of their food basket in order to
purchase other necessary commodities, the amount and variety
of WFP food stuffs available in the market suggested that
there are problems with the food distribution system. The
refugee camps did not appear to be fully populated and
members of the delegation observed many empty tents and huts.
When asked about the empty dwellings, the refugees gave
vague and unconvincing responses about the whereabouts of the
supposed occupants. A common line from both Polisario
officials and refugees was that life is difficult but the
struggle for recognition and cultural identity give people
strength to carry on. Almost all conversations included the
phrase: "Until we go back to our country." We asked one
refugee family what they would do if the negotiations with
Morocco failed. Without hesitation, the parents and the
older children said they would go to war in order to reclaim
their "country." Though such overt bellicose rhetoric was
rare during the visit, nearly all the refugees we spoke to
indicated a strong desire to change tactics considering what
they appeared to believe was the almost certain failure of
the UN-sponsored negotiations.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) The Polisario leadership and refugees we spoke to have
lost much confidence that the UN and the negotiation process
will address their concerns. While the level of their
rhetoric has increased and talk of a return to armed struggle
is now frequent, no specific war plans are apparent, though
Sahrawi frustration is palpable. In a press conference on
March 17 in Algiers, Poliario Foreign Minster Salek
Ould-Salek, unhappy with both the UN and Morocco, told the
press that the "situation is dire and could explode at any

ALGIERS 00000335 003 OF 003


moment." Meanwhile, the Sahrawi refugees go about their
daily lives in the Algerian Sahara, completely dependent upon
the international community for assistance.
FORD