SAHRAWI AMBASSADOR: POLISARIO ENERGIZED BY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000021

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC PBTS MO WI AG
SUBJECT: SAHRAWI AMBASSADOR: POLISARIO ENERGIZED BY
SUCCESSFUL TIFARITI CONGRESS

REF: 07 ALGIERS 1055

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: According to the Polisario Ambassador to
Algeria, the December 14-20 party congress in Tifariti has
provided the Polisario with an injection of energy and
confidence moving into the January 8-9 Manhasset
negotiations. While the pledge to resume armed struggle
against Morocco "has always been on the table," according to
the Sahrawis, we made our opposition to this approach clear
to our contacts at the Sahrawi Embassy as well as to the
highest levels of the Algerian security services. In both
cases, we were reassured that there are no immediate plans to
resume hostilities. The Sahrawis blame "clumsy and
unbalanced" maneuvering by the international community for an
increase in Polisario talk of war at Tifariti. The success
of the congress and their newly aggressive stance, they hope,
will serve to shape previously "unbalanced" bilateral
negotiations by making the Moroccans "nervous." Our contacts
also expressed concern that the UN, weakened by the December
11 attack on its facility in Algiers, has been forced to
stall much-needed World Food Program support for Polisario
refugee camps. Finally, the Sahrawi Ambassador passed us a
personal letter to President Bush, from the Chairman of the
Tifariti congress. The complete text of the letter is
provided in paragraph 9, and we will forward the original to
the Department. END SUMMARY.

A SUCCESSFUL CONGRESS
--------------


2. (C) Polisario Ambassador to Algeria Mohammed Beissat told
Pol/Econ Chief on January 6 that he had never in his life
seen a party congress as large and successful as the December
14-20 Tifariti edition, the twelfth Polisario congress.
According to Beissat, 1750 delegates attended, and 20 percent
of the Polisario leadership was replaced. Beissat, who is
moving to Tindouf in mid-January to assume his new duties as
Polisario Minister-Delegate for African Affairs, will be
replaced by Abdallah Ghali in Algiers. Beissat said the
congress was observed by 250 international representatives of
40 different nationalities. He added that the ideological and
policy debate at the congress was the deepest and most
energetic he had ever seen.

TO FIGHT OR NOT TO FIGHT?
--------------


3. (C) Pol/Econ Chief cautioned Beissat about returning to
arms against Morocco, warning that it was a bad idea that the
international community would not support. Beissat replied
that the Tifariti call for renewed armed struggle has "always
been on the table," and the Polisario was prepared to fight
for self-determination. He was quick to explain, however,
that the Polisario had no immediate plans to attack Morocco
and still preferred direct negotiations, hoping that the
steadfast stance adopted at Tifariti would force the
Moroccans to be more flexible and negotiate all proposals
"rather than just their own." We reminded Beissat that the
U.S. views the Moroccan proposal as a legitimate basis for
discussion, to which Beissat responded by asking several
questions about "when a U.S. administration's policy shuts
down" in the final year of any given presidency. He made it
clear that he believed there might be some benefit in waiting
for a new U.S. administration to take office.


4. (C) Separately, Ambassador told Algerian external
intelligence service director Lallali on January 6 that the
U.S. hoped the Polisario would not risk returning to
hostilities in the Western Sahara. Referring to A/S WelchQ,s
January 4 conversation with Algerian Foreign Minister
Medelci, the Ambassador told Lallali that we hoped the direct
conversations about the Moroccan autonomy plan in New York
would allow for some tangible progress in shaping a political
solution. Lallali brushed the remarks aside. He
acknowledged the rhetoric coming out of the Tifariti
conference was sometimes hot but said it was not a serious
threat. One could expect no less from a leadership and
people who felt their backs were against a wall, he claimed.

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When Ambassador pressed the point about no return to
hostilities, Lallali reassured that there would be none.

MOROCCO "ISOLATED LIKE CUBA"
--------------


5. (C) The biggest success of the congress, Polisario
Ambassador Beissat said, came in the reaction it provoked
within the Moroccan government. According to Beissat, the
Moroccans demarched "every MFA in the world" following the
congress in an attempt to make sure that the rhetoric of the
congress did not weaken its position in advance of the next
round of Manhasset negotiations. A confident Beissat claimed
this showed "weakness and desperation." Because an
unprecedented 12 members of the new Polisario government come
from the Moroccan side of the berm, Beissat said the
Moroccans were nervous because "this was happening right
under their noses and there is nothing they can do to stop
it." Beissat claimed that Morocco was worried because it was
now isolated "like Cuba" - its EU aspirations cut off at the
North, and surrounded by regional neighbors whose principles
are sympathetic to Polisario demands for self-determination.

PUSHING FOR GREATER RESPECT
--------------


6. (C) Beissat was grateful that the U.S. had advised Morocco
to talk directly to the Polisario, and said that the
Polisario was committed to direct negotiations as long as
they were "balanced" and free from "double-standards." He
repeated several times that he admired U.S. principles of
democracy and self-determination, and hoped that ultimately,
the U.S. would go further and push Morocco to accept UN
resolutions 1754 and 1783. "Morocco should not feel
overconfident," Beissat urged, as this would not help induce
the peace and stability the U.S. desired in the region.
Beissat suggested that if the U.S. was truly committed to
fair and direct bilateral negotiations, it should invite both
delegations to the White House or State Department
immediately following the conclusion of the January 8-9
talks. He also insisted that the Polisario at least be
invited into the State Department or met by an Ambassador,
and urged that more U.S. delegations be sent to Tindouf.
(Note: Beissat was referring to delegations from the
Executive Branch, not CODELs or NODELs, of which he said they
receive "a steady flow." End note.)


7. (C) Algerian external intelligence director Lallali,
meanwhile, extolled to the Ambassador on January 6 the
virtues of the Baker Plan and urged the U.S. to deliver
Moroccan acceptance of that plan. The Ambassador said the
plan was now dead. The U.S. had supported it but the
Moroccans had clearly rejected it. Ambassador told Lallali
the autonomy plan presented by Morocco, by contrast, is on
the table and merits discussion, especially since the
Saharawi refugees have long suffered and the Sahrawis inside
the Moroccan zone claim they are suffering as well. Lallali
thanked the U.S. State Department for sending a team to
Layoune recently, calling that a positive step. However, he
underlined that the Polisario request for a referendum that
allowed the choice of independence "even if the Sahrawis
donQ,t take independence" was reasonable. The U.S., he
urged, should support this as the only realistic and fair
choice.

COMMENT: EMBOLDENED AND ENERGIZED
--------------


8. (C) Beissat, recently promoted into the highest ranks of
the Polisario "cabinet," was clearly energized and optimistic
after the Tifariti conference, believing it will give the
Polisario a stronger negotiating position in the Manhasset
talks. Beissat repeated the same old arguments we reported
in reftel about what the Polisario sees as the U.S. "double
standard" and rhetoric that "sabotages the negotiation
process." What is different now is that, in Beissat's view,
there is a certain inevitability to self-determination for
the Sahrawis, since he believes Morocco is unable to maintain
control over the Western Sahara even with U.S. support. The
remaining question for Morocco, the U.S. and Europe, in

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Beissat's view, is how difficult they choose to make the
process. Meanwhile, the Sahrawis appear prepared to run out
the clock on the U.S., hoping that a new U.S. administration
will bring a new U.S. approach to the negotiations. We see
no hint of flexibility from the Polisario here, nor from the
Algerian military establishment, and MFA Minister Delegate
for Maghreb Affairs Missahel was just as blunt as Lallali
with the Ambassador in mid-December. END COMMENT.


9. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH:

Letter to Mr. George W. Bush
President of the United States of America
The White House

Tifariti, 20 December 2007

Mr. President,

It gives me great pleasure to address to you this letter as
chairman of the 12th Congress of the Polisario, held in
Tifariti from 14 to 20 December 2007, and to extend to you
and the American people our most sincere wishes for a happy
and prosperous New Year 2008.

Mr. President,

The Congress studied deeply the UN Peace Process in Western
Sahara as well as other important issues relating to the
participation of women in all decision-making structures and
the role of Sahrawi civil society in promoting democracy and
respect for human and fundamental liberties. In this
context, the Congress also reviewed thoroughly the latest
Security Council resolutions 1754 and 1783 by which the
Council urged the two parties to the conflict, Frente
Polisario and the Kingdom of Morocco, to enter into serious
negotiations without preconditions, which would lead to the
exercise by the Sahrawi people of their right to
self-determination in a free, just and democratic manner.

The Congress applauded the role of the United States, under
your Presidency, to promote and defend human rights and
preserve international peace and security. The Congress,
however, noted with regret the recent stand of your
administration, which would not lead to a speedy, just and
lasting solution to the conflict Western Sahara (sic) that
can only be resolved in accordance with the UN doctrine
relating to decolonisation.

Mr. President,

The 12th Congress of the Frente Polisario strongly urges your
administration to use its privileged relations with the
Kingdom of Morocco to encourage it to abide by the UN
resolutions relevant to the question of Western Sahara in
particular those calling for the holding of a free and fair
referendum by which the Saharawi people could decide their
own future. Furthermore, the Congress calls upon you to
ensure that Morocco immediately puts an end to its violations
of human rights in the occupied areas of Western Sahara.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest
considerations.

Hamma Salama
The Chairman of the Congress

END TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH.
FORD