NEW POLISARIO AMBASSADOR IN ALGIERS HEWS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000199

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC PBTS MO WI AG
SUBJECT: NEW POLISARIO AMBASSADOR IN ALGIERS HEWS TO
FAMILIAR LINE

REF: ALGIERS 21

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Thomas F. Daughton;
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a February 20 meeting, new Polisario
Ambassador to Algeria Ibrahim Ghali and Polisario
Minister-Delegate for African Affairs Mohammed Beissat told
us that it was getting more difficult for the Polisario
leadership to convince the Sahrawi people to be patient and
respect the Manhasset negotiation process, especially given
their dismay at UN Special Envoy Peter Van Walsum's
statements during a recent visit to the Polisario refugee
camps at Tindouf. In the wake of the December Tifariti
congress (reftel),Ghali and Beissat asserted that the
Polisario intended to move ahead with plans to "reconstruct
the liberated territories" on its side of the berm, and that
the call to arms was still on the table, although the
Polisario had no immediate plans to attack Moroccan
positions. Both men also said that the Polisario was at once
encouraged and saddened by the prompt U.S. recognition of an
independent Kosovo, believing their Western Sahara claim to
be stronger than Kosovo's. END SUMMARY.

A "FRUSTRATED" VAN WALSUM VISITS THE POLISARIO
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2. (C) According to Beissat (who was until recently the
Polisario ambassador in Algiers),a "frustrated and
pessimistic" Van Walsum visited the Polisario at Tindouf
recently. Beissat said Van Walsum told the Polisario to "get
real" and accept that "nobody is going to help," since "the
U.S. and France are friends of Morocco." Van Walsum then
pressed the Polisario, according to Beissat, to enter into
serious negotiations on the Moroccan plan, acknowledging that
the Polisario had the right to self-determination but that
this would only come to pass if the U.S. and France in
particular put pressure on Morocco. Van Walsum told the
Polisario he simply did not see that happening and urged the
Polisario to "accept reality." Beissat said that he and the
Polisario leadership were dismayed by the UN Special Envoy's
message, musing that frustration like Van Walsum's was
"normally characteristic of youth." He suggested that Van
Walsum needed prodding to identify obstacles to progress in
the negotiations and move the process forward.

NEW DETERMINATION TO REBUILD THE "LIBERATED TERRITORIES"
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3. (C) As we reported in reftel, the Polisario emerged from
its December 14-20 party congress at Tifariti with a new
burst of energy and defiance. Beissat said that the
Polisario was now determined to implement a rebuilding and
reconstruction program in the "liberated territories" on its
side of the berm. This program, he said, was to include
schools, housing, courts and other public institutions, as
well as basic infrastructure. DCM cautioned that this could
be perceived as an escalation and/or a violation of the
cease-fire agreement, but Beissat insisted that the Moroccans
were doing the same thing on their side of the berm and the
Polisario did not see the need to consult or seek permission
from anyone. He pointed out that at Tifariti, the Polisario
reminded itself that roughly one-quarter of the Western
Sahara lay outside the berm. Beissat said the Polisario was
clear on the five kilometer "no-go" zone, as well as the
15-kilometer restricted movement zone next to the berm, but
that the activities it foresaw were outside that band.

A RESTLESS CONSTITUENCY
--------------


4. (C) Ghali, a member of the Polisario negotiating team at
Manhasset, is a founding member of the Polisario and former
minister of defense. He stressed that negotiations should
not be considered an end in and of themselves, and that it
was growing harder for the negotiating team and the Polisario
leadership to convince the Sahrawi people that progress was
being made, since the negotiations had not yet produced any
tangible results. Beissat said that the call to arms at
Tifariti was serious enough that one Polisario leader even
pushed to send the women and children home immediately, while
the men would move directly from Tifariti to attack Morocco.
DCM stressed that there was no sympathy in Washington or
Europe for Polisario threats of violence. Continuing to make
such threats could also have an adverse effect, he noted,
creating sympathy for Morocco. An incredulous Beissat

laughed, saying "Morocco already has your sympathy, if we had
this sympathy it would be much easier for us to keep quiet."
Ghali asked the U.S. to "help us" find something to show the
Sahrawis to renew their faith in the current negotiation
process.


5. (C) Ghali and Beissat stressed, however, that the
Polisario had no immediate plans to resume violence and were
committed to work towards the fourth round of negotiations at
Manhasset from March 11-13. Ghali said the Polisario
congress had agreed to "a period of evaluation" of the UN
negotiation process before a decision would be made whether
another approach was warranted, but he was vague as to how
long the period would last and what another approach might
resemble. If the result of the March talks at Manhasset was
the same as the last round, the two officials speculated,
then the Polisario might finish its "evaluation." Echoing
his past comments, Beissat recited that the cease-fire
agreement with Morocco included plans for a referendum; if
the referendum was taken off the table, it was only logical
for the Polisario to take another look at the whole package.

THE KOSOVO EFFECT
--------------


6. (C) The swift U.S. recognition of the independence of
Kosovo offered both hope and despair to the Polisario, in the
eyes of Beissat and Ghali. Beissat said it was "wonderful"
to see people celebrating their right to self-determination,
and "inspiring" to see the U.S. "stand up for its real
values" in supporting Kosovo. He said the Polisario
supported an independent Kosovo, and was planning to send an
envoy to meet the new government in Pristina, as it had done
in Montenegro after that country's independence. However,
when DCM pointed out that Algeria had not yet recognized
Kosovo and asked if the Polisario would move forward with
recognition regardless, Beissat and Ghali both demurred,
saying a decision had not yet been made.


7. (C) An independent Kosovo, Beissat said, made the
Polisario hopeful for its own cause. Beissat believed the
Western Sahara issue was "easier" than Kosovo, since "Morocco
is weaker than Serbia and the Polisario is stronger than the
Kosovars." Furthermore, Beissat said that although Kosovo's
independence was a positive development, Kosovo had less
justification for independence than the Sahrawis, he
believed, since Western Sahara is a formal part of the UN
decolonization process while the UN had formally always
considered Kosovo to be a Serbian province.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Van Walsum's comments to the Sahrawi leadership in
Tindouf may have dismayed them, but we saw no indication that
the Polisario plans to change its approach at the next round
in Manhasset as a result. Beissat purported to agree with
Van Walsum that a change in approach was needed, but
indicated that it was up to the Moroccans to make it. The
much younger and more energetic Beissat, recently promoted to
the senior ranks of the Polisario "government," presents a
marked contrast to the veteran hardliner Ghali. In a meeting
together, Ghali was surprisingly deferential to Beissat.
Their interpersonal dynamic may be a reflection of the recent
self-assertion by younger Polisario activists at the Tifariti
congress, to which Ghali alluded several times in our
conversation. Whether Ghali has been "exiled" to Algiers as
part of an internal power struggle remains to be determined;
his continuing role on the Manhasset negotiating team
suggests he has not been completely sidelined. One thing is
clear, however: the Sahrawis' new ambassador in Algiers will
not be telling the Algerians anything they don't want to
hear. The two men's evident deference to the GOA on Kosovo
recognition shows that the client relationship between
Algeria and the Polisario is alive and well.
FORD