SENIOR ALGERIAN MFA OFFICIAL DOWNBEAT ON LEBANON,

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000141

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM LE AG
SUBJECT: SENIOR ALGERIAN MFA OFFICIAL DOWNBEAT ON LEBANON,
WON'T BLAME ONLY SYRIA

REF: A. STATE 10786

B. 07 ALGIERS 1808

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) MFA Director General for Arab Affairs Bouzaher (A/S
equivalent) told Ambassador February 6 that the political
situation in Lebanon looked deadlocked and that the Algerian
Government was not hopeful that the Arab League would succeed
in paving the way for a presidential election. Bouzaher said
the Algerian Government supported the Arab League effort.
That said, Bouzaher expressed doubt that Amre Moussa could
succeed. The insistence of the two competing factions that
the other offer larger compromises makes finding a way
forward practically impossible, he asserted. Bouzaher
expressed some sympathy with what he called the Syrian
response to Amre Moussa that Syria only was being asked to
lean on its Lebanese allies and not the other external states
with influence. Saudi Arabia, Iran, France and the U.S. all
have influence too, Bouzaher observed. Ambassador rejoined
that the KSA, the U.S. and France wanted the Arab League to
succeed. Only Iran and Syria seek to block Amre Moussa's
effort. Bouzaher did not argue the point beyond saying that
the Syrians officially support the Arab League initiative and
that all sides need to make concessions. He also
acknowledged in a quiet aside that the Algerian authorities
do not really understand the dynamics of Lebanese politics,
but they want to maintain a stance perceived as neutral by
all sides.


2. (C) The Ambassador highlighted our support for the
Special Tribunal as well as for the Lebanese security forces
and Lebanese economic needs. He urged that the Algerians
consider material support as well as issuing public
statements in support of Siniora's government. Bouzaher
noted that the Algerian government had issued no public
statements about Lebanon so far. Similarly, there was no
bilateral Algerian assistance to Lebanon now. While he could
give no definitive answer, he was dubious that Algeria would
change its allegedly neutral stance.


3. (C) Comment: Our sense is that Bouzaher is influential
within the ministry on Middle East issues. Foreign Minister
Medelci, who is a finance/economics technocrat, has little
experience with issues like the Arab League or the Middle
East. Bouzaher has worked in several Arab capitals (most
recently as ambassador in the UAE). Bouzaher and the
Algerian ambassador in Cairo, an older Arab nationalist named
Abdelkader Hadjar, probably carry the most weight when
President Bouteflika (another old-style Arab nationalist) and
Medelci seek advice. Bouzaher himself has a full workload,
and the Lebanon dossier does not figure on his priority list.
The background paper in ref A had much information that was
clearly new to Bouzaher and his notetakers. The biggest
problem with Algeria on Lebanon is that Bouteflika and his
aides want to maintain their pious stance of neutrality and
maintain good relations with Syria. (Syria, for example, is
important to Algerian efforts to interdict movement of
Algerian jihadis moving between Algeria and Iraq.) Our
feeding more information to Bouzaher about Lebanon is useful
in getting the GoA to take another look at its stance. It
would also be helpful for other Arab states, and Siniora's
government, to keep nudging the Algerians to support Amre
Moussa more strongly.
FORD