RIFTS WITHIN THE "POUVOIR" MAKE RARE HEADLINES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001306

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM AG
SUBJECT: RIFTS WITHIN THE "POUVOIR" MAKE RARE HEADLINES

REF: A. ALGIERS 1194

B. ALGIERS 1267

C. ALGIERS 984

Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: An extremely rare public and personal
exchange between a former president and a retired general has
broken the omerta code usually observed by Algeria's ruling
elite, exposing divisions within the "Pouvoir" that have
persisted since the struggle for independence. The bitter
exchange between the famously silent former President Chadli
Bendjedid and the retired General Khaled Nezzar underscores
that, as the generation that has ruled Algeria since 1962
enters its twilight years, its members are preoccupied less
with Algeria's future and more with jockeying for the
greatest possible personal roles in Algeria's official
history. Those who took up arms against the French from the
beginning of the war in 1954 continue to feel they have
greater credibility and ownership of the political system
than anyone else, particularly those who deserted from the
French army and joined the struggle in the late 1950s or very
early 1960s. At the core of the argument is the still-open
wound of who is to blame for the 1992 cancellation of
elections and the civil war that followed, as well as whether
that moment represented the demise of democratic evolution or
the salvation of a secular state. The political reality of
Algeria today is that these divisions remain extremely
relevant within the current government, as power in Algeria
is likely to remain in the hands of this same group of
septuagenarians until what one contact calls "biological
realities" finally enable Algeria to look to the future. END
SUMMARY.

THE END OF THE BEGINNING
--------------


2. (C) The November 12 revision of the constitution (ref A)
devoted a disproportionate amount of ink to defining
Algeria's official symbols and giving the state
responsibility for the "official history" and its
transmission to younger generations in schools. Former
Communication Minister Abdelaziz Rahabi, who is helping
Chadli write his memoirs and is also an acquaintance of
Nezzar, told us on December 7 that Algeria's ruling elite can
be expected to focus more and more on Algeria's history, both
as a means of distracting people from what ails them and as a
result of the natural phenomenon of aging. Rahabi said that
Algeria has reached "the end of the beginning" in which the
leaders of its revolution were now taking stock of their
lives and working to have future generations look positively
on them. Personal legacies, Rahabi said, have thus become
even more important with time than the code of silence and
loyalty that has historically governed relationships among
the members of the Pouvoir. Human rights lawyer Miloud
Brahimi (brother of Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi) agreed
with Rahabi, saying that the next few years were likely to
bring continued political and economic stagnation and more
public historical revelations, accusations and sniping from
previously silent members of the ruling elite. Both Brahimi
and Rahabi confirmed that Bouteflika himself was as much
preoccupied with the burnishing of his personal legacy as
anyone else (ref B).

THE DAF AND THE MAQUISARD
--------------


3. (C) The December 4 editions of the French language dailies
El Watan and Liberte featured lengthy, personal, front-page
articles by General Nezzar and Chadli Bendjedid,
respectively, each hurling accusations at the other. Nezzar
worked closely with Chadli during the latter's presidency,
but later blamed him for a policy of political accommodation
that allowed the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) to emerge and
ignite the civil war of the 1990s. Nezzar was one of the
famous "janvieristes," a small group of generals who
intervened in January 1992 to cancel the elections that had
promised to sweep the FIS into power across the local and
national spectrum. These generals also pressured Chadli into
resigning from his 13-year presidency. Popular legend has it
that the mercurial Nezzar was so enraged by Chadli's initial
refusal to resign that he held the president by the throat
against a wall in his office until Chadli agreed to step

ALGIERS 00001306 002 OF 003


down. Nezzar's daughter told us on December 9 that her
father was indeed "very emotional" about Chadli's public
statements, in which he referred to Nezzar as a "French
agent" and blamed the generals for derailing Algeria's march
to democracy. Chadli asserted that he himself would have
"set up a parliamentary system," although the full text of
his remarks did not address how he would have managed the
Islamist threat at the time. Brahimi told us that Chadli
consulted him at the time, saying he only allowed elections
in 1991 and 1992 after being mistakenly reassured by the
presidential think tank, the National Institute for Global
and Strategic Studies (INESG),that the FIS would carry "a
maximum of 18-25 percent of the vote."


4. (C) Both Chadli and Nezzar are moudjahedine (veterans) of
the 1954-1962 war for independence. Chadli took pains to
point out that he was a "maquisard," a veteran who took up
arms from the beginning in 1954. The maquisards take their
name from the "maquis," wooded and rugged mountainous terrain
(ref C) that served as the launching pad for guerrilla
attacks against the French military. Nezzar, in contrast,
initially was a conscript in the French army and "took the
maquis" years later after deserting in the late 1950s. He is
part of a group of generals that is still known as Deserters
from the French Army (DAF),and tensions over which group has
greater authority have helped shape alliances within the
Pouvoir since independence. Nezzar's December 4 tirade in
the press lambasted Chadli's mistakes and personal
shortcomings in excruciating detail lost on ordinary
Algerians, using an intimidating tone and demanding that
"just because you took the maquis a few years earlier, you
think that makes you more patriotic?" Chadli's daughter,
whose child attends the same nursery school as one of our
local staff, later told us that the wounds are so sensitive
that when Chadli called Nezzar after the exchange in an
effort to bury the hatchet, Nezzar refused to see him or even
speak to him on the phone.

A BIOLOGICAL SYSTEM SEEKS TO CLONE ITSELF
--------------


5. (C) In Brahimi's view, Algeria is in desperate need of
generational change in leadership that will not occur until
the "biological clock" causes the moudjahed generation to die
off. Even then, he said, stability remains paramount, and
the proud members of the Pouvoir do have an interest in
maintaining stability for the future. Rahabi agreed, saying
that although these individuals lack a vision for the future,
their attitude is not completely "apres nous, le deluge."
Rahabi's view was that the various factions within the
Pouvoir are attempting to clone themselves within the next
generation, the 50- to 60-year-olds, as another means of
securing their legacies relative to the other factions.
Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, born in 1952, is a perfect
example of this phenomenon, having the backing of active and
retired DAF generals of the security services. Brahimi
lamented that Ouyahia's generation "is not the generation we
need" in power, saying that power needed to pass to the
"30-somethings." Otherwise, he said, Algeria is likely to
see more of the same with the 50-somethings: a perpetuation
of the current factions and alliances within the Pouvoir,
though "perhaps a bit diluted" since this generation did not
participate in the war for independence.

COMMENT: SQUABBLING WHILE ROME BURNS
--------------


6. (C) Forty-six years after independence Algeria's founding
generation is entering its twilight years, struggling to
assess the evolution of the country and assign credit and
blame for its decisive historical moments. According to
Brahimi, "they realize they have nothing left to contribute"
but are not ready to step aside until assured of a glorious
place in the history books. Outside their walls, a teeming
young population is left feeling completely disconnected from
the squabbling of the proud old men of the Pouvoir.
According to Citibank country manager Kamel Driss, the vast
majority of Algerians consider themselves "outsiders,"
alienated by a tribalized ruling elite with a set of
priorities completely different from their own. Meanwhile,
Brahimi explained that history is "too emotional and
personal" an issue for the members of the Pouvoir. As a
result, individual egos now trump secrecy on occasion, even

ALGIERS 00001306 003 OF 003


while the clannish alliances of the 1950s remain as relevant
as ever in the corridors of power.
PEARCE