Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ADDISABABA3066
2008-11-12 05:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

USAU: AU, PARTNERS KEEPING PRESSURE ON MAURITANIAN

Tags:  PREL UNSC KDEM AU MR 
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 120528Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2686
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7584
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 003066 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/FO AND AF/RSA FOR WHALDEMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: PREL UNSC KDEM AU MR
SUBJECT: USAU: AU, PARTNERS KEEPING PRESSURE ON MAURITANIAN
JUNTA

REF: ADDIS ABABA 3051

Classified By: Ambassador John A. Simon, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 003066

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/FO AND AF/RSA FOR WHALDEMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: PREL UNSC KDEM AU MR
SUBJECT: USAU: AU, PARTNERS KEEPING PRESSURE ON MAURITANIAN
JUNTA

REF: ADDIS ABABA 3051

Classified By: Ambassador John A. Simon, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) Summary: The African Union and its international
partners agreed on November 10 in Addis Ababa to issue a
communique warning the Mauritanian junta of sanctions and
isolation should they fail to respond to the international
community's demand for the immediate unconditional liberation
of President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, his restoration to
office, and a return to constitutional rule that recognizes
his role as the legitimately elected head of state. The
communique, endorsed by permanent members and African members
of the UNSC during a special session following the
AU/partners meeting, urges the junta to use the scheduled
November 20 consultation between the EU and the junta to
demonstrate their commitment to resolving the Mauritanian
political crisis in a way that will satisfy the international
community. The junta's response on November 20 will be the
subject of a ministerial-level meeting of the AU and EU
troikas, as well as the other participants of the November 10
meeting, in Addis on November 21. End Summary.


2. (U) On November 10, the AU and its international partners
(Arab League, UN, Organization of the Islamic Conference,
Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, and the EU)
met in Addis Ababa to discuss the political crisis in
Mauritania. Specifically, they reviewed a proposal that a
delegation representing the Mauritanian junta had conveyed to
AU Chairman Jean Ping during an unannounced visit to Addis on
November 4. (Note: Both the AU and the Arab League had sent
delegations to Nouakchott in attempts to resolve the crisis.
End Note.)


3. (U) The junta's proposal, which the AU leadership
dismissed as "not serious," (see reftel) called for the
"rapid liberation of the former President who will enjoy all
the privileges and prerogatives due to a former Head of
State." Further, it stated that Abdallahi could, "if he
wishes, participate in the General Assemblies on Democracy."
The proposal also called for "the holding of national days
for consultations known as General Assemblies on Democracy

that are open to all the Mauritanian political forces without
exclusion concerning participation or taboos on the subjects
to be discussed," and it included "the adoption, at the end
of these General Assemblies on Democracy, of a road map which
will specify: the duration of the transition period; the
electoral calendar leading to free and transparent
presidential elections; eligibility to contest for these
presidential elections; and guarantees of regularity and
transparency, including international observation of the
elections."


4. (U) The joint communique forged on November 10 makes clear
that the proposal is unacceptable. (Note: The official
communique will be transmitted as soon as available. End
note.) The AU and the international community regard
Abdallahi as the President -- not the former President -- of
Mauritania. Moreover, as the legitimately elected President,
he has a role to play in resolving the crisis in Mauritania.
AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra told
permanent members and African members of the UNSC who
attended a special session immediately following the
AU/partners meeting that the major point of contention
between the junta's proposal and the AU (and ultimately the
international community) was the status of the President. He
said the junta proposed allowing Abdallahi to only play a
role as a "former" head of state. "He is not a 'former' head
of the state," Lamamra asserted. Abdallahi would only be a
former head of state if he had stepped down. If such a
situation were to occur, "The international community should
be satisfied that he has not resigned under pressure, but
that he has done so freely to help his country overcome this
crisis."


5. (U) An EU representative who participated in the drafting
of the communique confirmed that the "bone of contention"
between the junta and the international community was the
status of the President. "The President must be a major
actor in the transition process," he said. The EU also was
concerned that the junta was already manipulating the
transition process by appointing its henchmen to key
positions. Unless President Abdallahi is freed and is
allowed to participate in the transition, the EU will
consider the new government unconstitutional, he added.


ADDIS ABAB 00003066 002 OF 002



6. (U) The communique, which the permanent members and the
African members of the UNSC had an opportunity to comment on,
also contained a warning to the junta that if they failed to
respond to the international community's demands, they would
face sanctions and isolation. The communique did not
explicitly call for the withdrawal of the military from
power. The Ambassador delivered his prepared points
concerning the need for the President to be restored to
office, the military to withdraw from power, and
constitutional rule to be restored as bases of any transition
process. He asked pointedly whether all agreed the
communique was clear on these points. Lamamra assured the
meeting that the recognition of Abdallahi as the legitimately
elected President and the reference to respect for the
Mauritanian constitution means the President should be
restored to power and the "withdrawal of the military should
take place."


7. (U) Lamamra said the goal of the communique is for the AU
and the international community to "speak with one voice" in
expressing "our commitment to democratic principles" as well
as a willingness to help resolve the crisis in Mauritania.
He said the AU and its international partners expected the
junta to "fully integrate" this position of the AU and the
international community into the response they give at their
consultations with the EU scheduled for November 20. The
junta's response to the EU on November 20 will be the subject
of a meeting of the AU and EU troikas in Addis on November

21. If the junta responds favorably, cooperates, and if its
response is acceptable to all Mauritanians, the AU and the
international community would join in the efforts to resolve
the crisis and restore constitutional order in Mauritania,
according to the communique. If, on the other hand, the
junta does not reply to the EU or if its response confirms
that the political dialogue is at an impasse, then the AU and
EU troikas will have an opportunity to assess the situation
and consider what measures to take.


8. (C) Following the special session, Lamamra gave the
Ambassador his assessment of how junta leader Maj. General
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz might react to the communique.
Lamamra said Aziz may resist the international community's
efforts because he has his own presidential ambitions, but he
said the threat of sanctions and isolation may succeed in
splintering the junta and thus reducing its grip on power.
Lamamra suggested that once the President is restored to
power, the military could play a productive role by sitting
on a national security committee. But the military should
not have a role in the transition, he insisted.


9. (C) Comment: We understand from some of those who
participated in the drafting of the communique that the final
text had to be softened to reach a consensus. The communique
still contains the major points that we and the AU's other
international partners consider essential, namely that
President Abdallahi be liberated immediately, and that he
should be considered the legitimately elected President.
YAMAMOTO