DRL A/S KRAMER NOTES U.S. CONCERN ON CSO LAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002103

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2018
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL ET
SUBJECT: DRL A/S KRAMER NOTES U.S. CONCERN ON CSO LAW

REF: ADDIS 1593 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) DRL Assistant Secretary David Kramer highlighted
significant U.S. concerns over the likely impact and
potentially unintended consequences of Ethiopia's draft Civil
Society Organizations (CSO) law in meetings with Prime
Minister Meles, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda
Alemu, donors, CSO representatives, and the press during his
July 23-25 visit to Ethiopia. While donors and CSO
representatives detailed their concerns about the impact of
the draft law, Prime Minister Meles and his advisor BEREKET
Simon confirmed that the Ethiopian Government (GoE) is
convinced about the fundamental issues captured in the draft
law and that there is unlikely to be any drastic change in
its view over time. A/S Kramer emphasized to all
interlocutors the USG desire to establish the democracy and
human rights pillar of U.S.-Ethiopia bilateral relations on
firmer ground to ensure that it is not shorter than other
pillars of the relationship. The British Ambassador noted
that due to strong domestic opposition to the draft law
within the U.K., Ethiopia's CSO law is "getting close to
being a red line" for Her Majesty's Government. In light of
the clear impact that sustained international pressure
against the CSO law appears to have had, it is critical to
sustain senior U.S.G. pressure, both in Addis Ababa and from
Washington, to prevent the passage of a CSO law that would
severely restrict civil society operations and U.S.
assistance programs in Ethiopia. End Summary.

DONORS AND CSO'S ON THE CSO LAW
--------------


2. (SBU) NGO representatives at a July 23 luncheon with
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Rights, and Labor
David Kramer acknowledged that some amendments made to the
second version of the draft law represent improvements --
particularly walking back slightly on some of the Civil
Society Agency's (CSA) authorities, now allowing
foreign-funded NGOs to work on community development, and
requiring NGOs' re-registration every three years rather than
annually. Still, by dramatically increasing criminal
penalties for administrative errors and adding new prohibited
sectors for foreign-funded NGOs' engagement (i.e. advancing
the rights of children and the disabled, and promoting gender
equity),in many ways the revised draft is much more
draconian than the first draft. Participants at a luncheon
argued that by establishing a false dichotomy among NGOs
based on their engagement in "advocacy" efforts, the law
indicates the GoE's intent to further close Ethiopia's
political space. Although Prime Minister Meles told A/S
Kramer that the CSA would not have authority to detain
individuals, one U.S. NGO representative engaged in the
donors' legal analysis of the draft law argued that this
interpretation is incorrect. In fact, the CSA can explicitly
appoint the police as its representatives who can, in turn,
detain CSO officers. The representative further noted that
the revised draft only permits "national" NGOs to appeal
questions of law to the courts, leaving the CSA as the final
appellate authority on questions of fact. A domestic human
rights organization expressed concern that the CSA's
authority to force the disclosure of NGO information could
force human rights organizations to divulge what would
normally be protected sources (often within the GoE)
reporting abuses, which the GoE could then use to retaliate
against such informants. Further the guaranteed CSA presence
at NGO meetings risks silencing voices.


3. (SBU) In response to A/S Kramer's question whether the law
was a response to any particular development, one participant
argued that it is rather an element of the broader resurgence
of the ruling party's Revolutionary Democracy ideology (see
Addis 1154) being implemented to close political space
sufficiently to prevent a repeat of the broad vocal
discontent of 2005 as Ethiopia approaches the 2010 national
elections. The British Ambassador echoed this arguing that
the GoE remains fundamentally Marxist-Leninist and has
introduced this draft bill and taken other actions since 2005
to maintain control domestically after the 2005 threat of

ADDIS ABAB 00002103 002 OF 003


losing power.

NGO RECOMMENDATIONS: KILL IT, OR DELAY IT
--------------


4. (C) NGO representatives argued that engaging the GoE on
the details of the draft NGO law risks allowing the GoE to
simply pick and choose which (cosmetic) changes to make,
while defending final passage of the version of the law it
wants with the argument that it had made compromises in
response to stakeholder pressure. Instead, many NGOs
strongly urged A/S Kramer and other assembled donor
representatives to counter the draft law in its entirety,
rather than seeking to improve it around the margins. NGO
representatives recommended that donors first seek to kill
the law, and if not, to delay it. The French Ambassador
noted a degree of concerns about the draft law within the GoE
as well, which may present an opportunity to exploit through
sustained international pressure. (Note: On July 28, the
British Ambassador reported that ruling party central
committee member Teklewoine Assefa confided to him that
morning that the international pressure against the law, if
sustained, may prove successful in causing the GoE to delay
introduction of the law to parliament by months, and possibly
years. End Note). The British Ambassador also noted that
due to strong domestic opposition to the draft law within the
U.K., Ethiopia's CSO law is "getting close to being a red
line" for Her Majesty's Government.

MELES: GOE THINKING ON CSOS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE...
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Prime Minister Meles confirmed to A/S Kramer that the
GoE is convinced about the fundamental issues captured in the
draft law and that there has not been, and will not likely
be, any drastic change in its view over time. He suggested
that the international community's issues with the draft CSO
law stemmed partly from a misunderstanding of the draft CSO
law and partly from a difference of opinion on the role of
civil society. The draft law is not intended to stop NGO
activity or block foreign funding from NGOs. Instead, Meles
claimed that the intent was to divide NGOs between those
engaged in political activities and those not. For those not
engaged in political activities, Meles argued the purpose of
the law was to provide transparency about funding and
accountability about expenditures. Meles argued that
non-political NGOs "should have celebrated the law, unless
they have something to hide." Meles argued that political
activity is a right reserved for citizens. While
non-citizens may have the privilege of being involved on such
issues, they do not have a right to be involved. Meles
further argued that "Ethiopia's civil society must be
revitalized from within, not as a consequence of its external
ties. The GoE is not convinced that foreign-funded NGOs are
the way forward for Ethiopia's civil society."


6. (C) To formalize this division of CSOs, Meles was emphatic
that the GoE would stand by the threshold of 10% of funding
from external sources as a defining characteristic by which
to classify foreign from national NGOs. Meles stressed the
view that "foreign governments should not be involved in
political activities in Ethiopia except in support of GoE
efforts, and upon explicit GoE requests to support
implementation of our vision." Still, Meles noted that the
draft law does allow the GoE to bring in the foreign
expertise that it needs and which is consistent with its
governance vision through foreign NGOs. Still, Meles argued
the GoE's fundamental perspective that "Ethiopia's democratic
progress will be weakened if dependent on foreign funding,
and foreign funding should be limited to training and
capacity building for an organic civil society process to
succeed." Meles discounted A/S Kramer's concerns that the
law would affect many U.S. programs in Ethiopia by arguing
that there are many ways the U.S. can support GoE needs, but
these must be by an invitation from, and in agreement with,
the GoE. In response to A/S Kramer's concern that the new
Civil Society Agency's reporting requirements would be
onerous on NGOs, Meles assured that copies of existing NGO
reports provided to their funding agencies would suffice to
meet the stipulated reporting requirement and that the CSA
would strive to minimize additional reporting requirements.
Meles dismissed objections to the provision of the law that
denies foreign-funded NGOs judicial appeal by arguing that

ADDIS ABAB 00002103 003 OF 003


such organizations would only be operating in country by
invitation from the GoE and, therefore the GoE could rescind
the invitation at any time without requiring the intervention
of the judiciary. (Note: While this argument is pertinent
for foreign-funded NGOs focused on political activities
through an agreement with the GoE, it ignores the denial of
judicial appeal to the far broader grouping of foreign-funded
NGOs engaged in non-prohibited development activities. End
Note.)

...BECAUSE CSOS ARE UNDERMINING ETHIOPIA, BEREKET
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) In a follow-on July 24 lunch with ruling Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) central
committee member and advisor to the Prime Minister BEREKET
Simon, BEREKET took an even tougher stance on the CSO law.
BEREKET acknowledged that the GoE and NGOs are at
loggerheads, but "we didn't start the fight." Instead,
BEREKET explicitly asserted that NGOs are working closely
with terrorists and undermining Ethiopia's constitution. He
specifically cited NGOs' roles in the international media
campaign to derail the CSO law, various recent human rights
reports, and UNICEF's inflated figure of six million
Ethiopian children at risk of malnutrition as examples of
NGOs' efforts to undermine Ethiopia. To defend against these
challenges, BEREKET argued that the GoE has a country to
build and holds the sovereign power to promulgate laws based
on the "cold calculations of our interests." Highlighting
the GoE's active stakeholder dialogue on the draft bill,
BEREKET lamented that "stakeholders were not sufficiently
prepared." While confirming that the GoE has no intent to
rush the law through without due consideration, he was
adamant that the GoE would incorporate others' suggestions
"only if convinced that specific existing provisions will
negatively affect Ethiopia's democratization process."

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) A/S Kramer's engagements with GoE and CSO
interlocutors were important in noting senior Washington
concern about the pending draft CSO law. Meetings with GoE
and EPRDF principals, however, were crucial in eliciting the
fundamental belief among ruling party hard-liners such as
BEREKET, that CSOs are undermining Ethiopia by supporting
terrorists and the Prime Minister's confirmation that the
GoE's perspective on CSOs will not change. These two
disclosures confirm NGO representatives' concerns that
international advocacy for improvements to the law will
result in only cosmetic improvements to a law closing
political space for civil society. Still, one cannot rule
out that Meles and BEREKET, despite their rhetoric, might
rethink their rigid position under continued pressure and
expressions of concern. Post and A/S Kramer agree that
international pressure to either "kill" or delay the bill
would better serve U.S. interests and promote American
democratic values in Ethiopia. Ambassador Yamamoto, along
with his British and French counterparts, will meet with
Prime Minister Meles on July 30 to press the GoE along these
lines. The insider's confession from Teklewoine that the
pressure is working, combined with the British Ambassador's
confirmation of increasing opposition to the draft law by
HMG, suggests that redoubled USG opposition to the law now,
both from Post and Washington, is critical to protecting
against a further closure of Ethiopia's political space and
ensuring a continued avenue for USG support for Ethiopia's
democratization. End Comment.


9. (SBU) DRL A/S Kramer edited and cleared this report.
YAMAMOTO