MANPADS STRATEGY: COMMENTS FROM ETHIOPIA

S E C R E T ADDIS ABABA 000018

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

PM/WRA FOR STEPHANIE PICO AND SHO MORIMOTO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2018
TAGS: MARR MASS PARM XW WET
SUBJECT: MANPADS STRATEGY: COMMENTS FROM ETHIOPIA

REF: STATE 156001

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: Embassy Addis Ababa supports pursuit of
the proposed Horn of Africa MANPADS strategy (reftel). While
counter-proliferation and acquisition-related strategy
elements would likely be well received in Ethiopia, and will
complement on-going arrangements, elements of the stockpile
security and destruction component must be handled carefully
to achieve U.S. objectives without offending Ethiopian
sensibilities. End Summary.

FEEDBACK ON THE PROPOSED STRATEGY
--------------


2. (S/NF) Counter-Proliferation: Ethiopia is a very proud
country. While it is generally willing to engage in
partnership and receive assistance, such assistance must be
framed in a way that is not perceived to be invasive or
critical. Embassy Addis supports approaching MANPADS
supplier countries to encourage them to vet sales to the Horn
of African (HoA) region, but emphasizes that if such
approaches are perceived to suggest a concern against the
legitimate procurement of MANPADS by the Ethiopian military,
they could jeopardize the broader bilateral military
relationship.


3. (S/NF) Stockpile Security and Destruction: Post's
interagency review team assesses that it is highly unlikely
that the Ethiopian military would provide significant
information about its own MANPADS stock or permit the United
States to assess either that stock or security mechanisms in
place to safeguard it. Instead, Post believes that, if it
even acknowledges the existence of a military MANPADS stock,
the Ethiopian military is most likely to either confirm to
the USG that it is already adequately secured or to ask the
USG to provide funding for stockpile security improvements
which it itself would implement. While stockpile security is
a major element of the proposed strategy, Post believes that
the most effective way to approach the issue with the
Ethiopian military is to offer a training course for
Ethiopian officials on best practices in securing MANPADS
stocks, as well as technical assistance for implementation if
the Ethiopian military is receptive. The USG may learn
otherwise unavailable details of the extent of the Ethiopian
military's MANPADS stock through discussions on the margins
of such a training. In light of the expected lack of
Ethiopian disclosure of details about its MANPADS stock,
securing Ethiopian military buy-in for collaborative or
USG-assisted destruction of its surplus military stock may be
difficult. Post advises an approach to the Ethiopian
military that unilaterally highlights safety threats from old
technology MANPADS believed to be in their stock (i.e. such
as the risk of batteries overheating causing pre-launch
explosions in SA-18s or SA-7s) and only then offering
assistance with the destruction of old or unstable military
stocks. Post believes that the Ethiopian Government would be
receptive to assistance with legislation regarding MANPADS as
well as to improved border security to detect and impede the
cross-border transportation of MANPADS.


4. (S/NF) Acquisition: Post is already implementing an
arrangement with the Ethiopian National Intelligence and
Security Service (NISS) through which we purchase MANPADS
seized by Ethiopian government entities. To date this
program has not been as productive as we would have liked,
probably due to unclear chains of command and coordination
among Ethiopian entities. While Post assesses that an
acquisition component in the MANPADS strategy would be
productive, Post's interagency team notes that even if the
military is not forthcoming on details of its own stockpile,
the Ethiopian military may take advantage of such an
arrangement to pass off to the U.S. old SA-7s from its own
stock in exchange for cash. If early discussions with
Ethiopian military officials unveil a willingness to disclose
to the USG details of its own MANPADS stock, those
discussions may facilitate incorporating the Ethiopian
military into the acquisition arrangement. If not, the
acquisition arrangement may either 1) remain limited to the
NISS, or 2) to the extend that the Ethiopian military is
incorporated, may be limited to SA-18s or other items not
believed to be in the Ethiopian military's stock.

RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
--------------


5. (S/NF)
Feasibility: Post assesses that the proposed strategy is
generally feasible within the context of the challenges and
information provided above.

Ethiopian Counterparts: Post believes that the NISS would be
the primary Ethiopian Government counterpart for
implementation of this strategy. The Ministry of National
Defense (MoND) would be the appropriate counterpart for the
stockpile management courses or destruction collaboration,
and possibly also for part of the acquisition component. The
Foreign Ministry would be the appropriate conduit for initial
discussions and arrangements for any formal agreements.
While the Federal Police would not likely play a significant
role in this strategy, they should be advised at least of the
existence of the acquisition program.

Timing: Post does not see any specific timing preferences for
initiating discussions or the plan of action for this
strategy.
YAMAMOTO