Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ADDISABABA1198
2008-04-30 14:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: SRSG ENNIFAR PROVIDES UNMEE

Tags:  PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2116
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1198/01 1211407
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301407Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0455
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 2634
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 8981
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1745
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7350
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001198 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E , AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: SRSG ENNIFAR PROVIDES UNMEE
UPDATE

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto. Reason: 1.4 (B).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001198

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E , AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: SRSG ENNIFAR PROVIDES UNMEE
UPDATE

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto. Reason: 1.4 (B).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Acting Special Representative of the
Secretary General Azouz Ennifar told the diplomatic community

SIPDIS
on April 29 that the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and
Eritrea (UNMEE) was coming to an end and that all of the
contingent owned equipment would be shipped out of Eritrea
within weeks. Ennifar said that the fate of the UN owned
equipment was unclear. He briefed that the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) was divided over the fate of UNMEE
and that the April 22 consultations in New York had not
provided a clear way forward. UNMEE Addis Ababa Head of
Office Joseph Stephanides postulated that Eritrean President
Isaias' strategy was to push Ethiopia into withdrawing from
the Algiers Agreement to seal UNMEE's fate and claim victory
over the border decision. Regarding the Eritrea-Djibouti
border Dispute at Ras Doumeira, the French Ambassador briefed
that both governments appeared committed to avoiding
conflict, and that the French government was not sure what
the Djiboutian government wanted from them. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
MOVEMENT OF CONTINGENT OWNED EQUIPMENT TO MASSAWA UNDERWAY
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Ennifar opened by stating that UNMEE was "close to
the end." He said that all of the contingent owned equipment
(COE) would be in Massawa and shipped out of Eritrea within a
few weeks. Ennifar stated that the transportation of the COE
was proceeding smoothly and that the local contractors were
working out well. He noted the Eritrean government had given
the contractors 70,000 liters of fuel to move the containers
and vehicles. Ennifar said that the first ship would dock in
Massawa on April 29 or 30 and pickup the Jordanian equipment.
Several more ships would be arriving in Massawa within days.
The remaining 162-man rear party of Indian and Jordanian

troops would depart Eritrea once the equipment has been
shipped, leaving a small civilian staff behind. Ennifar
added that the Force Commander and his staff had relocated to
Addis Ababa.

--------------
FATE OF UN OWNED EQUIPMENT UNCLEAR
--------------


3. (C) Ennifar said that he did not know what would happen
to the UN owned equipment that remained in the Temporary
Security Zone (TSZ). The Eritrean government refused to take
responsibility for it and UNMEE had no access to the
equipment because the force is no longer allowed inside the
TSZ. UNMEE estimated the depreciated value of the equipment

SIPDIS
to be in between USD 2-3 million. He noted that most of the
equipment was infrastructure, living quarters, furniture, and
at least 75 large generators. All remaining satellite dishes
and other communication equipment had been removed or
disabled.

--------------
UN SECURITY COUNCIL DIVIDED OVER WAY FORWARD
--------------


4. (C) The UNSC is divided and the April 22 consultations
in New York had provided no clear way forward, according to
Ennifar. He said that the United States wanted to terminate
UNMEE by May 31, and that others on the council recognized
that UNMEE was coming to an end, but wanted to explore other
options first. He reminded the group that the Secretary
General's April 7 report laid out four options and noted
that, of the four options, Eritrea was never going to lift
its restrictions on UNMEE or accept a new mission. Regarding
a possible mission on only the Ethiopian side of the border,
he thought Ethiopia might consider it although he noted that
no formal proposal had been made to the Ethiopian government.


5. (C) Ennifar assessed that the UNSC had not decided on
UNMEE's future for two reasons. First, some UNSC members

ADDIS ABAB 00001198 002 OF 002


were preoccupied with the increased risk of war if UNMEE
left, and they did not want to assume responsibility for
pulling the mission out. Second, some members supported the
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) demarcation by
geographic coordinates decision (aka virtual demarcation)
while others did not. The Belgian Ambassador added that
there were two strong views in the council that have
"prohibited productive consensus," and that it was difficult
to come up with an inventive solution. The French Ambassador
said that his government supported the EEBC decision because
it is the only option, but that privately they felt that
virtual demarcation was "absolute stupidity." He added that
his government did not consider virtual demarcation to be the
end of the process.


6. (C) In response to a query, Ennifar said that the UN had
not made any determination on the validity of the virtual
demarcation decision. He said there were two opposing
schools of thought among legal scholars on this issue, and
that it was not the UN's place to make such a judgment.

--------------
ISAIAS' GRAND STRATEGY?
--------------


7. (C) UNMEE Addis Ababa Head of Office Stephanides
postulated that Isaias' strategy in maintaining a maximalist
position on the border--demanding UN Chapter VII action to
force Ethiopia to withdraw from the disputed territory and
insisting that the EEBC virtual demarcation decision
consummated the Algiers Agreement--was designed to force
Ethiopia to withdraw from the Algiers Agreement. In doing
so, Isaias would be able to discard some aspects of the
post-war fall-out he did not like, including the TSZ and
UNMEE, while holding on to a "legitimate" claim to Badme and
other areas to be "cashed in" sometime in the future.

--------------
UPDATE ON ERITREA-DJIBOUTI BORDER DISPUTE
--------------


8. (C) The French Ambassador, at Ennifar's request, briefed
that both Eritrea and Djibouti appeared committed to
resolving their border dispute through diplomatic means,
although he noted that both countries were acting
contradictory. He said that a few hundred Eritrean troops
were several hundred meters inside Djiboutian territory, and
not the 10-15 kilometers claimed by the Djiboutian
government. The Ambassador stated that Isaias and Djiboutian
President Guelleh had talked by phone and that generals from
each army had met. He said that the French government did
not really understand what the Djiboutian government wanted
from them and that there appeared to be a lack of
coordination between the civilian and security components of
the Djiboutian government. He added that the Ethiopian
government intended to keep a low profile on this issue. He
declined to speculate on Isaias' motives for the incursion.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) While Isaias' strategy over the border remains
unclear, we do assess that if the current trend continues
with no condemnation of UNMEE's expulsion and militarization
of the TSZ, the Ethiopian government's threat to withdraw
from the Algiers Accord may well be executed. While their
withdrawal would not necessarily presage conflict, it will
most certainly raise the temperature along an already
smoldering border. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO