Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ADDISABABA1001
2008-04-10 15:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: SRSG ENNIFAR ON THE FUTURE OF

Tags:  PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8877
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1001/01 1011505
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101505Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0260
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 2484
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001001 

SIPDIS

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E , AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: SRSG ENNIFAR ON THE FUTURE OF
UNMEE, BORDER UPDATE


Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto. Reason: 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001001

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E , AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: SRSG ENNIFAR ON THE FUTURE OF
UNMEE, BORDER UPDATE


Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto. Reason: 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. On April 8, Acting Special Representative
of the Secretary General Azouz Ennifar, United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Force Commander Major
General Mohammad Taisir Masadeh, and UNMEE Addis Ababa Head
of Office Joseph Stephanides briefed the Ambassador on the
Secretary General's new report on Ethiopia and Eritrea.

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Ennifar said that the report identified four options on a way
forward: first, Eritrea could lift its restrictions on UNMEE;
second, UNMEE could be terminated; third, a small observer
mission on the border could be established; and fourth,
liaison offices in Asmara and Addis Ababa could be
established. Ennifar warned, however, that if the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) did not react to Eritrea's
recent mistreatment of UNMEE, then Ethiopia would withdraw
from the Algiers Agreement. Force Commander General Taisir
reported that all UNMEE personnel except for a 164-man rear
party had departed Eritrea and he explained that the Eritrean
government, through the use of contractors, had agreed to
transport UNMEE's equipment to Massawa for shipment out of
the country. Ennifar and Taisir agreed that a UN observer
mission only on the Ethiopian side of the border would have
limited military value, but they emphasized that the risk of
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea would increase if there were
no UN presence on the border. Lastly, Taisir said that Bure,
in Sub-Sector East, had become a flashpoint because the
Eritrean military was extending its defensive works at night
and they were now within 100 meters of the Ethiopian lines.
END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
SYG REPORT IDENTIFIES FOUR OPTIONS ON WAY FORWARD
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Ennifar opened by stating that the Secretary

General's report on UNMEE's withdrawal from Eritrea had been
released and that it laid out four options on the way
forward. He said that: first, Eritrea could lift its
restrictions on UNMEE; second, UNMEE's mandate could be
terminated; third, a small observer mission could be
established; and fourth, liaison offices staffed by military
and civilian personnel could be established in Asmara and
Addis Ababa. He said that the UNSC was not of one mind on
what to do next and there appeared to be no sense of urgency
in dealing with this issue. He noted that the South Africans
wanted to delay any consultations until after the April 16
UNSC joint session with the African Union Peace and Security
Council in New York and the Italians did not see the need for
any consultations and instead wanted "to give something to
Eritrea." Ennifar agreed with the Ambassador that the border
was symptomatic of the larger issues between the two
countries and that a way must be found for the two to conduct
simultaneous border and normalization talks.


3. (C) Ennifar said that if the UNSC did not react strongly
to Eritrea's mistreatment of UNMEE and Eritrea's
militarization of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ),the
Ethiopian government would become angry and see no
alternative but to abandon the Algiers Agreement. He said
that Ethiopia was waiting to see what the Security Council
was going to do leading up to July when UNMEE's mandate will
end.


4. (C) Ennifar noted that the Eritrean government was
insisting that there be no more talk of demarcation, and any
such discussion hinted of an alternate mechanism to undermine
the boundary decision. Rather, he said, Eritrea was
demanding that the UN take action to remove Ethiopian troops
from the disputed territories. In Eritrea's view,
demarcation was no longer an issue because the
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) demarcation
decision by geographic coordinates had settled the boundary
issue once and for all.


5. (C) Stephanides opined that Eritrean President Isaias
had determined to remain firm on his hard-line stance to wait
until the next administration in Washington to "deal with the
Democrats." He said Isaias would remain inflexible and may

ADDIS ABAB 00001001 002 OF 003


even backtrack, but that Isaias would have to show his cards
in July when the UN would have to decide on UNMEE's future.
(Note: Stephanides, in a separate meeting with PolOff on
April 8, criticized the SYG's report noting that paragraph 49
undermined the possibility of establishing a mission on the
Ethiopian side of the border because it states that, "...such
a mission could be perceived by one party as freezing the
status quo and serving the interests of the other..." He
also noted that paragraph 51 would anger the Ethiopians
because it called into question Ethiopia's commitment to the
EEBC decision and that the report came dangerously close to
an endorsement by the SYG of the EEBC's demarcation by
geographic coordinates. Paragraph 51 notes that, "Ethiopia's
position that the demarcation coordinates determined by the
(EEBC) are invalid...raises questions about its commitment to
accept the final and binding status..." He emphasized that
any endorsement of the "virtual demarcation" by the UN would
drive the Ethiopians to leave the Algiers Agreement.)

--------------
ONLY 164 UNMEE PERSONNEL REMAIN IN ERITREA
--------------


6. (C) General Taisir said that only 164 UNMEE personnel
remained in Eritrea. He added that this number included a
small number of Indian and Jordanian troops who were tending
to their respective countries' equipment, but that those
Indian and Jordanian forces would leave Eritrea when their
equipment was shipped out.

-------------- --------------
ERITREAN GOVERNMENT TO MOVE UNMEE'S EQUIPMENT TO PORT
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Ennifar briefed that the Eritrean government had
agreed to transport all of UNMEE's equipment, through the use
of contractors, from Asmara to the port of Massawa for
shipment out of the country. He expected that the Indian and
Jordanian equipment would be shipped out sometime in May with
the UN's equipment to be shipped out sometime thereafter.
General Taisir added that he had successfully moved all of
the contingent equipment--including vehicles, arms, and
ammunition--to Asmara and Assab where it is being
containerized and made ready to ship. Ennifar said Eritrea
would rather allow contractors the fuel to move the equipment
than give fuel to UNMEE and allow UNMEE to move it
themselves. He added that the Eritrean commissioner to UNMEE
said that Eritrea wants nothing of UNMEE to remain behind and
that if UNMEE left anything behind the Eritrean government
would give it away rather than keep it.

-------------- --------------
OBSERVER MISSION ONLY IN ETHIOPIA OF LIMITED UTILITY, BUT...
-------------- --------------


8. (C) General Taisir remarked that a UN observer mission
only on one side of the border in Ethiopia would have limited
military value and Ennifar said that a mission only in
Ethiopia would be perceived by Eritrea as the UN siding with
Ethiopia. Taisir said that the observer's ability to see
into Eritrea was extremely limited because of the mountainous
terrain, but that if UNMEE had sophisticated intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment the force could be
more effective. Taisir said that Ethiopian Chief of Defense
(CHOD) General Samora was critical of a mission only in
Ethiopia, but Ennifar added that the Ethiopians probably
would accept an Ethiopia only mission if only as a gesture of
good will to the international community.

--------------
...THE RISK OF WAR WILL INCREASE ABSENT UNMEE
--------------


9. (C) Nevertheless, Ennifar and General Taisir agreed that
the risk of war will increase if there were no UN presence on
the border. General Taisir went on to assert that there
remained some utility in maintaining an observer presence at
the primary flashpoints of Humera, Badme, Mareb Bridge,
Tsorena, Zela Ambessa, and Bure. Taisir said that the risk

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ADDIS ABAB 00001001 003 OF 003


will increase because the armies are face to face and getting
closer, it was unclear how long both sides could support the
costly border deployments and mobilization, the flashpoints
are becoming more critical and tense, and there would be no
UN monitors to mediate incidents or conduct patrols. He
added that both sides were moving equipment and forces closer
to the border. Ennifar said that if Eritrea continues its
provocation at some point Ethiopia will respond, but that it
would not solve anything.

--------------
BURE AN EMERGING FLASHPOINT
--------------


10. (C) Lastly, General Taisir raised the issue of the
increasing tensions at Bure in Sub-Sector East where in the
last several weeks the Eritrean military had begun building
new trenches that were now within 100 meters of Ethiopian
trenches. Ennifar and Taisir agreed that Isaias was doing
this deliberately to test both UNMEE and Ethiopia to see how
far he could push and get away with it. Taisir said that the
Eritreans were digging the trenches at night, but that UNMEE
could not determine whether the new trenches were in
Ethiopia, as the Ethiopians maintained, or in Eritrea.
Taisir said he had asked Eritrea for permission for an UNMEE
patrol to cross the border at Bure and investigate the new
activity, but was denied. Taisir planned to raise this issue
with Ethiopian CHOD General Samora at the earliest
opportunity.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The Ethiopian government is becoming increasingly
frustrated with the lack of action on the part of the
international community and the UN Security Council. Prime
Minister Meles is demanding strong action on the part of the
UN to respond to Eritrea's continued and increasing
violations of the Algiers Agreement. If the UN does not deal
decisively with Eritrea's treatment of UNMEE and
militarization of the TSZ, and/or the UNSC endorses the
demarcation by geographic coordinates decision, then Prime
Minister Meles, under increasing pressure from within his own
party for action, probably will have little choice but to
abandon the Algiers Agreement in response. END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO